




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NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

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East Europe

JPRS-EER-92-091

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National Intelligence Service Chief Interviewed

92BA1008A Sofia POGLED in Bulgarian 4, 11 May 92

[Interview in two installments with General Brigo Asparukhov by Angelina Petrova; place and date not given: "According to Gen. Brigo Asparukhov, Director of the National Intelligence Service, the Bulgarian Spies Are Very Good Professionals, but That Is Not Very Good...."]

[4 May p 4]

[Text] [Petrova] In your opinion, why does the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] suddenly think the National Intelligence Service [NRS] must be taken from the president and put under the prime minister?

[Asparukhov] I would not say the SDS or anyone else thought of that all of a sudden. Who does not want to make use of the services of such a service, which is a bearer of valuable, reliable information? Naturally, all political forces strive for that. If the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] or the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] or I do not know who else has not expressed such a desire openly, that does not mean that it does not long for our service to inform them. The SDS insists that we pass to the executive power, that we be subordinate to the prime minister, as it assumes that the president also retains certain rights and control over its activity. It is expected that the prime minister nominate a director of the service. However, few people know that my designation as director of the service was at the proposal precisely of the prime minister, but from the previous Cabinet. On the basis of his proposal, President Dr. Zhelev issued a decree to name me. My rank of general was granted also at the proposal of the prime minister.

[Petrova] You were a colonel at the time?

[Asparukhov] I was a lieutenant colonel. It is good that you ask me. Speculations in that regard were made in the press, in May in DUMA, that ranks were being distributed freely, in particular to the director of the NRS. However, when they calculated how many years are required to receive the rank of colonel, in general it came out to 20. I have served for 22 years—that is, I should have become a colonel in September 1991. However, I was passed over, and I was named director of the NRS with the rank I had—lieutenant colonel. And, naturally, after that I became a general. My personal conviction is that the director of that service must have the rank of general. It does not matter if he is called Asparukhov or Dimitrov, Petrov or Ivanov.

[Petrova] In your opinion, what reasons are there for insisting that the NRS be subordinate to the prime minister?

[Asparukhov] It is the customary European practice. However, we have our own motives for wanting the NRS to be under the president. It is important how control over the activity of the intelligence service is accomplished. In West European countries, it works very

precisely, because of which the prime minister cannot use the service as he wants to. Parliamentary control does not permit exploitation or service for personal interests or for narrow party interests.

[Petrova] In your opinion, is there still any connection between the desire of the SDS members of parliament to shift the NRS to the executive branch and the scandal around "that list"? Surely it is not by accident that the scandal was first?

[Asparukhov] We learned about "that list" from the press. Officially, it was sent to us about a month after people began to talk about it—that is, on 11 March 1992. It was accompanied by a letter from Minister Sokolov, who wanted our opinion on whether the list contained names of our intelligence agents. We answered on the morning of 12 March. On 13 March, there was a meeting of the Consultative Council for National Security, at which precisely that problem was discussed.... The list has names of our intelligence agents, including almost all who are abroad. The goal of compiling it, in my opinion, was to have them called back from abroad. However, it is my conviction that that problem must be divided in two. One: Do the intelligence agents have to be returned? Categorically not! My motives: It is not important if the counterintelligence services in different countries know that our intelligence agent is an intelligence agent. It is more important that he be able to conceal his activities and sources of information with his professionalism. However, I have never been asked if the compilation of that list and the possible delivery thereof to a foreign embassy (there is talk of the Turkish Embassy in Sofia) is a crime. I maintain that, if that is so, the fact of the compilation of the list is a crime. Delivering it to the Turkish Embassy (if it is so) is not a crime; it is treason. The National Security Service [NSS] in the person of Chavdar Petkov did its work well: It explained the circumstances around the compilation of the list, and it limited the circle of compilers of the list. It is surprising that the prosecutor's office, which has to judge if the probable compilers of the list perpetrated that, is slow in doing that.

[Petrova] In a letter of 19 March to the president of the Parliamentary Commission on National Security, Chief Prosecutor Tatarchev reports that an inquiry has been instituted already.

[Asparukhov] However, more than a month later, it was clear that the prosecutor's office has the floor. But, if it judges that sufficient evidence has been gathered against the accused persons, the court will pronounce on the punishment for the crime committed.

[Petrova] Do you have information that "that list" actually went to Turkey?

[Asparukhov] We do not have such information. However, certain actions show it is possible that it is there.

[Petrova] What actions?

natural that different political forces wish to control the intelligence service. What could be better than having for yourself a service that can provide useful and valuable information for you, and that is very different from the information the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides? My deep conviction is that it is not the job of the intelligence service to give recommendations or recipes for solving problems. That is the job of the political leaders. The intelligence service has to acquire information, analyze it, and try to predict the processes.

[Petrova] Would you commit yourself to a prediction? Is a repeated Islamization of the Balkans a real possibility?

[Asparukhov] Scarcely anyone, be he the director of the intelligence service, would undertake to make such a prediction. I think that is a problem that should engage the attention of a serious team of scholars. Our service will happily provide them useful information. Some time ago, we were asked to explain what the Muslim presence in the Balkans is. We obtained interesting data. Approximately 4.5-5 million live in Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania. If we find any danger of a repeated Islamization of the region, it is in the unaltered strategic policy of Turkey with respect to that population. That process has to be observed very attentively and very closely.

[Petrova] Is the expansion of Turkish capital now in Bulgaria a part of that strategic policy?

[Asparukhov] That there is such an expansion is unquestionable. We have to assess whose interests that capital serves. The national interests of Turkey only or of foreigners.

[Petrova] Is it possible that they also serve foreign interests but only because they coincide with Turkish interests?

[Asparukhov] It is possible, and it is natural for it to be so. A lot of foreign capital is invested in Turkey. In my opinion, the economic boom in our neighbor is due not only to the correct and efficacious economic policy of the government. The results show that unquestionably it is carrying out a good policy. On the other hand, clearly it is being helped by someone's foreign interests, for the sake of which they are investing good capital in Turkey. For the time being, the attention of Turkey toward the Balkans is deflected from the Asiatic (former Soviet) republics. Some of the Turkish activities there are creating unrest among the European governing circles. That also is a serious process that we have to observe attentively.

[Petrova] Were you surprised by the expulsion of your people from the Foreign Ministry, or was there any preliminary discussion about that between you and Stoyan Ganev?

[Asparukhov] There were preliminary discussions at the end of last year in which he clearly expressed the wish for a limit to our presence in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad, but in no case our complete removal. At the

beginning of April of this year, without being notified ahead of time, the employees of the NRS simply were handed orders for cessation of their labor relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—that is, for dismissal. Many of the facts already are known in the press, and I would not want to discuss the chronology of affairs at length. Simply the policy of *fait accompli* was applied. In the same way, almost all of our employees working abroad as diplomats also received notification to return to Bulgaria, some by 30 April, others by 31 May of this year. I am trying to accept things reasonably and calmly, but clearly I recognize that the consequences of these actions will be harmful for our national security and the interests of the country.

[Petrova] And from Turkey?

[Asparukhov] Including from the Balkan countries.

[Petrova] And Bulgaria will not have an intelligence service?

[Asparukhov] I do not think there are sober-minded people who are convinced that Bulgaria does not need to have an intelligence service.

[Petrova] And who will work in the intelligence service?

[Asparukhov] Good professionals are working in the intelligence service now. However, the problem is that, because of the incessant attacks against us on the part of different political forces and the insecurity that exists among the employees, good professionals are leaving us and, because of the low, almost under-zero, image of the surface, it is difficult to find candidates to work with us. We are looking for people with higher educations, who must know one or two foreign languages. We want new recruits, but it is more and more difficult for us to find those who wish to work in the NRS. We lack stability and confidence. This may lead to destruction of the intelligence service.

[Petrova] Didn't you react to these attacks to eliminate the service?

[Asparukhov] Yes, in a proper way.

[Petrova] It appears that it was without result.

[Asparukhov] On the contrary. On the part of the president, Dr. Zhelev, we have full understanding. In the final analysis, I believe that we will succeed in convincing the others of the incorrectness of the decision to recall our intelligence agents from abroad because the national interests are much more important than the desire for this service to be controlled for a capricious reason.

[Petrova] Did the NRS present to Minister Stoyan Ganev information that was unpleasant for him to read?

[Asparukhov] I do not remember. However, in the recent past, he had information that did not go down well, and that is why workers from the service were punished. There

were several cases of recall from abroad and dismissal. They held us responsible for the fact that we reported evaluations of the governing circles abroad for political leaders in our country. In the Central Committee of the BCP, they did not like to receive information containing the truth about the so-called revival process. But an intelligence agent always has to say the truth, not a goal-directed or misleading truth but objective truth.

[Petrova] In fact, why do we need to have an intelligence service if almost all countries are our friends already?

[Asparukhov] There is no country in the world that could allow itself the luxury of not having an intelligence service. Intelligence is a mandatory element of national sovereignty. It is necessary to acquire information that will be useful for making foreign policy and internal policy decisions by any government.

[Petrova] For you to be liked by the ruling circles, did it not cross your mind for you to think of some story like "Telephonegate" from the past year? The former deputy director of the NRS, Radoslav Raykov, really hoped that he would win many points for himself through it, but, it did not help him to avoid the recent second retirement.

[Asparukhov] I cannot say if the so-called Telephonegate was fabricated or not. This case is from before I was named director. I do not know who wanted to be liked by whom. For me it is not important who likes you. I am interested in making the intelligence service useful for state information and to function normally.

[Petrova] Is Radoslav Raykov the inventor of Telephonegate?

[Asparukhov] It is very difficult to make such an accusation; evidence both pro and con is needed. Possibly, Mr. Raykov himself could answer this question.

[Boxed item: In the previous issue, the interviewer allowed a troublesome error: The chief prosecutor, Tatarchev, reported in a letter of 23 April that an inquiry had been set up, and not from 14 March, as is written.]

Opposition Groups, Publications Denounced

92BA1006A Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian
25 May 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Encho Mutafov: "The Mafia: A State Within the State"]

[Text] The ominous word "mafia" is intruding more and more into the lexicon of our daily social life. Until recently, it was pronounced with contempt: It was used as a name for the Bulgarian Communist Party/Bulgarian Socialist Party (BCP/BSP). Now it is pronounced with amazement: It is used to name a new coalition against democracy and Bulgarian national life. Our newly fledged mafia fulfills an ancient scenario. It is drawing together people who previously were socially and civilly one against another. One of the ways it was able to become strong is that it was able to make quite a number of deals in secret and undisturbed. The incubation

period began with companies and banks and extended into the media, and ultimately the mafia expanded with the labor unions.

The emergence from the incubation period took place at the crucial moment of our new history: the return of the land and privatization. In the countryside, the communist mastodon relied on "the rural war" at the time of the dismantling of its stronghold, the labor cooperative farm (TKZS). In the city, it relied on the mafia: the seizure of the large business establishments and the manipulation of society.

The conclusion of the incubation is being signaled with an open sign: pretensions to the government. The mafia no longer hides its goals: to push the buttons of the government, to prevent it from being held accountable for money and deals, and to dominate in privatization. Only the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], its leadership, and its journal stand in the way of the mafia.

The conflict in Bulgarian society has shifted.

While the BSP (communist), the scenario writer of the new mafia, was a state equal to the state, the executor of the scenario is a state within the state. The first mafia was possible under Communist totalitarianism. The second, under posttotalitarianism. With the strengthened democracy, it will be hindered, the structures of the government and the society will work against it, and, therefore, the newly fledged parvenus are in a hurry.

The 45-year-old mafia was unambiguous: the red servant of the Soviet regime and the executioner of its people. In the second mafia, the color is diluted. It applauds private business and flourishes a sword against the SDS and the BSP (communist). Its skeletons are primarily the cons of concrete heads of the first mafia, which developed with the people's money under special conditions and in large centers of the world, which swallowed up information on how to do this and that. The fathers were blindly loyal to their mafia, the sons felt stifled there—they wanted their own mafia. They did not want only to curse the West and to copy it, they wanted to be West. Particularly impatient, now it turns out there were those who knew a great amount from the services. Valentin Mollov, an official in a ministry, woke up one morning with millions; he himself made no secret of his participation in these services.

Life discarded communism, but mother-mafia, with her more adroit spies, high-ranking officials, and diplomats, prepared the conditions for a new type of mafia: initially latent and then open plundering of the country. In a few years, they plundered 10 billion. Naturally, they extended outward. From our newspaper, you know the names of a fair number of its handsome fellows.

Now the readers really understand why the radicalism of the changes is a poison for their secret ambitions. They

attacked those who are the most hated by the neomafiosi in a cartoon in 168 CHASA: the prime minister, the leader of the parliamentary group of the SDS, the president of the parliament, and the editor in chief of DEMOKRATSIYA.

While the SDS has made all efforts to renew the country, the mafiosi are embezzling from within. While the SDS has made all efforts to renew the country, the mafiosi are embezzling from within. While the SDS is struggling to extricate the country from the catastrophe, into which the mafia-mother put it, the new parvenus are dividing it up among themselves. Some are embezzling from business deals, others from the workers, and still others from the social conscience, all together—money, money, and still more money, and now they are hanging like vultures over the dying enterprises.

The grouping of the mafia already is open. They named themselves a state within the state. They said that they will operate subject to one principle. As far as I know, the mafia acts this way: the compulsory imposition of one principle that crushes all the rest. For the sake of the guiding principle, moral, social, and national principles are eliminated. Previous differences also are eliminated, rough places are smoothed out, and people who earlier would have walked past each other, even in the Sahara, shake hands affectionately.

Didn't you see? People such as Trenchev and Mollov (I will not list the others), who played opposite roles in the Zhivkov regime, are banding together. Just the other day some spoke of each other in vulgar language that would make a wagon driver blush. Trenchev said for Krust'yo Petkov "to blow him"—it reached the nastiest disgrace, that "two Gypsies beat" the professor. Now the doctor and the professor, compassionate defenders of the workers, are nestled together. But no one should think that the two defenders of the workers of Bulgaria have settled their differences over a glass of *rakiya* [brandy]. No, it is simply the law of the mafia!

I know little about Krusto Petkov. But I know more about the former dissident and anticommunist Trenchev, now standing against the SDS intimate with the mafia. Some call him a psychopath. I cannot repeat these words because I do not have a medical degree, but I do have documentation of his "trade union" activity. However, his megalomania and psychological imbalance breathe from his every word and step. I can share my personal impressions of the "Panorama" broadcast. There the doctor disturbed everyone. He stood, he sat, he waved his arms at the radio station for the bodyguards, he entered and left the room with a direct broadcast. And all the people there were guarded, and also committed to social and political life—the three leaders of the political forces and the two ministers. They sat quietly and waited for their turn, they endured the paranoia of this, apparently, truly sick man. It is not by accident that such a contrast in behavior flourishes in him: a mask of firmness and fear of denunciation and removal from Podkrepa.

Dear fellow citizens, we regularly inform you and make commentaries about this mafia. It is good that you understand what their guiding principle consists of and what it eliminates. This elimination gives birth to arrogance, aggressive style, and threats. Something strange will give birth to even more evil things.

Recently, I read an article by one of the bosses, Mollov. I never had a good opinion about this man, even before I knew what he was doing. My profession as a critic apparently has sharpened my feeling for people and gestures. Even before he says something, he gives off an air of mediocrity, protected with money. From this unrestrained article, I had the feeling that I was not hearing the words of a businessman (what would they have been from the true businessman, useful for the country and for himself, from a millionaire!), but of a teenager with a complex. Is it by accident that his newspapers from the press group use such degraded, unpardonable, and cynical language? Is it by accident that he copied the most pitiful newspapers of the West and that they titillate insatiable lusts of our tortured people; that, except for their patrons, they do not respect anything from this country; that with their journalistic lies and the next day's comic modifications they have acquired another name: the lying shepherd boy. Do not deceive yourself into thinking that this is a lack of professionalism. This is a style! On purpose, fixed—a style of those who have joined Zhivkov's mafia (some of them also good public servants), and who now walk around, brazenly, and who sensed when pockets were full and ready to be picked.

I will not say a word about Postfactum, another branch of the Raychev clan, simply because it disgusts me....

In spite of the risk, it was time for some one to stand up to their financial power and their other powers, to say: This mafia is a threat to the national life of Bulgaria! The journalists from the newspaper VESTNIK and I personally recognize the danger: Because it is a mafia, it will act as a mafia against all who oppose it. Their predecessors handled this in one way, the mutant in another. Except that today the situation is different. How?

Half of the people, guarded by the SDS and Podkrepa and other anticommunist parties and sentiments, stood against the first mafia. No matter how it mimicked and frightened the people, the BSP(k) was explicit, and the relationship to it also. The newly fledged heir was not so explicit for many people. It deceived society with a tale of private business and initiative. The presumptuous leaders of Podkrepa pushed the people toward angry strikes. The mafia diluted its image with maneuvering. Only the SDS, the government, and the newspaper DEMOKRATSIYA actually stood against it. That is why we are so hated by the mafiosi; that is why they invest funds without restraint for opposition and discreditization.

However, while we are opposed to them, that does not mean that we are against all dialogue. On the contrary.

Social dialogue is our desire. Neither overestimating them nor underestimating them. We know well that any association not based on many human and socially useful principles but on a single, crude, arbitrary, and aggressive principle is not permanent. We still know that Podkrepa is Podkrepa, that it will be such even without Trenchev. And that private initiative will produce true fruits, not Mollovskian ones.

I know that democracy already is a law of life and will overcome its obstacles. You cannot fight a law of life.

New Tariffs, Antitrust Provisions Explained

92BA1038A Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 13 May 92 p 5

[Article by Prof. Lyuben Berov: "Raise the Lath in Front of the Loyal Competition"]

[Text] In February of this year, the Council of Ministers passed a resolution that directed the Ministry of Finance to prepare a new customs tariff for imported goods. It was supposed to go into effect on 1 May of this year, but a supplementary resolution delayed the date until 1 July. This repeals the customs tariff now in effect in accordance with Decree No. 121 in DURZHAVEN VESTNIK No. 26 of 1991, which changed the tariff in accordance with Decree No. 81 of 1981 with somewhat later supplements and modifications. In contrast to the traditional extensive discussion of the normative acts for the Bulgarian customs tariff during the period 1878-1944, the change now passes without any particular commentaries in the Council of Ministers and without any commentaries in the press and on the radio. This cannot be accepted as justified, when we consider the great, many-sided significance of this tariff.

In the first place, the tariff is a customs barrier that more or less protects the interests of Bulgarian producers of industrial and agricultural products in the internal market at prices above the world market. This means it is possible (although differently for different commodities) for Bulgarian enterprises to be able to exist, in spite of the fact that they operate at a high cost because of outmoded or ineffective equipment, lack of initiative and interest on the part of the managers, inefficient organization of labor with an excess labor force, and so forth. The artificial (favoring the prevention of foreign competition) retention of such inefficient, costly production from a purely economic point of view is inefficient, but, given the great unemployment in the country, it is justified from a social point of view because it saves many unprofitable enterprises from bankruptcy and protects a large number of jobs.

However, on the other hand, one must not forget that almost every increase in import duties means a possibility for the local producers to sell at higher prices equal to the international market price plus the duty. This, to one degree or another, means reaching into the pockets of all consumers, who will pay higher prices. This gives another boost to the inflation in the country, connected with the increase in the price index and a further

devaluation of the Bulgarian lev. Such changes in the level of import duties are a very contradictory measure of the economic policy; they create advantages, or at least advantages for part of the society, and harm the interests of the other, no smaller, part of the population.

In this situation, the answer to the question of the general purpose of the customs tariff is very important. In essence, it is based on a tendency to increase or decrease the duty. The new tariff is already printed as an official publication of the Ministry of Finance and may be compared with the tariff of December 1980 with respect to individual commodities (which almost was not changed with the modification of December 1990). In the following comparison, the first two numbers give the percent of the tariff during 1980-90 in the case of an import from a preferentially treated developing country and an import from a country that avails itself of the provision of so-called most favored nation, and the following two numbers reflect the taxation according to the new tariff of 1992 in the case of imports from the same two groups of countries.

Particularly indicative are the changes in the case of agricultural products, where the increase of the percent of the duty is as follows: live animals from 0 to 11-15 percent; pork from 8-16 to 20-25 percent; mutton from 4-10 to 11-15 percent; meat from domestic fowl from 7.5-15 to 20-25 percent; cream from 7.5-15 to 30-40 percent; fresh eggs from 8-16 to 30-40 percent; fish from 1.5-3 to 7-10 percent; potatoes from 10-20 to 30-40 percent; onions from 4-8 to 20-25 percent; peanuts from 7-14 to 30-40 percent; and so forth. (There are also cases with a smaller degree of increase.)

There is less of an increase in the case of the products of the food, wine, and tobacco industries, where cases of a large or moderate increase of the duties are encountered rarely, and a small increase or even preservation of the status quo predominates. However, in the case of construction materials, there is only a great increase in the duties (for example, cement from 6.2-7.7 to 20-25 percent, marble from 5-6.2 to 20-25 percent, gypsum from 0 to 11-15 percent, and so forth). Petroleum and coal, which earlier were duty free, are slightly taxed at 3-5 percent. In the case of gasoline and lubricating oils, the increase in the duty is approximately five times. In the case of chemical products, the cases of a double to triple increase in the percent of the import duty predominate. The situation is similar in the case of the leather and fur industry; the textile, shoe, and jewelry industries; cellulose and paper products; metal finishing; metallurgy; watchmaking; musical instruments; and so forth. In machine construction, optics, the manufacturing of children's toys, medical apparatus, and so forth, there also are great increases, but an increase in the percent of the duty of 1.2 to 2 times predominates. The scope of this article does not permit a more detailed analysis according to groups of commodities.

If we summarize the comparison of the percent of the customs taxation in the case of 120 groups of commodities in 1980 and 1992, we find that in 64 groups we have a great increase of over two times, in 24 groups a moderate degree of increase, in 17 groups a slight increase, in six groups approximate retention of the level of taxation, and in nine groups, as an exception, there was a certain reduction in the duties. The general conclusion in this situation is that the new tariff is oriented toward a significant general increase in the import duties, which actually means a change toward a protectionist policy in contradiction to our desire for Bulgaria to be accepted in GATT. It is possible that budgetary considerations are the basis for this significant increase in the duties because the revenues from duties are a sure source of revenues for the budget. However, whatever the direct motives for this increase in the import duties are, it cannot be accepted as justified to make these important decisions of economic policy without a wider—at least official, if not mass-media—discussion of the contradictory consequences. In this case, we are continuing, as before November 1989, to forget that, in 1878-1944, the decisions for changing the customs tariff were made not by decrees of the Council of Ministers but by law by the National Assembly.

Provisions of New Labor Code Discussed

92BA1033A Sofia VEK 21 in Bulgarian 20 May 92 p 5

[Interview with Iliyan Shotlekov, vice president of the Labor and Social Security Commission, by Boryana Tsacheva; place and date not given: "The Labor Legislation Will Become Increasingly More Liberal"]

[Text] [Tsacheva] Mr. Shotlekov, the Law for Modifying and Supplementing the Labor Code was passed prior to day of the first reading [of the new law itself]. Why are these changes needed?

[Shotlekov] The need for changes in the Labor Code has existed for a long time. The draft legislation now being considered has been ready for a year and a half, and I cannot understand why it did not succeed in entering the full session until today. The old code was made for an economy that endorsed the socialistic organization of labor, a centrally regulated economy, in which labor relations were definitively determined by the law itself. There were a large number of compulsory legal standards that controlled these relations. The possibility for the parties to negotiate something different from what the law provided was small. Also there were a number of formulations—self-government of the labor collectives, which at the time was modern but that, in general, did not begin to work; the collective labor agreement, a system that also did not work (Chapter 4 of the Labor Code), was thought up; the transfer of state functions to the labor unions. Moreover, with the change in the economic situation in the country, the Labor Code began to be an obstacle to the creation of a free labor market.

[Tsacheva] What are the basic changes the Law for Modifying and Supplementing the Labor Code envisions?

[Shotlekov] First, we can talk about a change in the principles—self-government, the ornamental standards for the obligation to work, for the right to work, and so forth, are eliminated. Tripartism is introduced as a basic principle for regulating labor relations. The draft legislation also solves the question of freedom of negotiation between the employees and the employers. This is achieved on two planes. First, by the collective labor agreement (Chapter 4 is entirely new), which makes it possible for the workers represented by the labor unions to settle all those relations they find to be good and that do not contradict the compulsory standards of the law. Second, by the liberalization of the conditions of the individual labor agreement and, first of all, the possibility for the parties to come to an agreement about more favorable working conditions. Another thing the Labor Code changes is the liberalization of the termination of the legal work relationship, which also is expressed in two directions—by the elimination of the permits the labor unions granted when some people were fired for the reasons indicated in the law, and with the expansion of the legal principles of unilateral firing on the part of the business. I have in mind Article 328. In my opinion, we still cannot completely reject the principle of legal permanency of firings and to move to complete liberal conditions because, at this stage, it may result in an uncontrolled number of reasons for firing, and a large-scale expulsion of workers from the establishments will be stimulated. A very important feature in the draft law is that it sets up a specialized agency for monitoring the compliance with labor legislation, which will be the Labor Inspectorate. Only the signalling functions will be left for the labor unions.

[Tsacheva] This will mean reduction of the legal authority of the labor unions, won't it?

[Shotlekov] The legally established rights of the labor unions are reduced. However, at the same time, the mechanism of the collective labor agreement is created. That is, if there is an agreement between the employer and the employees represented by the labor unions, part of the rights of the labor unions, which up to now were definitively specified by the Labor Code, may be transferred to the collective labor agreements. Then they are mandatory for the employer. We believe that this must be put on a contract basis and that the labor union, insofar as the correctness of firings is concerned, must not have the right to control this if there is no explicit contract with the employer. The labor dispute commissions, which were composed of nonprofessionals, also are abolished. Also there are changes in the chapter on labor discipline. Some of the disciplinary punishments are eliminated. An attempt was made to introduce fines as punishment, but this idea did not receive enough votes in the commission and will be resolved in the full session. A warning of firing is viewed as an alternative from the point of view of the present unemployment.

[Tsacheva] Mr. Sholekov, wouldn't it be easier to create a new Labor Code instead of remaking the old one?

[Sholekov] No, because a Labor Code takes a long time, and there must be a clear concept of it. Also, there is the problem of whether it is necessary to have a Labor Code such as there is in France and Italy, or if there should be a great number of laws, as in the case of Germany and several other countries. In the transitional stage in which we find ourselves, we also need a transitional normative act that will retain part of the principles that existed up to now, in order to prevent the very severe blow, and that has undesirable consequences, which will be directed against a part of the people. This law could be used

within the framework of several years, while privatization is gaining speed and real owners are being created. In the future, the labor legislation of Bulgaria will become increasingly liberal.

[Tsacheva] Nevertheless, do you see any disadvantages in the legislation being considered?

[Sholekov] The defect of our labor legislation is the fact that we are trying to solve social security problems by means of regulating labor relations. The picture is backwards. We should have tried to have labor relations be regulated by the Labor Code, and social relations be regulated by social legislation.

Otto von Habsburg on Hungary's Joining EC*92CH0686A Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 21 May 92 p 3*

[Article by Zoltan Liskay: "Joining Europe With Habsburg Help"]

[Text] Yesterday, Dr. Otto Habsburg, president of the European Parliament, held a press conference in parliament on the third day of his visit to Hungary. As he said, this sixth and latest visit of his delegation can be regarded as a milestone in the process of which the ultimate goal is the acceptance of our country into the peoples of a United Europe.

The delegation, which was created within the organization of the European parliament largely because of his persistence, will dissolve itself and become a joint commission soon after the treaty on Hungarian association is ratified. The first task of the joint commission will be to ensure a legal framework for the cooperation between the Hungarian parliament and the European parliament, which has already become concrete. Incorporation of the treaty on Hungarian association into law and establishment of the joint commission are expected during the first third of 1993.

The fact that Hungary has received a green light from Europe is at least as much justified as welcome, said Otto Habsburg: "Our country has always been European. External forces are responsible for its temporary isolation," he said, and then he pointed out that, in spite of everything, our people do not have to be ashamed of the past. "Hungary gave the death sentence to communism in 1956," he stated. Otto Habsburg said the present peace, political stability, and interest in international capital are at least as important from the point of view of European unification. "Hungary has the best possible international reputation."

Outlining the process of complete integration, he characterized the status of our country as in line for acceptance after Austria, Switzerland, Malta, Sweden, and Finland.

Speaking of concrete questions, he also took a position on the Bos [Gabcikovo]-Nagymaros dispute. According to his statement, the European Parliament, already before the previous elections, expressed its concerns on seeing the plans, which involve incalculable environmental destruction and are reminiscent of Stalinist megalomania. In regard to solution of the problem in the name of the European Parliament, he agreed with the Hungarian recommendation: A neutral international commission should be entrusted with the decision-making role.

Progress Report on Return of Church Property*92CH0655A Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
4 Jun 92 pp 1, 7*

[Article by Andras Varga: "Church Property: Only With Patience"]

[Text] Emotions have been aroused around demands for the return of a few church properties, but, all in all, implementation of Law No. 32 of 1991 regarding the return of former church property has begun nicely and quietly. The big question is whether there will be enough money in the budget for the necessary compensations.

Let's look first of all at the numbers: By the end of November 1991, requests for the return of 6,200 pieces of property had been received from 13 churches by the Department of Church Affairs in the Ministry of Education and Public Instruction, of which in some 3,200 cases it was found that the requests were in harmony with the law, and the return process was begun. In the other 3,000 cases, either additional information was requested or the church concerned was informed that the scope of the law did not cover their request. More than half of the requests submitted were from the Catholic Church and its monastic orders, about 2,400 from the Reformed Church, 450-500 from the Evangelical [Lutheran] Church, and 80-90 from the Israelite [Jewish] Congregation, while the remaining 200 were divided among smaller churches.

Work has begun on the 3,200 requests, and this number has grown to 3,500 through supplements submitted since then. First the ministry recorded at the land office a 10-year-prohibition against selling or encumbering the properties. Then they asked the municipalities and the churches to begin working out agreements in accordance with the law. Since notification of those interested took place in March, and the deadline for making the agreements is 90 days, if all the extensions are taken, information on the local decisions should be back to the ministry by the end of June.

The Key: Function

By 25 May, some 600-620 agreements had arrived at the department. These suggest that about 50 percent of the cases were handled at the local level. About 280 agreements came back in which agreement was reached, but on condition of compensation for the municipality; that is, the municipality must be compensated with state property (from the KVSZ [expansion unknown]) or with money, in order to provide space for the activity of the institution that is now located in the property to be returned to the church. (In a few cases there was a total lack of agreement between the two sides, so in these cases a committee of the government and the church will decide.)

There is impatience on both sides. This frequently arises from a lack of understanding of the law. On one side, voices can be heard saying that if the church property

could be taken away in a single day, why wait years for it to be returned? Why doesn't the order get back the whole building, why only a single hallway, since it will guarantee the institutions operating there that they can stay up to 10 years. Some orders would do this free of charge; some have recommended the same thing for a rental fee.

On the other side, the principle question formerly was why the church is an exception. Why is its property being reprivatized? This is heard more rarely now because a single reading of the law makes it clear that there is no thought of that. But questions can be heard during negotiations, such as why give the churches schools that are already being supported from the budget, including some that are partly or completely supported by municipalities? Why does the school belong to the church? So that it gets the honor while the municipalities are forced to take responsibility for the basic costs—such as instruction—according to the law on municipalities?

In the law on returning church property, there is, in addition to a certain remedy for the legal damages suffered by the churches, an emphasis on creating material conditions for them to be able to function. The key word is "function." A piece of property can be requested to be returned if it is needed for the church, order, or congregation to restart its work. Also, if they undertake to accomplish certain tasks in instruction, education, health, social work, protection of children and youths, and culture (for example, maintaining museums). The law gives a possibility for the church to receive property in exchange. Property can be taken over along with the activity that goes on there, if they undertake to continue it.

Residents' Demands

The law does not cover church properties in which income-producing activity took place, or in which they now desire to do such work. For example, a charitable order—and this is a real example—that requests return of the former building of the order in which the municipality still maintains a home for the aged will receive back only a portion of the building if it does not feel strong enough to undertake this function. And if in a few years it grows stronger and is able to maintain the home for the aged, it can then request return of the rest of the building.

An important point in the determination is whether there is a social need for the function that the church wants to provide. In the case of instruction, this can be measured most simply in this way: Do the parents want to send their children to a church school? For example, in Miskolc, churches asked for four of the six high schools to be returned; however, only 300 parents stated that they wanted to send their child to a church school. For this reason, the "new" church high school settled into one building of one of the schools. In one small village, 60 percent of the elementary-school students attended religion classes, but the parents still did not ask for one of their schools to be returned to church control.

We can take as a counter-example Mezokovesd, where almost all the parents asked that one of the schools be Catholic. Finally, a total of 13 students and four teachers transferred to the other school in the village.

But the Mezokovesd example must be mentioned for another reason as well. The municipality had applied for support to build a gymnasium for the school. It planned to provide its own labor, and if in the meantime the school had not become church property, it could receive 10 million forints in support from parliament. The city council also undertook to help the church in providing the labor, but the laws did not permit the application to be continued. In the end, in this case, a few citizens, those who are students at the school, became second-class citizens.

So if making some institution a church institution satisfies the demands of the residents, then the question of why this institution receives state and possibly municipal support is basically a false one. On the other hand, the question of what happens if the church, for objective or subjective reasons, cannot fulfill the function it has undertaken is completely justified. For example, what if it closes the home for the aged and sells the building for commercial purposes? The churches' answer is this: They are institutions based on morals, and they would never do such a thing. The answer of the officials in the ministry is this: They have to make agreements that give long-range guarantees.

By a decision of the Budapest City Council last week, the Apathy Hospital will be returned to the Reformed Church. A worry in this case is whether in its new status the hospital will be able to further develop the areas of specialization that have made it famous up to now. Ivan Platthy, director of the Department of Church Affairs in the ministry, answered this in a forum for municipalities: In practice, nothing will change in this area. The hospital will still have access to public funds, as it did before. The doctors and patients will remain the same. But they will get one plus: whatever the church can offer. And this applies to all similar examples. He mentioned among these that in Alsoszentmarton, an almost entirely Gypsy village in southern Trans-Danubia, the local municipality and the Gypsy ministers created a Gypsy kindergarten. In Soltvadkert, the Lutheran Church started a German kindergarten. In God, the Piarists have a training school in the former MHSZ [Hungarian Federation for National Defense] school.

Goodwill?

Of course, there are counter-examples. It is enough to refer to the emotions aroused by the Deak Square elementary school, or the Zuglo church school, which has not yet been established, or the Radnot Gymnasium. "Who will take care of the building that, according to the present agreement between the municipality and the church—let us assume—will be returned to some church congregation in 1998?" This seemingly very simple question was asked by one of the workers in the Budapest

Mayor's Office. Really, who will take care of it? The church will not do it yet, but it will certainly get last place on the municipality's list when there is little money. In the meantime it will fall to pieces.

But the main question is: While the unresolved cases are being considered—and many of them involve hidden tensions between the two sides—limited budget resources will determine compensations to the municipalities. Even the law only prescribes that every year funds must be provided for at least 5 percent of the unresolved cases. This year the budget set aside 1.1 billion forints for purposes of compensation. This, according to estimates, will be enough for about 20-25 cases. Knowing the number of compensation cases so far, there will be a need to multiply this number many times in coming years. Implementation of the 10-year law will thus depend on the national economic situation and the "goodwill" of the members of parliament.

[Box, p 7]

Today in Hungary there are 42 sects and 63 monastic orders in operation. According to paragraph 23 of Law No. 32 of 1991, the parliament is to pass a separate law for the material conditions needed for their operations that are not regulated by this law. This work has already begun. The recommendation is expected to be presented to the parliament at the beginning of next year. The Ministry of Education and Public Instruction has requested recommendations from churches and parliamentary groups, and they have studied international examples as well. As Ivan Platthy, director of the Department of Church Affairs, said, the task is to make the churches completely independent of the state, but at the same time to guarantee their ability to function financially. For this, it seems the Italian and German examples should be followed: People can freely control a portion of their personal income taxes, and they themselves decide whether this amount goes to some church, to the state, or to some social purpose.

The Hungarian churches received 1,931,500,000 forints in 1992 as state support. Of this, 980 million was for support of operations and religious life; 731.5 million was earmarked for renovation of church property and support of investment development. Of the operational support, 640 million went to the Catholic Church, 190 million to the Reformed Church, 60 million to the Evangelical [Lutheran] Church, 55 million to the Israelite [Jewish] congregation, and 35 million to other churches and congregations.

[Box, p 7]

The number of elementary-school students in Hungary is 1.5 million; there are about 500,000-600,000 students in the high schools. Presently the churches have 14 kindergartens, 21 elementary schools, 26 high schools, and 20 colleges. Religion classes are conducted by 14 churches in more than 30,000 groups of students; this reaches some 600,000 children.

Constitutional Court Justices Described

92CH0686B Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian
28 May 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by Andras Sereg: "Another Power Test for Constitutional Judges"]

[Text] *The Constitutional Court is facing a difficult test of power, but this is not the first one in its two and a half years of existence. The constitutional judges will have the task of giving guidance by interpreting the law—as they say—on a serious constitutional question. In the following article, we shall introduce the members of this body.*

Perhaps few people know that the constitutional judges have as many rights as the other members of the government; for example, the president of the Constitutional Court has as many rights as the prime minister, and the other members of the court have as many rights as the ministers, and, in addition, they have the privileges that various legal provisions grant to the ministers.

The first five constitutional judges were chosen on 23 November 1989 by the parliament. Laszlo Solyom and Janos Zlinszky were nominated by the then opposition; Antal Adam and Geza Kilenyi by the Hungarian Socialist (Workers) Party; and Pal Solt by the independent organizations. Laszlo Solyom became the leader of the body, with the rank of vice president. Following the parliamentary elections, an additional five members of the court were sworn in: Geza Herczegh, Tamas Labady, Peter Schmidt, Odon Tersztyanszky, and Imre Voros, and a few weeks later, Andras Szabo, who took the place of Pal Solt, who had been elected president of the Supreme Court.

The president of the body is 50-year-old Laszlo Solyom, who in past decades had become well-known not only as a civilian lawyer but also as a defender of the environment.

The president is a reserved, relaxed legal person, who has trained himself during the last two years to be a thoughtful politician.

"Concrete experiences make me say that it is better to wait for the hysteria to quiet down," he said to our paper in November of last year.

The vice president of the Constitutional Court is 64-year-old academician Geza Herczegh, who as a historian of diplomacy also has plenty of diplomatic sensitivity. The oldest member of the body is 66-year-old Peter Schmidt. One of the best constitutional lawyers in the country, he taught for four decades in the Law Faculty of the University of Budapest. The two constitutional judges chosen as Socialist nominees, 62-year-old Antal Adam and the 56-year-old Geza Kilenyi, along with Imre Voros (48) and Janos Zlinszky (64), have made their mark in the so-called "genre of differing opinions." Voros, in particular, knows how to be strict, as when, in

those days, he "tore apart" the law on restitution, which was hissed at even by the judges who have lived through a lot.

The two former civilian judges, 48-year-old Tamas Labady and 63-year-old Odon Tersztyanszky, have spent relatively little time in the limelight. As they tell it, both of them are uncommitted independents, and therefore

with their very bold decisions they attracted the attention of those who were doing the nominating two years ago, and they received unanimous support in the parliamentary committee that investigated them. Neither is Andras Szabo, a specialist in criminal law, one of those prominent judges. He prepared the draft decision regarding the Zetenyi law. The 62-year-old constitutional judge was reelected this week as president of the Hungarian Criminology Association.

Parliamentary Clubs Reflect Fragmented Sejm
92EP0468B Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 20, 17 May 92 p 4

[Article by Cezary Leszczynski: "Are the Little Clubs Being Shuffled?"]

[Text] Today it is no longer known who precisely was behind it, but at the beginning of the parliamentary session, great confusion was elicited by the proposal that each parliamentary club have at least 15 deputies. Certainly, the proposal's aim was to mitigate political fragmentation in the new parliament. However, representatives of numerous minor groups decided to defend their identities and carried the day. The large clubs, busy with the battle for parliamentary stools, did not strive too actively to take groups of deputies composed of just a few people—or even one person—under their wings. After a few months, the small clubs grew stronger and distinguished themselves against the parliamentary landscape to such an extent that they became its enduring element. Today there is no talk of some larger club striving for unification of the smaller—quite the opposite. In a few of the largest groups, splits may soon develop. This threatens the already-divided parliament with further fragmentation.

In fact, the significance of the smaller clubs does not depend solely on their number. It so happened that there were a few politicians with well-known names in them. One often gets the impression that some of the small groups exert greater influence on the course of parliamentary issues than party clubs with dozens of deputies.

The electoral success of the Polish Party of Friends of Beer [PPPP] surprised everyone—perhaps most of all the party's activists themselves. Sixteen seats in parliament is considerable. Before the elections, Janusz Rewinski stated that in the landscape of serious party affiliations, this party constituted a fairy-tale element. But when he found himself in the Sejm, he declared that he would become a responsible politician. This transformation, however, took on a rather grotesque form, because the Friends of Beer acknowledged that they differ considerably among themselves and cannot function in one club. As is usually the case, it was a matter of money. Several activists, with Adam Halber at the head, accused a group of so-called businessmen of not fulfilling their promise to finance the electoral campaign. A split became unavoidable. A four-person PPPP club, which included Adam Halber, broke from the rest of their colleagues and henceforth began to play a rather marginal role.

But the twelve remaining deputies of this party founded a club under the name Polish Economic Program [PPG], also known as the "Large Beer." Its members sit in chambers a bit on the president's side, a little to the right. Since the beginning of the parliamentary session, much has been said about the unification of this club with the Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD], but somehow nothing has come of it so far. The PPG has retained its identity. Its activities in the legislative field began, of

course, with beer. The beer deputies proposed an amendment to the statute on education in sobriety so as to eliminate all restrictions on "small pale beer." Another time, Deputy Leszek Bubel in a question to the finance minister demanded that the turnover tax on unleaded gasoline be reduced. In the course of the debate over the foundations of socioeconomic policy and the budget bill, an understanding between the PPG and the Democratic Union [UD] and the KLD was nearly reached. A so-called small coalition, in other words an understanding between the above-mentioned clubs, has since been created. Tomasz Bankowski, head of the PPG, became one of the leading figures—and not only in the Sejm. Tadeusz Mazowiecki continually emphasizes that the UD can enter into a governmental coalition only with liberals and the "Large Beer."

Most problems are with the Christian Democrats. Were one to carefully examine all the appearances of deputies so far, one might come to the conclusion that Christian Democratic views dominate in the parliament. Only from time to time does some deputy give an address in which he separates himself from Christian ideology. In a poll conducted by the Center for Research on Public Opinion in September of last year, as many as 32 percent of those polled declared themselves in favor of Christian Democracy. But in the Sejm, the Christian Democracy groups are not large, and their political significance is rather modest.

The Parliamentary Club of the Party of Christian Democrats [PChD] was created by four deputies and three senators. The deputies sit on the edge of the right side of the hall, next to the government benches. The head of the party, Pawel Laczkowski, occupies a place next to Janusz Korwin-Mikke [head of the UPR, Union for Real Politics]. Andrzej Gasienica-Makowski of the Highlands Union and Mieczyslaw Gil (chairman of the OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club, since dissolved]), running on the "In Solidarity With the President" ticket, joined this club. The PChD is not a nationalist or ultra-Catholic party, nor is it a religious party. Its platform speaks of "open Christianity." The PChD actively supports the government of Jan Olszewski but does not do so uncritically. This party has more than 2,000 members in 20 districts all over the country. Moreover, it is continually increasing its membership. Its new members are "people with a certain initiative," representatives of small business.

At the head of the five-person "Christian Democracy" Deputies Club stands Deputy Jozef Hermanowicz, elected from the Gorzow-Pila district. It is difficult to discern any fundamental differences between this club and the Parliamentary Club of the PChD of Pawel Laczkowski. The deputies in this group support the government of Jan Olszewski with equal vigor. Fragmentation among the Christian Democratic groups outside of parliament has proceeded exceptionally far. Currently, two centers have crystallized. The first is the Christian-Democratic Congress, which embraces the

Party of Christian Democrats with Pawel Laczkowski at the head, the Polish Christian-Democratic Forum, the Christian-Democratic Association, the Christian Labor Party, and the PZKS [Polish Catholic-Social Union]. The other center is the Christian-Democratic Coalition, consolidating all the remaining groups, including the Christian-Democratic Labor Party.

All attempts to unify end in failure. Arguments concern the past and contacts with the old authorities. Moreover, the ties of individual parties to numerous Christian Democratic internationals is playing a significant role.

Three members of the Union for Real Politics parliamentary club sit on the right side of the hall in association with the Christian Democrats. The head of the parliamentary representation of this party, Lech Pruchno-Wroblewski, maintains that the Democratic Union is really against democracy, but for the time being it must operate within a democratic framework. The UPR is becoming stronger and stronger. More than 3,000 people have already joined it. These are mainly young people who want to live on their own account and who relate unwillingly to what existed and continues to exist in our country. The platform of the UPR club depends on initiating changes of a constitutional sort. Improvement of the current system through minor cosmetic measures, in the opinion of Lech Pruchno-Wroblewski, does not make sense. In one of his numerous, very colorful appearances, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, the party leader, stated that the Sejm is having more and more problems both in the just creation of law and in the settlement of contentious political situations. In order to find a way out of this, a Council of State should be created as quickly as possible, which would establish law in a constitutional procedure. This would be a small, more efficient organ. When some deputies began to express their doubts, Deputy Korwin-Mikke replied that the American Constitution is as good as it is because it was written by a very few persons.

The bill creating a Council of State has so far been signed by 11 deputies, but regulations require 35 signatures. The following people expressed their support for a Council of State: Jerzy Dziewulski and Tomasz Holc of the PPG; Adam Halber and Krzysztof Ibis of the PPPP Club; Waldemar Jedryka of the Party X Deputies Club; Wladyslaw Reichelt of the KLD; and several others. At first, the deputies of the Alliance of the Democratic Left [SLD, includes most of the former communist party deputies] expressed an interest in the bill. They liked the idea itself, but they were not eager to consent to the electoral system proposed by the UPR for this council. It made no mention of a principle of parity among parties.

The UPR Club presented a few other legislative initiatives. The bill on reprivatization, for example, which is already before the marshal, was signed not only by the above-mentioned UPR "sympathizers" but also by a few deputies from the Democratic Union, the KLD, and even the Christian-National Union [ZChN].

Lech Pruchno-Wroblewski says that his club will not enter any coalition agreements. It will only strive to support concrete legislative initiatives, which should become easier and easier because the UPR, in his opinion, is on the offensive. The organ of this party, NAJWYZSZY CZAS, has already reached a circulation of 60,000, which is the best evidence of the spread of conservative-liberal ideas.

In contrast to the UPR, the slightly more numerous Parliamentary Club of the German Minority (seven deputies) is demonstrating decidedly less initiative. The German minority achieved undoubted electoral success, outstripping candidates representing other nationalities. Aside from them, only a representative of the Byelarusians, Edward Czykwin, has a seat in the Sejm. The "Germans," under the leadership of Henryk Krol, are supporting the government of Jan Olszewski, but aside from that have not distinguished themselves particularly. They are only interested in the work on the law on national minorities and an appropriate provision in the Constitution.

The three-person Party X Deputies Club does not constitute a monolith. Chairman Antoni Czajka apparently applauded the loudest when the Sejm confirmed Jan Olszewski in the post of prime minister, but Czajka cannot much agree with his two colleagues. They often vote differently. Antoni Czajka at one point wanted to leave the club, but he did not do it, because the X representation would thereby cease to exist.

The members of the "Labor Solidarity" Parliamentary Club sit on the left side of the parliamentary chamber, next to deputies of the NSZZ Solidarity club, Peasant Accord on one side and the German Minority on the other. At first, there were four of them. Later, Zbigniew Bujak of the Democratic-Social Movement joined them, and a little later Stanislaw Kocjan of "Solidarity '80" began to participate in their work.

The pedigree of "Labor Solidarity" extends back to the previous parliamentary session. In May 1991 a circle of deputies with Ryszard Bugaj at the head split from the Citizens Parliamentary Club. An association with this same name was registered outside the Sejm. Jan Jozef Lipski, Karol Modzelewski, Jerzy Szacki, Jan Mujzel, and many others played a leading role in its formation. Up to the present day, no party has been created from this association, simply because members of the PPS would not be able to join. At first, "Labor Solidarity" proclaimed itself in favor of Jan Olszewski's government, but during the voting on the governmental principles of socio-economic policy, Bugaj, Malachowski, Piotr Czarnecki, Wojciech Kwiatkowski, and Zbigniew Bujak abstained from voting.

The "Labor Solidarity" Association numbers more than 2,000 persons. People who in the past rubbed shoulders with the communist party are also accepted into it. Only

those people who actively fought the democratic opposition in the past are prohibited from becoming members of the association.

A few dozen deputies are outside the club structures. Officially, they speak as unaffiliated deputies, but in general it is well known what orientation they lean towards. If they do not join clubs, it is chiefly because they have had a falling out with the leadership. Personal arrangements are very important in every parliament.

Primate Interviewed About Role of Church

92EP0517A Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish
14 Jun 92 pp D16-18

[Interview with Cardinal Jozef Glemp, primate, by Jerzy Achmatowicz; place and date not given: "The Defense of the Polish Church"]

[Text] Warsaw—The last time EL MERCURIO talked to Cardinal Glemp (who has headed the Catholic Church in Poland since the memorable year of 1981), in August 1990, the institution enjoyed great prestige in Polish society. Now, the situation has changed a little, and the Church is the target of criticism for "butting into politics," as its detractors say.

[Achmatowicz] Your Eminence, I would like to talk about the changes in Poles' consciences since not quite two years ago—that is, since we last saw each other. I am referring to the changes seen from the standpoint of the Catholic Church.

[Glemp] Naturally, the period of freedom, especially this accelerated freedom, has influenced the change in our attitudes: We are still undergoing a process of change and search. The changes do not always take a favorable path. I think here that the enchantment with freedom has not been accompanied by a cultural effort on the part of the people. Moreover, the economic difficulties, which above all are associated with political insecurity, have their influence on political stability, and that is why we are in a constant searching process.

[Achmatowicz] Lately, a lot of energy has been devoted to debates and controversies regarding the role of the Church in the country's political life and legal system. Nearly two years ago, some issues were undebatable, and now they are controversial again. Why is that?

[Glemp] I always believe it is a combination of problems that have been created rather artificially because the Church abstains from direct participation in politics, and, as a hierarchy, it plays no role whatsoever in the expression of party, government, and parliamentary positions. Now, the charge that the Church is participating in politics through lay persons cannot be regarded as an accusation in a democratic system. It is simply evidence of the discerning minds of believers. No, we do not have complexes; lay people are entering the structures of power, and the Church has and should have some influence on politics because, when all is said and

done, priests have their civil rights and thus have their influence on political life. Naturally, the priests here are aware of their Christianity, and they will defend the principles they believe in.

[Achmatowicz] In a recent interview, you spoke of "those exceptional situations in which we should express ourselves...."

[Glemp] Naturally, we expressed ourselves on the occasion of Mr. Walesa's election as president of Poland. The situation at that time was undoubtedly quite dramatic, and it was a time when our civic spirit showed through loud and clear. The same thing happened during the parliamentary elections of last November, when the priests gave some clear guidance to the five parties.

Now, that was not a declaration by the Church, but it was felt that the parties are close to Christian principles, and, in response to the questions being asked by the faithful, we had to give them that guidance. I do not think that upset democratic principles in any way.

[Achmatowicz] Do you not think that always entails a certain risk? Today many politicians who do not enjoy high esteem in society are identified with the Church, whether it likes it or not....

[Glemp] Yes, we are aware that there is always someone who wants to manipulate the Church here; we are aware of that. Nevertheless, we want to persist here sincerely in our civic stands, and we want to stand behind whatever good we are bringing as Catholics.

Walesa and the Church

[Achmatowicz] In terms of Walesa's election to the Presidency in that, as you put it, dramatic moment, an option that reinforced the Church, we could say today that it is quite a controversial option, to say the least, in society. Moreover, Walesa has made some statements as president that are not always favorable to the Church. What is your view of that situation?

[Glemp] Well on that point I do not agree, because Mr. Walesa is a sincere and responsible man. When it comes to the Church, he has never posed objective problems. Walesa's attitude toward the Church is a just one. In looking at his desires, his aspirations, we can also see his errors, which he himself admits. Naturally, Walesa is a man who is aware of his deficiencies in the job. He is a person who loves Poland, however, and he does not want to take advantage of his country. He has a strong will, and he wants to bring in democracy. Of course, many people may not like that, just as they may not like his manner of speaking and acting....

[Achmatowicz] Another problem is Walesa's entourage, which is very fickle: One day those people are with him, and the next day they are on the other side of the barricade. To be sure, Walesa continues to stay the course, but the people around him...

[Glemp] Well, it is difficult for me to express an opinion on those people's attitudes. They are politicians, and they assume certain risks and play certain games; I cannot get involved in that. One day close to Walesa, the next day further away—that is the world of political gamesmanship....

[Achmatowicz] But the Church is also involved in that gamesmanship!

[Glemp] No, no, I do not think so. Obviously, politicians come closer to the Church at times and move further away at times, and, naturally, all of them would like to count on the support of the Church.

Market Economy

[Achmatowicz] Let us move on to another issue. I would like to ask Your Eminence to assess the social and economic transformations that have taken place in Poland in the past two years, seen from the perspective of the encyclical "Centesimus Annus." I am referring, above all, to the paragraphs in the encyclical where we find a very clear opinion on the limitations of the free market economy, and the problem of poverty and exploitation is highlighted.

[Glemp] Well, obviously, the encyclical is a continuation of the Church's social thought that appears along with "Rerum Novarum" and expresses the desire to curb unbridled capitalism. The main accent is placed on solidarity, but, in its international dimensions—that is, the pope regards solidarity as a Christian virtue, and he wants it to be practiced among national communities. That is a task that is primarily incumbent upon Europe. I think that because Europe wants to be reborn unified. Some of the groundwork for the process has been laid here, and the encyclical and the bishops' synod of last year represent a continuation of that. Thus, the Church wants to be present at the birth of a new Europe. As I told the German bishops—and they were in full agreement—we should not wait for someone to come along and build that Europe for us; we must take it upon ourselves to build it, and there the Church has many possibilities.

[Achmatowicz] Nevertheless, I would like to focus more specifically on Poland here. That is to say, an ideology is circulating that can be summed up in these words: "Solve your own problems." All of this clearly contradicts the letter and spirit of "Centesimus Annus." How does the Catholic Church in Poland deal with the problems?

[Glemp] Yes, that is a problem of enormous importance throughout Poland and, thus, for the Catholic Church as well. It is not just a question of the emergence of large fortunes because, if it were earned honestly, that money could be committed to helping the country. We have examples of major assistance provided specifically by the rich, assistance for some good projects and for the poor. What horrifies us, however, are the scandals—that is, the looting of Polish assets abroad, major cases of embezzlement. Of course, there are some international mafias here, not always Polish ones; but that is terribly

discouraging to Poles. Now we, as the Church and as citizens, realize that, until there is economic and political stabilization, the irregularities will continue because the authorities are too weak to crack down and stop this behavior. We are aware of efforts to keep it to a minimum, however. I know that there is a concerted effort here to find the culprits and limit excessive enrichment to the extent possible. Legislation and effective enforcement are imperative because, unfortunately, what we have now is not up to the task. However, we understand that, if we want to keep our democracy, we must get through this period of "warming up" in political groups and the maturation of our parliament so that our government can be reinforced. Maybe that is what we are seeing at this time.

[Achmatowicz] In that context, I think there is no fundamental contradiction between the letter and the spirit of the encyclical and the problem of the role of the state—which, in the final analysis, emanates from society—when it comes to helping the poorest of the poor or the entire social sphere. Now, it strikes me that something strange happened: As a result of a kind of letting off steam, all such ideas are immediately associated with communism. And, yet, if we take into account the entire civilized world, the problem of aid for the most forgotten people, the problem of the state's presence in the process of shaping the most strategic decisions for the economy, all of that is absolutely obvious.

[Glemp] You have touched upon a problem that is very difficult and, at the same time, very fundamental. We of the Church can guarantee charitable aid, and such efforts are being carried out; we are really able to reach many people with aid. But it is not enough; there should be a state presence here that is not paternalistic, but one that places limits on those blind actions aimed exclusively at profit. We are searching for the right path, however, and I think the Church is an element of support for the involvement of the state, which must organize society, not as a collective, but as a community. Nevertheless, there is a phenomenon here that is linked to misery, something you mentioned, when you hear people saying: "Bring back communism, bring it back." People got used to receiving a certain amount, and often they would rather wait in line for five hours to get something because they know that in the end they will get it. Here, on the other hand, they must be skillful, capable....

Full Sovereignty

[Achmatowicz] The cuts in retirement pensions and the suspension of some rights that were important to those people are regarded with resentment. That is precisely why we are hearing this "Bring back communism."

[Glemp] Yes. The authorities are constantly explaining that these are the limitations imposed by a temporary situation in which the dictates of the international financial institutions play a role and limit us in one way or another. And it is difficult, very difficult, to speak of full

sovereignty. Today there is an economic and financial dependence, and it is very great....

[Achmatowicz] But, behind that, there is also politics....

[Glemp] Ah! I wish it were just politics! I fear it is ideology, as well.

[Achmatowicz] I have the impression that there is a certain idea here that ultimately consists of raising the powerful specters of consumerism, which is draining this country's foreign reserves.

[Glemp] Yes. Besides, we see that, in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Russia, there is a veritable flood of pornography. Even though there is legislation prohibiting the dissemination of pornography, no one dares enforce it because there is a belief that there should be pornography in those countries. That may not lead to the conclusion that there is a plan....

[Achmatowicz] What is Your Eminence's reaction to the rallying cry of decommunization?

[Glemp] But I do not know what that decommunization entails....

[Achmatowicz] Well, there are different ideas here. For example, a special tax on party people, a ban on holding various public offices for a few years, and so forth. Such general ostracism is beginning to emerge.

[Glemp] I agree, but we can see that the ex-communists are doing well, very well (he laughs).

[Achmatowicz] I think you are referring to the higher-ups, but the people in the party rank and file...

[Glemp] Oh, maybe them, the ones who always did the dirty work, maybe they do not have so much to do with it. In general, however, I do not see things going too badly for the people who had some standing in the party. Now, regardless of all that, I think it is an extremely difficult ethical problem because, aside from the arrivistes and ideologues—that is, the people who led Poland down the path of misery—there have been people who joined the party to salvage what they could. We must recognize professional, competent, and honest people because, in the final analysis, there have been people who tried to salvage Poland within the system that existed. That is why sorting out the guilty and the innocent, settling accounts, is such a tremendously difficult problem. I do not believe any court can be set up; I think an entire generation must commit itself to settling accounts with communism. Our generation and the coming generation must have solid grounds so that we do not issue relative judgments, so that the actions taken are objective in nature.

Controversies

[Achmatowicz] Some opinions, primarily in the press, have reached Chile, to the effect that in Poland there has been a decline in the authority of the Church.

[Glemp] Naturally, if you go by the criteria used by sociologists and public opinion researchers, the Church as a social institution will have its ups and downs. Undoubtedly, according to those criteria, which certainly do not "measure" faith, the Church as a social institution may be subject to fluctuations. So, yes, that decline may be a fact.

[Achmatowicz] Could that phenomenon be accompanied by the fact that, in at least some newspapers, perhaps of a sensationalist nature, there is coverage of some priests who stray from the values and ideas they should be representing?

[Glemp] There is no doubt that something may occur among these 25,000 priests....

[Achmatowicz] *Errare humanum est* [To err is human]!

[Glemp] Yes. Nonetheless, I do not know of a single case that could provide ammunition for a frontal assault. I think that, in general, there are certain behaviors among parishioners and their priests.... Well, I would say that those things happen everywhere; they always have and always will. We cannot eliminate them; they are human passions. I believe, however, that that is not the point. It is a question of some ideological prejudices against the Church. It is obvious that an atheist does not accept the influence of the Church. That is fine. We read many outstanding authors who say that the Church has played an inestimable role and that now it should confine itself to spiritual matters....

[Achmatowicz] But perhaps it was not an error that a high-ranking official of the ecclesiastical hierarchy—perhaps one of the bishops—made a statement in which he remarked sarcastically that intellectuals and artistic people would go to Church to receive various gifts when there were shortages, and now they are bad-mouthing the Church.

[Glemp] But that was obviously an error, even though it was not a bishop. I know who said that; it was a priest from Warsaw. He said it gratuitously, but simple people see the problem that way.

[Achmatowicz] Another very delicate issue I would like to touch upon has to do with the Church's financial claims, which have not been well received, at least in some circles.

[Glemp] This really is a very important matter. The Church, in making the claims, is just one of many property owners because the landowners, members of the bourgeoisie, and other people who illegally lost their property after the war are now getting it back. The Church enjoys no privilege. We, like others, find ourselves tangled up in the complex property claims. Now, one might say that the Church is not recovering all of its property because of some legal assumptions. For example, there is a provision limiting land to 50 hectares. Nowhere is the Church selling off hospitals or other social institutions. Naturally, if some nuns, for example,

had a hospital from which they were evicted in the 1950's, they have a right to get it back. The nuns do not even have a place to live because they are being kicked out of their assigned apartments. So they deserve that hospital; naturally, it will be given to someone, or some other arrangement will be made. There are still other items that the Church is recovering, and it is collecting rent. In fact, in many situations, the Church will come out ahead.

[Achmatowicz] What is the Church's reaction to the moral problems of politics? I am referring to the not-yet-mature democracy, the merry-go-round of political office, the personalization of politics, the economic scandals and affairs.

[Glomp] Among us, that has always been an issue. There are many documents, unfortunately little known, that explain how a Catholic lay person should act in the political sphere. The situation is progressing; we are not experienced enough yet because the political sphere was always reserved to the party. We are having to train ourselves quickly now....

[Achmatowicz] The Church is learning, too?

[Glomp] Yes, we are learning.

[Achmatowicz] By the way, I am surprised to note that practically all of the political options in Poland, including the Church, have their newspapers; but the Church has not managed to publish an attractive paper that reaches out to people, a less parochial journal that gives more coverage to politics and morality—in short, a newspaper that can compete on the journalistic market.

[Glomp] It is true that we do not have a newspaper like that, and we want one like that to come out. We have a lot of dailies, weeklies, and monthly publications, and they are good. We have THE UNIVERSAL WORD, which is good from the point of view of orthodoxy, but is not so popular. Naturally, we are thinking about establishing a Catholic press agency.

[Achmatowicz] During the past week in the Polish Church, there has been a kind of earthquake. I am referring to your administrative reform, the formation of the new dioceses, and so forth. The official word is that it will serve to improve the evangelization work and bring it closer to the faithful. News reports, however, talk about evidence of decentralization, even in connection with the power exercised by Your Eminence.

[Glomp] (Laughs)...Well, for those who think that way, I hope they are happy.... I hope they are happy. Now I, just as before, am still primate and elected president of the Conference of Bishops. The reform was very necessary for the Church for administrative reasons and because of the priests' work. The creation of more archdioceses and bishoprics is in keeping with the general guidelines of the Church. I do not believe my authority is diminished, and, besides, it is not necessary for the primate to have so much work, to be buried in work. Of course, with the

reform, there will be less work because one diocese was detached; on the other hand, I will have more time to deal with more general matters—that is, with conceptual tasks.

Poland's Future

[Achmatowicz] How do you personally, Your Eminence, and how does the Church in general see the future of Poland's development? For example, the idea of returning to Europe, where the Church says it is not necessarily like that and that perhaps Poland will expand the work of reevangelizing and re-Christianizing Europe. Moreover, Poland has a problem in its relations with its neighbors, and, finally, in its aspirations to join the European Community and NATO.

[Glomp] Well, those are really political issues on which I have neither the competence nor the desire to make a strong commitment. I do, however, believe that Europe must be built on the basis of the Community, which exists now, giving the countries of Central and East Europe the right to participate—there is no question about that. Whatever emerges will be built on existing wealth. On the other hand, we want to get along as well as possible with our neighbors; here we have an example of positive relations with the German bishops, with the German Church, and with the French. Contrast that with the problem of the Orthodox Church. It is a problem not just for us, but also for the Universal Church, and I think Poland will be the first to influence relations with the Orthodox Church. We are establishing the best possible ties to the Ukrainians.

[Achmatowicz] And Lithuania?

[Glomp] With Lithuania what we have now is really a political conflict rather than an ecclesiastical one. We are very saddened by what is happening there, and we feel it is harming the Poles in Lithuania. It is true that they were a little pro-Soviet, but, please, who in Lithuania was not pro-Soviet! There is no indication that the priests are speaking out there, and the political decisions in Lithuania are rather drastic as they affect the Poles.

[Achmatowicz] If everything is going so well, we have such excellent relations with our neighbors, and we are making progress toward joining Europe, why join NATO? Who is there to fear?

[Glomp] (Laughs)...Well, I am not saying that everything is going well. I just see possibilities for a closer relationship, and, in fact, our actions are leading to that. NATO is a military matter, a security matter. That is what the specialists are concerned with, and, frankly, I do not know where any danger might come from. If famine breaks out in Asia, however, and they flock to Europe... I do not know, I cannot answer that question.

[Achmatowicz] On the other hand, a close aide of Gorbachev's recently said that the Russians would also like to join NATO, but that no one wants them there, and apparently they are not interested in Poland, either.

It would appear that Europe likes us as long as it can sell us something, but not for any other reason.

[Glomp] I do not think Europe is interested in us merely as a market. I think the people of Europe are thinking more seriously about the future of the continent as a whole, and they see a spiritual, cultural potential, the potential for suffering that the people on this side have endured.... I do not think West Europe looks at East Europe just for trade. We must realize that men on both sides will come closer to each other, that there are practically no borders in West Europe anymore, and that phenomenon cannot be ignored.

Marginal Parties Described, Programs Presented

92EP0500B Warsaw PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY
in Polish No 24, 14 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by Magdalena Grochowska: "A Question of Taste?"]

[Text] "Come with us when the day of wrath arrives! We alone know why things are so bad (...)" state the leaders of the Polish Party for Social Renewal [PPOS] in their recruitment literature. And to dispel any uncertainty about the identity of the author of their prophecy about the collapse of the state, they add: "We are the first to shout out—the emperor has no clothes!"

But the apocalypse can be avoided if we stop the portentous dance of the haystacks, according to whose rhythm Poland is heading for abasement and colonial subordination. Besides the allusion to Wyspianski, the page of the brochure teems with the names of Mickiewicz, Father Kordecki, and John Paul II. The presence of these illustrious personages is designed to strengthen the ideological and moral bases of the party in the mind of potential sympathizers or members.

This party is not alone among insignificant political groups in making use of great names and quotations. The Polish Erotic Party [PPE] freely alludes to the authority of the "Most High God" himself. The commandment to love one's neighbor is the party's key to broad lifestyle freedom that excludes only a few sexual perversions. The PPE's delight in the Creator's work and a peculiarly understood humanism are supposed to legitimize the display of something more than just a low-cut neckline or a bit of thigh.

Some parties, and not just those that use the word Christian in their names, find the Church to be an excellent feature on their escutcheons. Although the accumulation of earthly goods does not have much in common with Catholicism, it is upon the fundamentals of faith that the Polish Prosperity Party [PPD] bases itself in its struggle for better living conditions for families.

The chancellor of the Union for the Restoration of the Monarchy spins a view of a state with a neutral world view which tilts toward Catholicism in cases where that

is appropriate to the needs of a majority of society. The little word "tilts" does not, according to him, represent a departure from the party's declaration of neutrality.

Besides supernatural powers and their earthly institutions, the forces of nature are also worth harnessing up for the political races. And it is not only the ecologists who are doing so. The members of the Volcano Party, who claim to have attained an exceptional efficiency in both hemispheres of the brain, are capable of foreseeing the future. That ability is supposed to help them transform Poland into a tourist-agricultural country and aid them to eliminate all physical and moral dirt from the life of society. Their slogan: "The Volcano Party has had enough!" resounds essentially like a rumble threatening a torrent of anger. The party leaders' press conference revealed that that torrent is one of empty words.

The characteristic sociotechnical element which emerges from the rhetoric of various small party declarations is the collision between the uncertain, fear-provoking present and the future. Depending on how optimistic they are, party activists see the future as less bright or brighter than the present. These parties say that the present political system is marked by "eroded foundations," that the legal system is creating an "inhibiting iron circle" and that "your family is going (...) to starve." The party will save you when things collapse.

The individual good is linked to the common good. Almost all small party politicians betray a nationalist instinct which, upon closer glance, sometimes appears identical with extreme nationalism. The headquarters and nearby square of the Polish National Union [PWN] are filled with gangs of shaved, athletic young men who, made more brazen by the silence of the surrounding area, shout anti-Semitic slogans.

The PPOS does not deny minorities their right to live in Poland, so long as those minorities do not become involved in public life and seek to involve themselves in decisionmaking on terms with the majority. The Union for the Restoration of the Monarchy and the Free Citizens Party [POW] stress the meaning of national identity which they think would be threatened by integration into Europe. The Volcano Party has resurrected the slogan: "Polish—that rings proudly."

These small parties are in no rush to assume control of the government, for that, after all, necessarily involves co-responsibility, the need to formulate specific socio-economic programs and, above all, the necessity of support by the masses. The lack of mass support does not interfere with their articulation of great ambitions.

The Polish Party of Malcontents does not go beyond loud criticism of the current situation. Not even in cases where this negativism is creative and not merely the negativism of malcontents. The Polish Negative Party (also called the Polish Party of Hungry Teachers), which, for its part, seeks to "demand and not to ask," acts in a similar manner. Those paper tigers are really only masquers on the political scene.

The monarchists, still without a pretender to the throne, are gathering wind in their sails, although, as their leader Stanislaw Masztanowicz notes, it is not a very strong wind. The anarchists are undertaking efforts to destroy and liquidate the state. For the moment, these efforts are ineffectual. The PPE will face the next election allied with the PTTK [Polish Tourist and Local Studies Society], the PCK [Polish Red Cross] and the TKKF [Society for the Promotion of Physical Fitness] in an electoral bloc called "The Future." As of this moment, 60 members of that party have been nominated as Senate and Sejm delegate candidates (the entire party membership is about 270,000). If they are victorious, the fact that sex is a driving force in human nature will be reflected in parliament. The Erotic Party Club is divided into factions according to the sexual preference of members. The party chairman, Sylwester Marczak, promises the electorate (he estimates their share at 6,000,000) total sexual bliss even more satisfying than that found in Japan or the United States.

Small party politicians and local chairmen have a style of their own. About Dr. Ewa Wierzbowski, the foundress of the Independent Association for Responsibility and Justice, I read: "In every situation, a woman keeps in mind that she is a woman. She never forgets to wear her hat and gloves." Indeed, she received me with a tasteful headcovering on her head. She is one of the type about whom the proverb says: "Where the devil is powerless, he sends a woman to do his work." Dr. Wierzbowski is fighting for a change in the repressive, communist legislative system that, she believes, is still in effect in Poland. She "wrenched" money from the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers] to fund an educational campaign conducted by her party in the area of endocrinology, neoplastic profilaxis and postdoctoral medical education. As a plenipotentiary of the Property Owners Association, she became involved in reprivatization issues. In that connection, she has visited the offices of the president and the prime minister. Right now she is on the trail of Housegate, abuses associated with the transfer of state property to gminas and real estate agents, involving losses to the state treasury.

The economic treatise of Jerzy Bogowski, chairman of the Polish Social Reform Party (20 members), is 150 pages long. Sent earlier to the well-known "professors" Rakowski and Jaruzelski, the treatise now awaits a critical evaluation by specialists from the SGGW [Main School of Rural Economy]. Editor Szeliga said about the treatise that it reads like a detective novel; so far, that is the only comment that the treatise has elicited.

Its author, a milk industry technology engineer, has created a monolithic economic theory which, as he says, assures a higher degree of effectiveness than does capitalism. According to this theory, energy is the essence of the economy. The par of exchange of money relates to the energy resources of society. Pay for work is strictly tied to activity, or, as he says, "people who do not work do not eat." Every other economic principle represents exploitation. The social ownership of the means of

production will raise people to a higher level of consciousness; the level of prosperity determines thought. And if we have already gone over these lessons before, it was in an unnatural form, he points out. He is in favor of socialism.

The power of capitalism is proclaimed by Jerzy Krajewski, leader of the PPD (about 500 members). He is himself a business card for capitalism. Impeccably dressed, he arrives at one meeting a trifle late and during the discussion creates the impression that he is becoming a little late for the next meeting. A journalist, formerly for GAZETA BANKOWA and now for NOWA EUROPA, he specializes in economic matters. He is a believer in figures, percents, and production indexes. He values freedom and, even more so, money. He made his first \$1,000 in trade. In the publication DOBROBYT, he advised about: where to get some capital and how to invest it, how to make millions quickly and how to find a job in the West legally. The absence of real possibilities to attain a meaningful political position by his party is not one of Jerzy Krajewski's biggest worries.

Should the name of the PPE be changed to the Love Party?—wonders Sylwester Marczak. In our prudish society the word erotic has bad connotations. After all, the aims of the party are noble!

Mr. Marczak teaches Family Living Adjustment in the Otwock Nursing School. He maintains his pedagogic habits even outside of classes. Valuing both theory and practice, he disseminates erotic films in party clubs and does not exclude practical activities. Women who belong to the Erotic Self-Help Club, "Samaritan women," serve without pay as so-called aides for gentlemen who cannot make a go of sexual abstinence. In language that I would characterize as anatomic-physiological, the party leader multiplies examples of party ideological activity as well. Herbert was right to say that political choices are, after all, a question of taste.

[Box, p 4]

Of the 105 registered political party labels, 14 includes the word national, 9—ecological, 7—Christian, 6—People's, 5—liberal, and 2—Catholic.

The largest number of parties is active in Warsaw and the Warsaw City Voivodship. Up until the time of the 1989 introduction of the law regarding political parties, 21 parties operated there. Eighteen were registered in 1990, nineteen in 1991 and one in the current year.

In Gdansk and the Gdansk Voivodship, six parties operated prior to the introduction of the law. In each of the following, one party operated: Wroclaw, Lodz, Katowice, Krakow, and Bydgoszcz.

Polish View of Cooperation With Italy

92EP0494B Warsaw RYNNI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish
No 60, 19 May 92 p 7

[Interview with Kazimierz Klek, trade adviser of the Polish Republic in Rome and minister plenipotentiary, by Teresa Radzimska; place and date not given: "We Have To Know What We Want"]

[Excerpts] [Radzimska] I have the impression that Poles feel somewhat disappointed over the way Polish-Italian economic relations have developed recently. It may be that we expected too much. Cooperation between Poland and Italy has often been defined in our country as a "model," and we expected that after the system changed in our country, trade with Italy would grow dynamically, that Italian capital would flow into Poland, and that business would really take off. What do you think the reason for this is?

[Klek] I have to tell you that this is the first time I have heard anyone talk about being disappointed with Italy. I personally do not feel that way, and I can say the same about Prime Minister Olszewski, who has been with us since the end of January. It may be that there are circles where more was expected of the Italians, but I could list many other countries that could be more convincingly described as possibly being "disappointed." Actually, we saw a recession in our trade with Italy during the mid-1980's, but we have seen many positive changes during the past three years.

[Radzimska] But these changes are going almost entirely in the directing of increasing our imports from Italy, and our balance of payments, which has traditionally been in the black, is now in the red.

[Klek] I don't agree with you. Since the beginning of 1992 we have been seeing clear progress in Polish exports, and our imports are decreasing. This is the result of ending the importation of machinery and equipment in connection with FSM's [compact car plant] undertaking production of a new small car, but it is also the result of our actions in the realm of tariffs last August and this year. I think that you have come up with the hypothesis that things have become worse in Polish-Italian relations, and that you want me possibly to explain this, but here we don't agree at all, because I think things are going well. [passage omitted]

Cooperation at a deep level, like production, for example, is a far more complicated thing than trade. On the other hand, the typical Italian is naturally cautious. I don't want to use the word "cowardly." I am reaching here in some sense for the causes underlying the state of affairs in response to your question. Italians generally do not know much about Poland, just as Poles have a very superficial knowledge of Italy. Few Poles are aware that it is the sixth greatest industrial power in the world. [passage omitted]

[Radzimska] You are talking about the information gap....

[Klek] And how! For us, Germany, the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France—these are the great industrial powers of the world, while Italy tails behind them all. Meanwhile, I think of Italy as the second country—I am purposely not mentioning which is first—worthy of our following. We should carry away from here many models for ourselves, like the network of holding companies, for example. I am glad that Minister Gruszecki was interested in the recent operation of large Italian holding companies, like IRI, ENI, and EFIM. We will still be "condemned" to live with large government plants for a long time. They should somehow be related to one another. I am not thinking about any sort of organizational scheme inflicted from above, but of one shaped in a natural way, so that profits can be increased. The branch should conduct a defined policy of development, rather than having every plant large and small doing this. [passage omitted]

[Radzimska] And what is your assessment of the extent to which Poland used the credit facilitations the Italian Government gave us?

[Klek] Well, now, things are not bad, but then they are not good either. Within the framework of the platform of government credit guarantees assured us in October 1989 of \$400 million, the SACE [Italian company] has already put up guarantee promissory notes and letters of guarantee for credit totaling about \$250 million. They have been designated to finance Italian imports, such as equipment for the zinc coating of car body sheets, carbamide production equipment, machinery and equipment to produce small-scale tractors, machinery to produce pasta, disposable hypodermic needles, meat processing equipment, and insecticides and other products Polish agriculture needs. SACE basically guarantees credit extended for purposes Polish officials consider to have priority. We are hoping that previous priorities will shortly be confirmed or corroborated.

We have had 100 billion lira allocated to us in the form of low-interest credit assistance. There have been great delays in using it. We have to admit that the procedure for the Italians to mobilize this credit has taken a long time. It consists of several steps: analysis of the project documentation, economic and technical evaluation of the project, a decision by the management committee at the foreign affairs ministry here in Rome, an appropriate decree by the minister of state, and, finally, a financial agreement between Mediocredito Centrale and the Commercial Bank S.A. in Warsaw, which acts as an agent of the Polish Government. For the moment, the final stage has been reached only in the case of a project to produce nonglutinous foodstuffs and nutritional supplements for children and to manufacture bandages, a project with a total value of 8.8 billion lira, but the financial agreement has not been signed yet, because the Polish side has not completed all the necessary documents. So the ball is still in Poland's court.

[Radzimska] Thank you for the interview.

Poznan Group Favors Berlin-Warsaw Highway

*92EP0502A Poznan WPROST in Polish
No 19, 10 May 92 p 21*

[Article by B.L.: "Traffic Jam in the Capital: The Wielkopolska Superhighway... Leading Nowhere"]

[Text] "We intend to prove that if something still cannot be done in Poland, that does not mean that it cannot be done in Wielkopolska," said one of the representatives of the Poznan capital group with a definite emphasis. (The Poznan capital group came into being in order to build the Wielkopolska portion of the Berlin-Warsaw superhighway.)

The entire project envisages the construction of a 280-km section of this artery from Swieciek to Kolo. The cost of the investment is set at \$650 million. Western consortiums interested in building the road are prepared to spend this sum. The superhighway is to be a toll road. Profit would go to the investors, but only for a specific time: After 30 years, the road would become state property.

The obvious benefits are that it will ensure employment for construction workers and later for those who run the hotels, stores, bars, and gas stations that spring up along the road. Then, too, there are also immeasurable benefits in terms of spurring the economy. Such benefits always occur in the regions through which important, modern transportation routes pass.

The project establishes the participation of the state treasury in a company which manages the construction and utilization of the superhighway. This participation, however, would not be in cash or credit, but in the form of material contributions, i.e., land on which the road is to be built and the existing section of the superhighway from Wrzesnia to Konin. Andrzej Patalas, who is responsible for the technical side of the venture, believes that this would guarantee the government approximately 30 percent of the stock.

The financial success of the project depends upon whether the regulation which prevents the collection of a toll for the use of the superhighway will be repealed. This may be done without waiting for the passage of a new law, merely by making minor correctives in the old law. The issuance of a license to the company to build the road is another precondition for work to begin.

The initiating group sent a letter of intent to Prime Minister Olszewski. The prime minister received the letter but did not give an official reply. Several days later, Aleksander Bacciarelli, director of the General Directorate of Public Roads, informed via the Polish Press Agency that "he currently does not see the possibility of building in Poland private toll superhighways." The agency also added that the words of the director were also a response to the plan for building the Wielkopolska superhighway. According to the director, current legal regulations preclude the implementation of the project.

"We informed the prime minister about the legal obstacles in a letter of intent," said Andrzej Patalas. "We did not do this so that the director of public roads would remind us of these obstacles, but so that he would consider the possibility of eliminating them."

Activists from the Union of Wielkopolska Residents [UW], who are supporting the initiative, recently paid a visit to a high-level official in the Ministry of Transportation. He declared that he "officially did not know anything" about the superhighway issue, since the letter of intent had gotten lost somewhere between his ministry and the URM [Office of the Council of Ministers].

Consequently, it is highly probable that the people of Poznan will not be able to prove the notion of the superiority of pragmatism over ideology, and there will be no superhighway.

Poor Highway Network Limits Development

*92EP0502B Poznan WPROST in Polish
No 21, 24 May 92 p 47*

[Article by M.L.: "Polish Roads: We Have Half as Many Superhighways as Czechoslovakia and One-Fortieth as Many as Germany"]

[Text] At present Poland has 257 kilometers [km] of superhighways. In 1986, 7.5 million automobiles traveled these and other roads and now almost 10 million cars are traversing them. The traffic has become more congested, especially on the major transportation arteries. Last year the concentration of traffic grew to 140 percent on the E-36 route. Up to 61.8 percent of all vehicles drive over interregional routes, which constitute less than 31.7 percent of domestic roads. Recently, tourism and trade have grown tremendously. In 1986, 383,255 vehicles crossed the border at Swieciek and Slubice; four years later, nearly two million more vehicles have crossed the border.

Obviously, superhighways (roads with two separate roadways which have a continuous strip available for emergency breakdowns and crash-proof intersections) are the best. Their parameters, the so-called grading, smoothness and adhesiveness, make it possible to drive at speeds of 120 km/h. Expert calculations indicate that on an average, a car can travel a superhighway at a 25-percent faster rate, using 30 percent less fuel. They are also the safest: The number of accidents occurring on them is 20 percent lower than on other roads.

The first superhighways were built in Poland during... Hitler's occupation. Later the development of high-speed roads was associated with the Gierke era. At that time, the highway between Warsaw and Katowice was built (the lion's share of the government leaders hailed from Katowice). The result of the "social action" performed in honor of the Seventh PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party] Congress was to build a highway from Kostrzyn Wielkopolski to Wrzesnia. However, this

highway has so many shortcomings that it cannot be linked in the future to the projected A-2 superhighway.

Generally, with the building of superhighways in Poland, it is much the same as with the building of socialism: "Objective difficulties" always stand in the way. Work on the 50-km section from Wrzesnia to Konin took 10 years.

In 1985, a draft plan for the creation of a network of superhighways and express roads was approved. Last year at Warsaw Polytechnical School, this plan was somewhat modified. The plan, in its modified form, is to be discussed at KERM [Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers] deliberations in the near future. Special emphasis will be placed on east-west routes.

[Box, p 47]


Leszek Rafalski, director of the Road and Bridge Construction Institute: "We should focus on building three superhighways: A-1 from Gdansk to Rybnik, A-4 traversing southern Poland (Wroclaw-Katowice-Krakow-Przemysl) and A-2 linking Berlin and Moscow. Of course there is no money to build all of the highways from beginning to end; at present the most essential thing is to build the Warsaw-Swieck section of the A-2 road which, via the capital of Germany, links us with Western Europe. The situation in the east is problematic,

but in my opinion our next priority should be to implement a portion of the A-4 superhighway running to Lwow, which will facilitate the expansion of trade with Ukraine.

Highway construction is extremely costly. A kilometer costs from \$2.5 million to \$3 million. The former GDR best illustrates the level of neglect in Eastern Europe. The costs of equalizing the level between the eastern and western part of Germany is 61 billion German marks [DM]. The recently approved plan for building a network of superhighways called German Unity, which is to join the former GDR with western laender is contingent upon this."

[Box, p 47]

Wieslaw Kwiecien, plenipotentiary for the general director concerning the construction of superhighways in the General Directorate of Public Roads: "The monies earmarked in our projected budget for roadbuilding are less than one-fourth the amount needed to maintain the existing transportation network. Talks are underway with the World Bank and other financial institutions on the subject of the funding indispensable to implement plans for the future. At the present time interministerial agreements are in the final stage regarding a new version of the law on public roadways. This law would make possible the collection of a toll for traveling a given road.



Private investors, among others, await this law, expecting that over the course of 15 to 20 years they will receive a return on their investments in this manner. The Ministry of Finance announced reservations about the draft law regarding the appraisal of land in the building of the new routes. If these doubts are cleared up, the draft law will be sent to the Sejm."


4-Month Statistics: Exports Up, Imports Down

92EP0507B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 9 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by D.W.: "At the End of Four Months: Exports Increase, Imports Decline"]

[Text] After four months, Polish foreign trade income (according to data from the NBP [Polish National Bank] amounted to \$4,528.5 million, and import expenditures amounted to \$3,884 million. Poland had a positive balance of payments of \$644.5 million.

In April, income from exports amounted to \$1,218.5 million and was \$44.5 million higher than in March. Expenditures amounted to \$959 million, down \$22 million.



Petropol Against Fuel Import Quota Changes

90EP0520B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 23-24 May 92 p 1

[Article by Anna Wielopolska: "Concessions Not According to the Law?"]

[Text] According to an announcement by Wojciech Niewiadomski, head of Petropol, the firm's Monday [25 May] press conference will begin with the arrival of a cavalcade of 10 tank trucks at the Hotel Victoria in Warsaw. The trucks are not to block traffic, but only to

accent the importance of the problem of the distribution of import concessions for engine fuel. Petropol is one of the firms that did not receive any concessions.

The press conference organized by Petropol is titled "concessions for importing liquid fuels and the observance of the law by bodies of the state administration." Representatives of the firm think that a violation of the law occurred when the Ministry of Foreign Cooperation burdened the concessions with, among other things, the regulations requiring timely tax payments. Petropol as a firm owned by foreign capital (Dutch-Swiss), according to the prior law on economic activity with participation of foreign objects, has a three-year tax exemption. The president of the firm, however, admitted that, during talks on import concessions, the deputy director of the legal department of the ministry suggested that Petropol give up its tax exemption.

The contradiction between the two regulations, in the opinion of the heads of the firm, practically prevents it from conducting further operations in Poland. Petropol deals in fuels, and the favorable terms—chiefly the tax exemption—inclined the foreign investors to invest in Poland. The investments made so far amount to more than \$2.5 million and are concentrated in Piotrkow Trybunalski, where Petropol located its base for more than 10,000 [metric] tons of fuel. During the last three months of its operations, the firm has sold in all 26,700 tons of fuel. The customers of Petropol consist of about 120 individual stations in a private network of gasoline stations and nearly 40 transportation and municipal firms, etc. The Piotrkow base, which was built over the course of several months, meets the most recent standards, including environmental protection requirements set at the ministerial level.

The heads of Petropol are also accusing the ministry of introducing a distinction into the application of its own regulations. In the opinion of President Niewiadomski, import concessions are being given to those who do not have storage and distribution facilities, another of the ministry's conditions. For example, the Sopot firm Horn, which, according to President Niewiadomski, acts as a fuel-purchasing middleman, has only an office and several trucks. As proof of this, President Niewiadomski cited his own experience, which shows that in April, Petropol, which was deprived of the right to import fuel, was forced to purchase diesel fuel that had been imported from Belarus from Horn, and also bore the foreign prepayment according to the regulations burdening the importer. Horn absorbed three-fourths of the profit from such an influx of fuel, and, according to the head of Petropol, it is a favorite of Minister Glapinski.

President Niewiadomski announced that, if his firm does not finally receive permission to import fuel, the case will have its epilogue in the courts for damages, which would be paid by the state treasury if Petropol won.

Prospects for Polish Copper Considered


90EP0520C Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
(ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish
23-24 May 92 p III

[Article by A.W., K.B., and A.K.: "Better Prospects for Copper: Our Ore Reserves Calculated at 80 Years"]

[Excerpts] This year, the price of copper has increased barely 70 pounds sterling for a [metric] ton (about 6 percent) on world markets. At the London Metal Exchange, a ton for immediate delivery currently costs about 1,210 pounds; the price for a ton, three-month future, is 25 pounds higher. Last week, the price of copper fell because of the strike situation in the German metal industry. [passage omitted]

Seventh Place in the World

Poland's opportunity as a supplier of copper for Western markets appears favorable. In 1991, the Copper Mining-Smelting Works in Lubin produced 350,000 tons of electrolytic copper and 860 tons of silver, which puts Poland in seventh position in the world in both cases. In 1991, the value sold exceeded \$1 billion, of which nearly 72 percent were exports.




Sales of the Copper Mining-Smelting Works and State Budget Income (in trillion zlotys, lower part of each bar)

Plans for 1992 call for an increase in actual production of electrolytic copper to about 385,000 to 390,000 tons and about 900 tons of silver, of which 92 percent is to be from their own concentrates; the rest is to come from Chilean imports. It is estimated that the amount of sales should reach the level of 12 trillion zlotys [Z] and the profits should be on the order of Z1.2 to Z2 trillion.

Polish copper ore reserves are among the largest in Europe, including the European part of Russia. The total mine production of copper in West Europe is about

400,000 tons (chiefly from Portugal and Yugoslavia—together about 290,000 tons), or about 10 percent more than Poland's production.

The known reserves of our copper ore are 1.6 billion tons with an average copper content of 1.63 percent, which given the current level of production should provide 80 years of economically justified production. According to information from the Central Office of Statistics, in 1991 Poland (which de facto means the works in Lubin) exported 241,300 tons of copper and semifinished products, 17.8 percent more than in 1990, and earned an average price of \$2,337 per ton (13 percent lower than in 1990). The reduction in income in comparison with expectations resulted from the decline in the price of copper on world markets last year.



Total Sales of Copper (thousand tons) and Amounts Exported (lower portion of each bar)

At present, the Copper Mining-Smelting Works in Lubin employs 38,500 people, but the level of employment is systematically falling. The works constitute a unified organizational structure (20 factories, including three mines and three smelters), that, according to management plans and the Ministry of Ownership Transformation, will be restructured. The restructuring program calls for breaking up the works into several more efficiently operating units. There are also plans to privatize the firm, but the choice of possible partners has not been made. In the opinion of the management of the Copper Mining-Smelting Works, a good partner would be the American firm Asarco, which has turned in a worse financial performance than Lubin, according to the Lubin managers. In 1991, the Copper Mining-Smelting Works earned \$100 million in profits, and it has no debt. Asarco earned a profit of \$50 million and has debts on the order of \$800 million.

Chances for Prolific Fruit Harvest Viewed

92EP0483A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA (ECONOMY AND LAW supplement) in Polish 3 Jun 92 p II

[Article by Edmund Szot: "Abundant Fruit Harvest Predicted: How Shall We Utilize the Harvest?"]

[Text] In a market economy a bumper harvest is chiefly good news to consumers, for it means that farm product prices will be low. Farmers and fruit growers are not as happy about it, but still they are not worried, because it is better to have merchandise for sale than to have none, even if, owing to its surplus, prices have to be lowered.

Precisely such a situation may occur this year on the fruit market. All the signs in heaven and on earth point to a bumper harvest of tree-grown fruits and a berry harvest only somewhat lower but still better than a year ago. The only worry is whether the fruit and vegetable industry will have sufficient funds for fruit procurements, which shall begin soon now, within less than two weeks.

There is an anecdote about Wladyslaw Gomulka, a fellow who wanted to be recorded in history as "the Good Boss": At some or another meeting he is said to have declared, "We are not afraid of a disastrous harvest; we shall allow the fruit to remain on the trees." Who knows whether this year that "economic maneuver" might not be repeated here and there. After all, for the time being, the fruit and vegetable industry is short of funds, and the participation of other entities in fruit procurements is still low.

Besides, we still have to speak in the conditional tense about this year's fruit harvest. "Maybe" is not tantamount to "certainly." We have to wait for the so-called setting of fruit on St. John's Day and, when estimating the size of the coming harvest to allow for the still possible eruptions of various fruit diseases and pests, and only after all the obstacles are surmounted, to rejoice in a successful harvest for fruit growers. Now the first signs for this harvest were auspicious. Last winter was exceptionally favorable to the wintering of trees. Neither the trees nor the shoots nor the flower buds froze. The precipitation also turned out to be favorably distributed, considering that a couple of extra days of rain could spoil the berry harvest, while, on the other hand, prolonged drought could cause strawberries and currants to be smaller in size and then their harvest would be smaller.

Dr. Andrzej Cholewinski, director for the dissemination of progress at the Fruit and Flower Growing Institute in Skierniewice, has been successfully doing fruit harvest forecasts for several years now, and he warns against excessive optimism. "Our forecast is optimistic," he said, "but on certain conditions, for it to come true, the fair weather has to continue."

Thus if the weather remains the way it is now, we can expect a harvest of 1,800,000 metric tons [mt] of apples (a year ago 1,146,000 mt), 80,000 mt of pears (53,000 mt a year ago), 100,000 mt of plums (67,000 mt a year ago), 100,000 mt of cherries (80,000 mt a year ago), 20,000 mt of Bing cherries (same as last year), 10,000 mt of apricots, peaches, and nuts (4,000 mt a year ago). The berry crop does not seem as abundant. At present there is still a chance for harvesting 300,000 mt of strawberries (263,000 mt a year ago), 40,000 mt of raspberries (32,000 mt a year ago), 130,000 mt of black currants (95,000 mt a year ago), 70,000 mt of red currants (75,000 mt a year ago), 47,000 mt of gooseberries (42,000 mt a year ago), and 3,000 mt of blackberries and blueberries (same as last year). Altogether, the aggregate harvest of all fruits may reach the level of 2,700,000 mt, compared with 1,850,000 mt a year ago.

We are thus facing an abundance which, for the aforementioned reasons, may not be fully exploited, especially considering that the exports of Polish fruits to the West have never been particularly large, and those to the East have almost completely ceased following the collapse of the USSR. And yet we used to sell some 250,000 mt of apples annually to the Soviets and we had even signed an agreement for increasing the exports to half a million mt annually by the year 2000. Fate has decreed otherwise and our Eastern neighbors nowadays need potatoes more, considering that, given the decline in living standards, calories have priority before vitamins. In Poland itself that has not happened yet and does not have to happen. But one prerequisite is a sagacious utilization of all the bounties of nature.

CD's Constantinescu Holds News Conference

92P20338A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
30 Jun 92 pp 1, 3

[Article by Constantin Lupu: "Let's Tell the Truth to the Very End' Says Emil Constantinescu, Democratic Convention candidate for president of Romania"]

[Text] In his first news conference, Emil Constantinescu, who was just named the sole candidate of the Democratic Convention [CD] for president of the country, came out in favor of a "relaxed dialogue," directly with representatives of the most diverse segments of the population. Therefore, he intends to travel through the country, far and wide, in the next three months.

Mr. Constantinescu is not excluding the press from this dialogue. No way, since the press "is the only thing that is operating satisfactorily in the current system of democracy in Romania." At any rate, Prof. Constantinescu is decisive: "Let's tell the truth to the very end!" "The coming months will be decisive not only for Romania and not only for the next few years"—the sole candidate of the CD predicted, concluding his introductory speech.

The many journalists present at the press conference took aim. It seem that, except for some hesitations, the professor proved to be a well-prepared student. Perhaps because he had been in the same room on Saturday, almost in the same position, with almost the same audience.

Under these more special conditions, we learned how Constantinescu had been chosen, first of all, to be one of the five CD candidates. He told us that some colleagues in University Solidarity had an idea: to prepare a composite image of a possible president. Then, they began to look for those who corresponded to the image. "I was not the only one contacted"—Emil Constantinescu confessed, modestly. "But some people were not drawn to the idea"—he added. We understood that the special characteristics of the CD candidate were among the traits that the composite image should have: He is an independent candidate, with legal training along with technical training, with managerial experience (during the past two years he was prorector and now he is rector of Bucharest University).

He did not refer much to what might be his disadvantage. "The press says that I am an unknown"—Mr. Constantinescu said, indicating his "Achilles' heel." Therefore, lack of renown. "But, renown can be positive or negative"—the speaker continued, betraying his roots as a teacher. "Many political figures in our country have negative renown." He refrained (out of delicacy?) from naming them.

We learned that his election campaign would give "priority to what we have to say and to our solutions for change."

The issue of the monarchy, or more precisely, the need for a referendum on this subject, cannot be absent from

the discussion. The president of the country must guarantee that the nation will be consulted by referendum on essential issues. But the nation must also be well-informed. However, Mr. Constantinescu stated, correctly, that "there should not be a campaign for the monarchy but one for the truth!"

Ultimately, the CD candidate is less concerned about whether there is a monarchy or a republic than about the constitutional character of the form of government. However, it should be taken into account that he is running for the office of president of the Republic....

It is certain that Mr. Constantinescu is in favor of a stricter interpretation of presidential functions: noninterference in governmental activity, reduction of the guard and protocol forces, and the reduction of "working visits." In regard to a possible presidential residence, Mr. Constantinescu said very explicitly: "I will not live in Cotroceni!" Two reasons might be behind his decision: the illegitimacy of the annexation of the palace to the Presidency and the fact that, in these hard times, "much more decency" is needed.

In regard to the Securitate files, the speaker at yesterday's news conference pointed out that "each person's access to his own file, so that he can become completely familiar with it, should be facilitated." In regard to the files of informers, he believes that "it is not a good idea to publish all their files. The nation is not interested in whether mechanic X gave who knows what information to the Securitate." On the other hand, the situation is different in regard to public functions. "As for me," Emil Constantinescu said, "I want my Securitate file to be made public, if there is a file. However, I have not had any sort of contacts with the Securitate or with the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service]."

A colleague from a recently established daily newspaper, carrying a Motorola radio-telephone on his left hip, was interested in learning the host's opinion in regard to his initiative for the publication of the transcript of Saturday's secret meeting. This was in reference to the transparency to which Mr. Constantinescu referred earlier. But his reply was: "Transparency is one thing, but the less than elegant way in which you have operated is something else."

In a few words, Mr. Emil Constantinescu proposed: "Simplicity, coherence, transparency, to transform the image to which many people have become accustomed—that of a factotum president."

CD Candidate Discusses Options, Presidency

AU1407062592 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 1 Jul 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Emil Constantinescu, presidential candidate of the Democratic Convention, by Roxana Iordache; place and date not given: "I Consider Participation in Political Life a Moral Option"]

[Excerpts] [Iordache] Professor, did you ever expect a candidate for the position of Romania's president to be nominated the way you were?

[Constantinescu] It was indeed something new for Romania, where we are used to a single candidate. The fact that the electors of the Democratic Convention [CD] had the chance to elect a candidate from a choice of five is a sign that here, in Romania, we do not lack personalities. I am convinced that this model will cover in the coming years also candidates to the parliamentary forum.

[Iordache] What was the factor that made the 67 electors of the Democratic Convention elect you?

[Constantinescu] The members of the electoral collegium have various political views, ages, professions, and life experience, and they represented—in a limited framework—the electorate of 27 September. Maybe they thought that through my legal and technical education and my experience in life I could be the answer to the expectations of several social and professional groups with specific interests. On the other hand, I believe that they took into consideration the political education in our country, in which a great majority of the electorate, who have barely entered into democracy, prefer as president somebody who is not a party member, who is not the head of a party, and who has not run before. Novelty might be a good weapon against disappointment. Or maybe they saw in me an ordinary person who is close to the masses. A candidate of the Democratic Convention, even if he is not known, is believed to be an organizer of people's hopes.

And this is important now, when an increasing number of the future voters see in the Democratic Convention their chance of carrying out changes. [passage omitted]

[Iordache] Professor, some people have pictured you as a scientist who spends his life exclusively among books and complicated instruments. To what extent does this picture match reality?

[Constantinescu] In a way this is true. Certainly, I spend a lot of my time in research. But this in no way means that I am cut off from reality. On the contrary, my profession itself—I am a geologist—has given me the chance to travel throughout the country. From the sheepfold to the university laboratory the road took me to many peasant homes—I am very familiar with life in the countryside—and all kinds of workplaces. Equally I have known the everyday life of peasants, workers, and students, and I have lived together with them. I was not with them as an activist and met them during working meetings.

[Iordache] What do you detest most?

[Constantinescu] Intolerance.

[Iordache] What makes you most happy?

[Constantinescu] To honor people's trust and people becoming my friends.

[Iordache] What do you think is your greatest advantage in life?

[Constantinescu] The fact that I have always been among young people and I could always learn something from them, such as the freshness of their way of thinking, their courage to start all over again, and their sincerity.

[Iordache] What made you accept the proposal to run for the Presidency?

[Constantinescu] If you want to change something, you need the power to do it. Not power for the sake of power but power to be able to act. The life of the Romanian people must change for the better. I entered the political struggle in order to have the power to represent the Romanian people's desire to change the situation and to be able to officially impose these changes, starting with the real division of power in the state and the democratization of the institutions and ending with everyday life.

[Iordache] Do you believe that in accepting this candidacy to the office of president you can gain or you can lose something?

[Constantinescu] I am sure that I will lose very much in the professional sphere, but I also know that I can gain a lot on the moral plane, namely, the appreciation of people who trust you. Thus, there are two aspects here: one of losing something definite, one's professional career, and the other, to assume a hope. For me personally, my university career is important; namely, the field in which I have spent my life and to which I wish to return. After the revolution, events brought me to the highest level of a university career, to an area dominated by precise rules and criteria. Each moment of absence there might cost a lot.

I think that by leaving this career, even temporarily, I will lose the chance to complete many ideas and projects that will be very difficult to recoup later. However, currently we are going through a period when the intellectual's duty is to directly participate in the political life of our country in order to pull Romania out of the crisis. That is why I see it as a moral option.

[Iordache] What do you think the most important quality of Romania's president should be?

[Constantinescu] His character.

Defense Minister Discusses WEU Importance

AU1307110192 Bucharest LUMEA No 25-26
in Romanian 25 Jun 92 p 3

[Interview with Nicolae Spiroiu, Romanian minister of national defense, by Mirela Iarmandi at Konigswinter, near Bonn, on 19 June]

[Text] [Iarmandi] Mr. Minister, what is the significance of the meeting of the West European Union [WEU]?

[Spiroiu] Its importance lies in the fact that the military field has been included in the system of promoting European security, and this is the goal of the West European Union.

This intergovernmental body of cooperation in the field of security, which at the same time is also NATO's European support pillar, attempts to create an operational structure, which in concrete terms means to establish a cell of political and military analysis. This will allow for an effective intervention to eliminate crises that might emerge on our continent. The presence of defense ministers at this meeting, who had the opportunity to table their viewpoints and hold an exchange of views during the working lunch, will accelerate this process of WEU military assistance granted to the states that are currently undergoing the process of transition to democracy.

[Iarmandi] Among the concrete measures established, the declaration also stipulates the annual meeting of foreign ministers and defense ministers of the participating countries. What will this system of meetings mean?

[Spiroiu] Apart from the fact that these meetings will be institutionalized, the document also stipulates that such meetings will be held any time that there is need for them. This is very important. Thus, there will be cooperation in case of crisis. There will not be simple consultations because operational structures will be set up, meant to give power to this body and grant it the capability to react.

[Iarmandi] In a concrete way, how will Romania participate in these operational structures?

[Spiroiu] This remains to be established for each case individually.

[Iarmandi] How is the French-German body viewed?

[Spiroiu] The French-German body is viewed as the element of power of this structure. It will become operational in two to three years. However, it is suspected of being a way to renounce the NATO military structures. Romania's position has been clearly explained: The WEU structures should not superimpose the structures of the CSCE and NATO; they should only be complementary to those structures. But this is necessary because the NATO regulations do not allow for an effective intervention. For example, in case of the Gulf war certain armies could not participate in the action because of certain limitations.

Scenario Foresees Rebirth of Communism

*AU1107144792 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 2 Jul 92 pp 1, 3*

[Florin Iaru article: "The Heirs"]

[Text] After the more than probable date of general elections has been announced, a large part of the mass

media started circulating the idea that the last hardship we would ever have to face would be the reinstallment of President Iliescu. God had mercy on us, nothing else can possibly go wrong, and we should be satisfied that the National Salvation Front [FSN] will not be reelected! Well, I will try to demonstrate that this aspect is just the visible tip of the iceberg and that the postponement of elections—out of 'carelessness' as they say—will have extremely serious political consequences. I will leave aside the fact that having such a state leader as Mr. Iliescu will further push us toward the Third World, because of his priority alliances, wanted by no other person (China, fundamentalist Islamic countries, Central African countries, and so on). Similarly, it is commonly known that unlike other Eastern state leaders, our head of state is never invited anywhere, no one will negotiate with him, and no one is relying on what he says, because he is seen as the typical transition man. People abroad who are interested in Romania are expecting that the honorable gentleman will be defeated, without being punished, as many might think. I pity him, quite frankly. Here he is, thinking of himself as a clear-sighted and wise patriot, using up all his energy (and a considerable amount of funds), and still so misunderstood by the people! What a typically Ceausescu-type plight! The only truly patriotic gesture he could make would be to resign for good, although I no longer believe in the unselfishness of the converted.

Still, I am not even pessimistic. The way I see it, Mr. Iliescu will not be able to win more than 35 percent of the votes in the first ballot. We will see what happens next. After all, a president who is isolated from the world and from his own country—by a democratic Parliament—would be the worst propaganda for such a wretched democracy. Mr. President (I repeat, if he manages to become our president) will have to content himself with what he has been dreaming of all his life: Paying working visits.

Suffocated by the legislative, economic, and administrative chaos, political commentators have been unable to see the long-term consequences of holding elections on 27 September. It used to be fashionable about two years ago to elaborate all kinds of catastrophic scenarios. Now that we really are on the brink of a national disaster, no one cares to ring even a storm bell. But let us set out from pure facts: In 1990 the (theoretical) time interval between elections and the date of the first session of Parliament was 24 days. Supposing that there will be a similar delay this year, Parliament will first meet on 20 October. I have already toyed once with suppositions (and I correctly foretold the result of the local elections): Thus, I predict that not even the democratic coalition will win the majority, obtaining around 40 percent of the votes. The National Liberal Party will be unable to rise above 8 percent, which—under the current circumstances—would be a surprisingly good result. The left-oriented parties (the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania, the Traditional Social Democratic Party, and the Republican Party), the extremist-leftist parties (the

Democratic National Salvation Front and the Socialist Party of Labor), and the ultra-rightist parties (the National Unity Party of Romanians and the Romania Mare Party) will altogether obtain 30-35 percent of the votes. The "classical" FSN will be left with 20 percent of the votes, standing alone, like a strictly ruling umpire. Although it may seem tragic, the FSN will have to play into the hands of the executive. Negotiations to set up the cabinet will prove to be very difficult, because such "heavyweight" ministries will be at stake as the Ministry of Interiors, Defense, Finance, and Foreign Affairs. The party that will vitally contribute to the setting up of the new cabinet will be entitled to call the odds. No doubt, the times of comfortable majority are gone.

Under such circumstances, taking a minimum time into account, the new government will not be sworn in before 10 November. Let us add one more week for handing the business over to the new team. December will already be knocking on our door. The heritage of the lucky winners could be summed up in this way: general food and energetic shortages; financial blockage and inflation; a high unemployment rate and lack of Western financial and economic investments. Winter has always been a great enemy of the comprehensively developed socialist society, but democratic governments cannot ignore it, either. Trade unions will be boiling over; all kinds of social explosions will be possible. Do you think that there is a wizard government, anywhere in the world, that could overcome that heritage within a few days?

The people who stalled elections, postponing them until fall, did not have in mind strengthening their party in the meantime, but rather to bring about an intolerable situation designed to rapidly trigger a cabinet crisis. Being unable to govern and unable to give up power, the authors of the game are relying on the psychology of fatigue and envy. If the new government is unable to solve the problems within a few days, a coup may be attempted—with the support of the Securitate, the Army, and the yellow trade unions—for the well-being of the country and for national salvation. Hitler, although elected, could not have grasped power had the situation of Germany not been so dreadful between the two world wars. And, as a matter of fact, I heard the Socialist Party of Labor candidate to Bucharest's mayoral office praising fascism in communist terms.

Sources—which for the time being remain unofficial—have suggested that a genuine communist superparty is being reorganized in a conspiratorial manner, according to the best underground communist tradition, by their past and present leaders: Top army officers, Romanian Intelligence Service [SRI] people, party activists, and high-ranking officials have reached the conclusion (prompted from abroad) that democracy is superfluous in our country. The story about the blacklists is no fairy tale at all if one gets out of the narrow circle of fools. The best circumstances for these conspirators are offered by the economic chaos and disaster of the country.

The social layer of the population that supports their strong-arm measures is also ready: Our poor—that is, the majority of Romania's population—will welcome any measure as long as markets are supplied with some merchandise and apartments are heated. It will not matter at all that Romania will be isolated. Certain countries will endorse the new regime, provided it will not shoot political personalities in the head.

Receiving no Soviet support, the comrades will avoid political processes by all means. Nationalization, on the other hand, will strongly affect all private owners, while farmers might get away with it more easily, at least in the first stage. Our banking system will be state controlled again and purgings will follow at all levels. Having learned from Ceausescu's mistakes, the comrades will install a ruling system based on more leaders. Mr. President will of course have his own role.

You should not think that the SRI is asleep! Whereas the opposition—engaged in this bitter domestic fighting about the superfluous issue of presidency—has been snoozing well, in my opinion, for quite some time.

Be sober, nation!

Particiu on PNL-AT Issues, Political Scene

AU1307111592 Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 7 Jul 92 pp 1, 7

[Part one of interview with Dinu Patriciu, member of the National Liberal Party-Young Wing, by Aurel Perva; place and date not given: "Romania Is the Victim of a Big Scenario"]

[Excerpts] [Perva] Mr. Patriciu, are you a freemason as you are accused of by some of your political team members?

[Patriciu] No.

[Perva] Categorically no?

[Patriciu] Yes. However, I regret that I am not. I think that freemasonry is an absolutely essential structural category of a modern society. The solidarity of the elite means nothing but a dissemination of the social energies that generate social stability. As a matter of fact, aside from revolutions, changes, and modernization, this was the role of freemasonry, especially in the past decades.

[Perva] Why have feuds and splits appeared in your party? Is this a characteristic phenomenon of Romanian politics at this point?

[Patriciu] A scenario like that prior to 1989 is taking place in Romania, a scenario that, slowly but surely, is becoming obvious to all of us. This scenario essentially concerns the existence of a big socialist party that is leading a country with a puppet opposition made up of some historic parties. This is what was pursued all the time. A few modern and absolutely new political forces have emerged from this scenario, such as the Civic

Alliance Party [PAC], the Liberal Party-Young Wing [PNL-AT], and the group around Mr. Roman. These forces messed up the preestablished games in this country. They are trying to take it toward a balanced and normal political specter to guarantee stability.

[Perva] These scenarios have almost become a national illness. On what grounds do you make these affirmations?

[Patriciu] Proof is my experience in the past two years during which—on various occasions and with various people—I noted efforts by one or the other side of the barricade to enact this scenario. It is very clear to me, while the origin of this scenario is a completely different matter. I am sure that there are even secret services that developed this scenario. I am sure that there are also governments that thought of it, just as I am convinced that this scenario is based on certain vestiges of the postcommunist mentality in Romania. [passage omitted] Anyhow, this is the major illness of the infant democracy that we are experiencing.

[Perva] We are often tempted to explain the incongruity of certain steps and actions by invoking this scenario. Without explaining, I think that the moral and intellectual precariousness of today's policymakers is the most tangible reason at hand and the current parliament has often proved it.

[Patriciu] I have often said that I am more ashamed to have been part of this parliament than of having been a Communist Party member. [passage omitted]

[Perva] Let us see what actually happened in your party.

[Patriciu] One of the characteristics of liberalism is its pragmatism. [passage omitted] Our party has often been accused of a sort of political meandering. This political meandering is generated by the existence of a group that has become extremely powerful within the Steering Committee led by Viorel Catarama who let each political action be dictated by an instant mercantile interest. [passage omitted] Meanwhile, another thing has happened. This party began to be perceived by entrepreneurs, by this forming middle class, as the representative of social group interests. This dual personality of the party led to great support for it. It became powerful. This could be seen at the Brasov congress. It is a powerful party in terms of people, intelligence, and finances. This scared those within the party and those outside it. At that congress, it turned from a company of nominal shareholders into a limited company. [passage omitted]

[Perva] What are the accusations against you?

[Patriciu] The accusations were the same as those in the 1950's against the party members who were to be excluded from the Communist Party. I was accused of being a freemason, of wanting relations with the enemy, and wanting to dismember this country. [passage omitted]

[Perva] Did the accusation of meeting with the "enemy" refer to your meeting with Mr. Virgil Magureanu?

[Patriciu] This accusation of meeting with the enemy is based on a real fact that is completely distorted. [passage omitted] I agreed to meet with Mr. Magureanu, together with Mr. Nicolae Simescu. I was surprised by our discussion linked to the general and presidential elections. I told Mr. Magureanu that Mr. Iliescu's candidacy would not be to our country's advantage.

Bratianu Sees Need for Unity, Political Ethics

AU1307173592 Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 2 Jul 92 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Vintila Bratianu, president of the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention, by Mircea Florin Sandru; place and date not given: "The National Liberal Party Has To 'Clean Up' Its Image"]

[Text] [Sandru] Mr. Bratianu, following the events in December 1989 you had numerous offers to participate in Romania's political activity, but you declined them. Obviously, your attitude of not getting involved has changed, and today you are at the helm of the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention [PNL-CD].

[Bratianu] When I returned to the country at the beginning of January 1990, Mr. Dan Lazarescu proposed that I become the honorary president of a group of 12 liberals, a group that made up the current PNL nucleus. I said I would only accept the position of temporary president until someone younger than me came along. Mr. Radu Campeanu was found.

[Sandru] What made you accept the presidency of the PNL-CD now?

[Bratianu] This is not a change of attitude. I have been asked by many friends, including deputies and senators, to return to the country to support the liberal movement and thus contribute to the unity of all Romanians. The struggle we have to wage now, including through the Democratic Convention [CD], should not pursue narrow party interests, but the unity of the Romanian society and a different mode of life.

[Sandru] Your political involvement, however, is linked to a critical time, namely, when the National Liberal Party left the Democratic Convention.

[Bratianu] It was, of course, a critical situation. I did not realize in what direction the National Liberal Party intended to move. Since the Campeanu group left, the Democratic Convention went through a sort of confusion but that has been overcome and the CD is in very good "shape."

[Sandru] Do you view your abandoning this wait-and-see position as a personal sacrifice?

[Bratianu] No. I have always thought that I have to do my duty for the country. During WWII I also came back

to be at the side of my homeland. I do not do it out of ambition or for personal reasons. I will not run for the presidency, nor for the position of deputy or senator. The only thing I want is to preserve our unity and to build a society of a high European standard.

[Sandru] Do you believe that the National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention will become a powerful group with the passing of time?

[Bratianu] I do not want to say that in a short time the PNL-CD will become a "great" party. I rather hope for a "cleaning up" of the PNL. I have talked and written about this. Last April I sent a text to ROMANIA LIBERA that finally appeared in the CIVIC ALLIANCE in which I was talking about the need to clean up the PNL. In conclusion of that article I said that we cannot blame foreign countries or the nomenklatura for the crisis we are going through but only ourselves, the democrats. We ourselves have to solve this problem. In this context I mentioned the principles of Maniu and I. Gh. Duca [former leaders of National Peasant Party and National Liberal Party respectively]. Both promoted commendable political ethics. Since you represent a youth paper it is even more appropriate to talk about ethics in politics. Otherwise young people lose their trust in democratic leaders. As you see, young people are leaving because their hopes for tomorrow have been shattered. It hurts me to watch this situation.

[Sandru] Does the presence of the PNL-CD and of the National Liberal Party-Young Wing [PNL-AT] in the Democratic Convention constitute a factor of balance?

[Bratianu] Yes, because they are parties that are consolidating as we are moving along. As far as we are concerned, many senators and deputies have switched over to the PNL-CD. Aside from this, entire local organizations have joined us, bringing along their chairs and headquarters, so to speak. It is comforting. I would like to travel around the country to encourage and attract young people who should be in the forefront. We, the older people, will be happy to be their advisers.

[Sandru] Are you going to make use of the traditions and experience of your family in your activity at the helm of the PNL-CD?

[Bratianu] Yes. I grew up in a family that places public well-being above personal well-being.

[Sandru] Will the fact that in the past years you have lived in countries with a recognized democratic tradition play any role in your political activity?

[Bratianu] At the beginning I lived in France for two years. I spent more than 20 years in the United States, then I lived in Germany and England. I am now trying to establish my home in Romania to do my duty, as I said. I will certainly make use of the experience I acquired during my exile. In this respect, I want to mention a text published in THE WASHINGTON POST that outlined Havel's speech at New York University. This text concludes with the following words: The activity of a politician has to be ethical. I will take the liberty to continue: Only in this way will we be able to consolidate Romania political activity and democracy, and only thus will young people trust us again.

Croatian People's Party Chairman on Elections*92BA1160C Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
24 Jun 92 p 5*

[Article by Savka Dabcevic-Kucar: "Going Out To Meet the Elections?"]

[Text] The prerequisites for calling elections were defined long ago by the president of the state. They are the complete withdrawal of the aggressor army from Croatia, the disarming of the Chetnik formations, and the return to their homes of those driven out. That is, the end of the war and Croatia's actual sovereignty over its entire and undivided territory.

Have we achieved that? Are we to take part in elections with refugees away from their homes, with Croatian soldiers still at their positions, with bombs falling on Stradun and people in Bosanski Brod and Sibenik in their cellars, without the Croatian flag that was promised in Knin? The responsibility of the assessment falls to the person who is responsible for the decision to call the elections!

It was back in December that the president made the promise about elections "soon." Along with the promise about the end of the war ("by Christmas"); then in January, and again in March, again in May, and so on. I do not intend to blame the incumbent party for not having brought about the prerequisites, but it is evident that their forecasts were completely mistaken. Incidentally, that is true in many other areas as well.

As for the HNS [Croatian People's Party] and me personally, we are for the elections on the condition that the prerequisites referred to are actually brought about. There will certainly be enough competitors. Not enemies, as some people in the administration assert. It is a good thing to have ahead of us a test of our strength, our programs, and our people, because Croatia can only benefit from a confrontation of proposals.

In the difficult social and economic situation we face, we will offer our program, compare it to others, especially those who for two years now have been saying that they have one, but they either never had one or they have been conducting the wrong economic and social policy. We all feel the consequences, and the war cannot be an alibi for a large part of them. Our specific programs (political and others) will finally be offered to the public, which has not been sufficiently possible for us up to now, and let the people decide whose vision is more accurate in looking at Croatian problems and whose "remedies" are the right ones. The democratic decision of the majority is the only way that Croatia can move forward.

If elections are called, we can finally speak completely openly. Critically—on behalf of Croatia. I am convinced that Croatia is harmed much less by criticism of wrong or undemocratic moves than by those moves themselves. For example, people who say that all those who think

critically—the press, enterprises, and the banks—should be "swallowed up." And to win the elections that way. What an odor of the past!

I expect that in these elections, if the war is finally brought to a just conclusion, and the independent sovereign state of Croatia is recognized, there will no longer be any decision "for" and "against" in a referendum—now the decision will be made on what our Croatia will be like; what programs and people will make it possible to bring to life a democratic society of free and prosperous citizens? I am personally in favor of all Croatian forces coming together toward that goal. But not subordinate to one party (regardless of which) and still less to one person (no matter whom), but rather I favor a unity through the diversity of solutions being offered. Let the best people win and let them be carried out by the most able people, not those who are most politically suitable. I do not see a future for Croatia opened up by the elections that have been heralded all this time.

It is a great drawback that the election law (thanks to a simple case of outvoting in the proceeding involved in enacting it) allows a candidate to go to the Assembly who has received a minimum plurality (because the second round of elections is not being held). I wonder if this still could be changed somehow in the interest of Croatia?

Unfortunately, the elections could even become a farce, especially if at least the following conditions are not brought about:

1. The voter lists must truly be complete, verified, and made public, so as to avoid the possibility of "dead souls" or lost voters, solely because in the present troubles they did not extend their residency. According to the information we have up to this point, not even 40 percent of the voters are entered in the lists;
2. There must be no manipulation with the votes of the diaspora. The list of possible "deceptions" is long. We have to avoid any irregularity if we want the elections and the results to be legitimate;
3. The election commissions, which are neutral as to party in their legal definition, must truly be so so as to guarantee a complete absence of bias at polling places and to make it possible for the act of the elections to be monitored by party representatives;
4. All party candidates and programs must be assured equal opportunities to appear in public. This particularly applies to prime time on Croatian TV, where up to now the rules of the game have been just the opposite;
5. If the elections are nevertheless held before the refugees have returned to their homes, they must be allowed to vote separately for candidates from the places where they lived previously;
6. Exercise of the right to vote must be guaranteed even to those among us who deserve the most credit—the Croatian fighters who are still at their positions;

7. Finally, I issue a plea for "fair play," for dignified, honest, civilized, and tolerant confrontation instead of a "catch-as-catch-can" battle, which, unfortunately, is taking on ever greater proportions to the detriment of democracy and Croatia's reputation as the election campaign nervousness increases, especially on the part of the incumbent party.

There also remains the question of whether we should take part in the elections at all unless these issues have been resolved satisfactorily. I personally do not favor a boycott. The government is responsible for scheduling the elections and conducting them properly. It is the responsibility of all of us to offer Croatia what we consider to be the best. Croatia necessarily needs other solutions and new chances. We dare not leave the political field without a fight. And again, the interest of Croatia is above the interest of the party! The elections are a challenge and opportunity for everyone, but also the democratic way of verifying the incumbent administration—if they are democratic. And evidence on what Croatia is like today—before the world public, but, above all, before our own public. Let us all lend a hand in seeing that we pass the test.

Independent Role of NOVI DANAS Stressed

*92BA1185A Zagreb NOVI DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
29 Jun 92 p 7*

[Editorial by Mladen Maloca: "Why a New DANAS?"]

[Text] Is there any point in quarreling over the past? Should one depart without speaking his truth? Would this not be intolerable and negligent behavior toward all those who for an entire decade have invested themselves, all their knowledge, intellectual capacities, and spiritual courage in DANAS? Just think of all the trials and challenges there have been during those 10 years! How many rises and falls, how much support and rejection. Nevertheless, after 10 years and four months, following issue No. 537, the covers of the book have closed. DANAS as we have known it is no longer being published. Much has already been said about the reasons. But for the sake of the truth, not for repetition, we should say that those who are now attempting to prove at any price that DANAS disappeared solely for financial reasons are not right. It is true that DANAS did have financial difficulties, but those difficulties that fall in the area of the political were much greater and more fatal, though some might not like to hear it. The attitude toward DANAS was usually shaped according to political criteria, and in the interpretation of the powerful winners of the election they did not favor a weekly that after 10 years of publication was not just a political fact, but also a cultural fact in these parts. That tragicomic situation in which a pudgy party bureaucrat panically shouted "Stop REUTERS," believing that in this way he would conceal the horrors of the events in Kosovo, has been repeated almost paradigmatically these last two years in the case of DANAS. Many even in Croatia, especially in the recent past, have attempted to hobble

the media, thinking that by silencing them they would persuade the world and all around them that things with democracy stand far better than what the newsmen are writing. That is a dangerous illusion of the powers that be, one that results in the suffering not only of newsmen, but also the democracy to which everyone is making such pledges.

And if the attitude toward journalism constitutes the democratic credentials of any administration, including therefore the one in Croatia, then many newfound democrats must blush concerning the case of DANAS. Everything that they have done, hiding behind the slogan that they are concerned about the financial situation in DANAS, as though they wanted to preserve social property, proved to be only the wings of the theater behind which they were attempting by clever manipulations to silence the critical voice of DANAS. And so, when it comes to the past and the truth, we should add that DANAS was never on any other side except the side of truth and its vocation. We have tried to defend the right of opinions to differ and to confront one another, we have argued in favor of political pluralism and a free market, a civil society, and human rights. Our success in this has been uneven, but we have always and above all been guided by a desire for professional integrity.

These few sentences had to be written for other reasons than pathos or sentiment. In starting up NOVI DANAS, we want to say that it has not come out of nowhere. In its conception, it is a new paper, but in a way it is a continuation of those values on which its predecessor gained its reputation and professional prestige. We feel, then, that at this moment, in spite of the virtual flood of new titles and newspapers, Croatia also needs a modern political weekly that will take a journalistically sovereign and committed approach to establishment of a new democratic political system. This should be a weekly that will recognize trends and analyze processes, but not in a dry and boring way, but with a creative approach that will feel the pulse of the times and of the reading public. It will be a balanced combination of an opinion magazine and a news magazine, so that we can supply readers with a great many opinions and facts.

NOVI DANAS will, of course, try even under the new conditions, freed from the restraint of state ownership and government political intervention, to preserve the critical aspect in its approach and coverage of topics. It is our position that in these moments, when large parts of Croatia have been destroyed by the devastation of war, under pressure of the tragic scale of refugees and exiles and the general impoverishment, a decisive battle is being waged for the democratic future of all of us. We are profoundly convinced that the future of the Republic of Croatia and its becoming part of the European organism depend on the authentic commitment to democratic regulation of relations and to its democratic system. We must be aware that it cannot become an integral part of European civil democracy and tradition by joining this or that association, but only by building an authentic democratic atmosphere in Croatia itself. Only insofar as

we in Croatia succeed in establishing democratic criteria will we be able to speak of firmer or weaker integration into present-day European developments. NOVI DANAS will try to recognize them and offer them to readers in an interesting and attractive way, consistently committing ourselves as journalists to the ideas of human liberties and a law-governed state, a free market and private enterprise, precisely those things that an independent and sovereign Croatia wants to share with the entire world.

In that task, NOVI DANAS will try to maintain its independence, neither bowing to political groups or individuals, nor giving in to emotions or sympathies of the moment. Openness to everything that aims at democratic practice and a critical attitude toward everything that departs from it must be the sign of recognition of NOVI DANAS quality.

We are deeply convinced that with more pages and a graphic redesign of the paper we will win the confidence of readers both in and outside of Croatia.

Increased Customs Fees on Foreign Goods

*92BA1185B Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
4 Jul 92 p 1*

[Article by Drago Ovcar]

[Text] As of midnight Thursday [2 July], Croatian customhouses, customs offices, and customs services at national border crossings are applying a new and altered import regime, whose basic feature is higher prices of all consumer goods purchased abroad and intended for final consumers.

Beginning Friday, that is, a new rate of the special customs duty is in effect. Up to now, it has been 7.5 percent, but now it is 15 percent. This makes all imports 7.5 percent "dearer," but even a few percentage points

more than that, because it also increases the base for computation of taxes, because the value of the goods used as that base also includes the customs duty. Thus, for example, the total customs charges for importation of an automobile will increase from 26 percent to 33.5 percent, and that then increases the tax. The higher special customs fee does not apply to the importation of production supplies, raw materials, and spare parts.

As of Friday, the preferential rate of duty on goods originating in Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia has also been abolished. Up to now, duty was charged on products from those states at a rate of 1 percent, but beginning on Friday total customs charges on Slovene, Bosnian-Herzegovinian, and Macedonian goods will be 23.5 percent, to which the appropriate increase in the tax burden should be added.

Something else is new for Croatian nationals: Whereas up to now when they returned from abroad they were allowed goods at the border of up to \$3,000 at the uniform customs rate, now they can import goods at that rate only up to the value of \$500. The uniform customs rate of 24 percent is applied, and then tax obligations are added to that. For imports worth more than \$500, customs duties are charged according to the regular schedule.

There has been no change in the right of Croatian nationals who have been working or residing abroad for a lengthy period to import goods up to the value of \$1,500 once a year. All citizens of the Republic of Croatia have the right whenever they return from abroad to import articles without payment of duty and tax up to the value of \$100.

Feri Horvat, president of the Economic Chamber of Slovenia, has sent a letter to Ivica Gazi, president of the Economic Chamber of Croatia, in which he suggests that he intervene with the Croatian Government to exempt Slovenia from the additional fees on goods exported to Croatia.

Bunkers Prepared for Serbian Leadership

92P20336A Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
4 Jul 92 p 8

[Unattributed article: "Bunkers Are Ready"]


[Text] Although Serbian President Milosevic is still in the saddle, he has certainly ensured himself of at least a temporary refuge to escape a fate that he has prepared for his loyal people if it comes to a UN military intervention in Serbia. He has not left to chance even a retreat if there is a fall a la Ceausescu.

The Serbian capital has, as seen on the map, several good underground shelters, the majority of which belong to the army. Since it is quite possible that the generals of the new Yugoslavia would not like to see the Serbian president in their own hideouts, he has chosen Tito's former hunting grounds in Dobanovacka Suma [Dobanovacka Woods] as a wartime substitute for his villa in Dedinje.

This is a luxurious shelter dating from Tito's Yugoslavia. It is located between the Surcin civilian and the Batajnica military airports, where a Falcon, Lear jet, and JAK-40 are always ready, as well as MI-8 helicopters and Gazelles with ethnically pure crews. The shelter is connected directly to the Presidency and the General Staff buildings and is well secured.

Higher officers will also hide underground in three locations: under the center of the General Staff building, in the shelter under Rakovica Hill, which was used by the Wehrmacht [WWII German Army], and in the underground bunker at Stari Banovci, not far from the Batajnica airport.

Well, the leaders are taken care of, and the hide-and-seek game can begin.



Key:

1. Underground bunker; Command of the Fighter Regiment and the Missile Brigade of the Air Defense Command
2. "13 May" Training Center of the Serbian Interior Ministry Special Forces
3. Batajnica Airport
4. Surcin Airport
5. Military Recreation Center
6. JNA General Staff
7. Bunker in Rakovica: Command of the 1st Corps Air Force and the Air Defense Command

Sanctions Against Serbia Cause 'Panic'*92BA1186A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
30 Jun 92 p 13*

[Article by Momcilo Djorgovic: "Fourth Week of the Blockade: Between Nightmare and Panic"]

[Text] Shock is short-lived by its very nature. After that paralyzing blow come states of lively and lucid consciousness or a still deeper intoxicating unconsciousness. Immediately after the first shock, over several days we became aware of the national and economic disaster we face, and now in the fourth week of the blockade the nation has relaxed, made itself comfortable once again, and continued its anarchic unconsciousness and constant chewing of its cud. Traffic has become lively again, coupons and foreign currencies are circulating without hindrance on the black market, enterprises are not operating, but everyone is receiving his salary, and the political nightmare continues. Time is going slowly for Dobrica Cosic, and his series of conversations and advisory sessions threaten to turn into that bad endlessness that will destroy his authority as a possible messiah and will anesthetize any action. His moment will pass, the whirlpools of chaos will carry him away, and they will be proven right who judged that Cosic's selection was a "clever maneuver to save the communist old guard." Cosic has already begun to complain publicly of "political obstruction" so that it is very difficult for him to gain access to the prime minister, but people expect him, as head of state, to clearly identify those obstacles. A serious bite has been taken out of his prestige by Slobodan Milosevic, who, although the new federation still has not been officially inaugurated, has already announced creation of a confederation with Greece, leapfrogging over the new president. And no sooner were the Serbs led into a new state than they were led out of it and into another one. They were not even all asked about the first one, and they have learned about the possible second one from the newspapers.

Panic has become the aura surrounding every event and a constituent element of consciousness. The Serbs have been put in a state of permanent fear and have become agitated, like rabbits who have a foreboding of a cataclysm, but at the same time they are helpless, and every avenue of flight seems to them absurd. The administration is not opening a single valve, nothing is changing, patriotism is advocated in the name of defense of our positions, and the Serbian Assembly, which has never been more pitiful, is offering support to an administration that is completely battered. The opposition has fallen to squabbling, and the St. Vitus' Day of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia], which was to be an effort of all citizens and all nationalities, is turning into a royalist-student demonstration deriving its main energy from Draskovic's SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement].

In any case, the principal star of this happening was in fact Draskovic, and the crown prince was only decoration and an argument to the effect that a segment of the

opposition wants something quite different than what we have had up to now. For one segment of the political forces, the prince is the crowning trump in the struggle against the present government. No one did more to confuse the gathering in front of the Assembly than Vuk Draskovic with his statement that "we must form a provisional government, a transitional government consisting of representatives of DEPOS, the university, and all democratic forces, on the one hand, and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] on the other." This proposal was immediately booed, although it might be a good political move, in spite of the fact that the Manichean division and latent confrontation is retained in the form of an alliance. Draskovic is displaying a feel not only for biblical rhetoric, but also for political tactics that could above all dislodge all those Milosevices who have been holding on to him convulsively and supporting him out of the fear that his fall is to be followed by a flood in which they will experience a terrible judgment. Draskovic has thus opened the door for them, and at the same time he is announcing that his movement will get rid of political exclusiveness.

The benevolent and likeable Prince Aleksandar has again found himself among Serbs, offering himself to help when they are in the most difficult position. In return, of course, he is seeking a monarchy of the parliamentary type, of which most people in the street who are calling for monarchy have not much idea. One would rather say that their royalist appeals represent a nostalgia for the old Serbian glory, a longing for Balkan aristocracy, and new leaders. Of course, everything that is ugly and all the collisions between the modern and the conservative that ran through the previous Serbian monarchies have been erased from that idyllic and heraldic picture. The prince himself, who grew up in an utterly different kind of world, would have few prospects of becoming a real mediator for democracy in the Balkan political jungle, of which those who are calling for him and supporting him are probably well aware. No one at the moment is interested in what kind of escapades would result from a weak parliamentary monarchy with a strong camarilla; they are only interested in what one of the prince's bodyguards has said: "Just let us get rid of these communards, damn their eyes." But the monarchy would renew the old Serbian divisions and revanchism, get rid of one corruption and open up a new one, and instead of a nobility of party bureaucrats and mediocrities, it would establish a nobility of royalist bureaucrats and mediocrities, and the will to power would again remain at the bottom of everything, just in a different package. Serbia would again be thrust away from freedom and democracy, a system based on law, and real parliamentarianism, and from a parliamentary monarchy.

Knin Using Last Oil, Gas, Food Supplies*92BA1185C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
26 Jun 92 p 21*

[Article by Petar Ladjarski: "A Social Map of the Krajina: Roast Lamb and Roots"]

[Text] The fact that in Knin and surrounding towns a kilogram of roast lamb costs 3,000 dinars, the same as two packs of smuggled poor-quality cigarettes, is only one of the absurdities here. The transportation blockade is felt at every step, and store signs reading "Closed—Out of Stock" testify to this. The consequences of the blockade are hurting the health service most drastically. Stocks of drugs and medical equipment are nearly exhausted.

The average citizen is practically down to his last reserves. Rarely does anyone sell foreign exchange, because "funds for a rainy day" have been depleted, and numerous branches of Belgrade banks have sent foreign currencies to their central offices without investing a single dinar in capital investments in Krajina. There are fewer and fewer dinars in circulation. The consequences of the change of currency in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], from which money is not reaching Krajina, are anxiously awaited, because the banks and post offices are not taking payments, giving as their reason the problems in transportation. Whether it is only a question of the transportation blockade, or there is a possibility that Krajina will be excluded from the settlement system that has existed up to now, can only be guessed at. The authorities here do not perceive this as a problem about which they should be thinking, and they see the solution in the printing of their own money, which local cynics have already met with the comment that that money will be backed up by a gold log.

Requisitioning

Should there be a blockade of settlements and if the FRY Assembly makes no appropriations for Krajina, as was done in the first three quarters of this year, life will come to a complete stop. It is precisely thanks to the funds that have come up to now from the federal budget and the "output" of the Topcider mint that the border of the subsistence minimum has been maintained. Even now, the possible consequences are being felt—there is a question about payment of salaries for those employed in what is called the social superstructure, payment of money aid to workers in factories that have not been operating for a long time or have not been making a profit, soldiers and officers at the front (by contrast with those in the Knin Command) still have not received their salaries for May, and it is uncertain whether the Krajina policemen will receive their next paycheck.... What then is one to say about pensioners and about the fact that there are more than 30,000 refugees from Croatia in Krajina, from border areas along the line of the front, and indeed even from neighboring communes in Bosnia...?

The government of the RSK [Serbian Republic Krajina] is unable to moderate all the consequences to any great extent, but it could realistically do more than express concern and take note of the complexity of the situation. The attitude of the authorities toward rural areas is illustrative when it is thanks to them that it has been possible to extend the "life" of existential survival. The

announcement of requisitioning of grain irresistibly recalls the postrevolutionary period, although the authorities have been attempting to dispute this with the assertion that this is a loan of surpluses that will be returned in kind and with interest. Something similar is being planned with "regulation" of the livestock population and the creation of reserves of livestock, but attention is not being paid to the fact that "mandatory loans" without market criteria inevitably have the opposite effects and production is confined exclusively to the farmer's own needs. At the same time, nothing has been done except to hold meetings and take note of the need to preserve the livestock population in abandoned villages along the line of the front (near Knin, a farm for fattening 400 baby beef cattle still stands empty, and the milk shortage is chronic), and because of the shortage of livestock feed (Knin has a livestock feed mill) even the foundation herd is being sold off at the pig farm in Drnis, which has an annual capacity of about 10,000 fattened hogs.

For more than a month, no oil or gas products have been for sale on the open market. The "resourceful" are using the tanks of military vehicles, and the RSK government is issuing certificates and collecting 1,000 dinars per liter of gasoline, although it is not registered with the competent economic court as an enterprise for trading in oil or gas products. As though the government feels what is being prepared, and it wants to anticipate the shortage of currency in order to be able to pay salaries to its own employees. For that matter, the practice up to now of nonenforcement of the Law on Salaries only confirms this, in view of the fact that officials are the first to get their salaries, and the rest are paid what is left over. This was made possible thanks to a decision of the RSK government that all the money from the federal budget be transferred to the government's giro account.

War Profiteering

In practice, it turns out that war profiteering is the only industry that is not in a crisis. In the meantime, three strata of war profiteers have become distinct. In the first are the petty smugglers and middlemen who form the chain between the petty buyers, the "chicken thieves," as they are called, and the bosses, who handle big deals. The third group consists of what might be called political black marketeers. Careerists, hacks, and other spineless cronies have made a profession of Serbism, and the main criterion of fitness is obedience. Personnel once thrown out of the local kitchens known as the commissions for personnel affairs of the Socialist Alliance have gone back to positions as directors or have moved up to ministers and assistant ministers. Key positions in the RSK government have gone to people on election posters who were nominated by what at the time was Racan's SDP [Democratic Reform Party]. The public has no insight whatsoever into the wheeling and dealing with personnel, and the political team that has taken power on the slogan "The Vance Plan unconditionally, peace, a free Radio Knin" is now advocating the views which it criticized, and it is frustrating the flow of information by

dominating the information space (Radio Knin, with support of Radio-TV Belgrade), just as the government decision on the moratorium on the operation of all political parties on behalf of political unity is bringing about the preconditions for a kind of totalitarianism of both parties.

A future of roots is for the moment the only certain one, and those who have offered it have covered their retreat, and they are maintaining their own positions with promises, by whipping up the tensions of war, and with prohibitions, creating the appearance of concern about the destiny of the Serbian people in Krajina. If they actually did something, the people would certainly be more grateful to them than they have been up to now.

Role of Cosic as FRY President Analyzed

92BA1156A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
22 Jun 92 p 16

[Article by Stojan Cerovic: "Dobrica Cosic, Regent: The Real and the Impossible"]

[Text] *Since Milosevic began, the only thing that Cosic has not liked is his arrogance towards the opposition. He has realized that tension has mounted to a tremendous level and that Serbs could begin to shoot at each other. Unlike Milosevic, he actually knows how to listen and talk; he would rather win people over than openly confront them, so that he could moderate at least his personal intolerance.*

In the 72d year of his life, Dobrica Cosic has been given the opportunity to play his third or fourth role in the political life of Serbia. Rarely is anyone offered that many chances, and rarely has anyone strayed, sinned, and been in error so many times only to end up being accepted as the last hope. Quite possibly, there has never been a case where more serious problems have been faced by someone who has shown his political ineptitude more convincingly. Nevertheless, it is believed that he must be given time and offered an opportunity.

Dobrica Cosic probably does not fully realize that he does not deserve this opportunity, unless that which must be done is regarded as punishment and an acknowledgment of personal responsibility for this country's catastrophe. He has become the president of a state that is recognized by neither the world nor some of its own citizens, which is under a blockade such that the world has never seen before, and which is being threatened externally by military intervention and internally by civil war. He knows how much his political thought and action has contributed to this, just as it is known that no one assumes the role of savior with so little moral right. But Serbia has nowhere else to turn. It is compelled to hold its nose and shut both its eyes in the feeble hope that this domestic Dr. Frankenstein will be able to curb his monster.

The first thing that the new president should do is to question his own position and the state that he leads.

Presumably, this has never even occurred to him. In his inaugural address, he mentioned new elections, but not for a constitutional convention, which means that he accepts this sort of Yugoslavia and wants to continue where Milosevic has left off. He noticed that something was not right at the very moment when the United Nations imposed sanctions, which means that he is unclear about everything regarding Serbia's responsibility. He is much more inclined to believe that the world is unfair and indifferent, that Serbia's enemies from past wars are getting their revenge, and that Titoism is to blame for everything.

Since Milosevic began, the only thing that Cosic has not liked is his arrogance towards the opposition. He has realized that tension has mounted to a tremendous level and that Serbs could begin to shoot at each other. Unlike Milosevic, he actually knows how to listen and talk; he would rather win people over than openly confront them, so that he could moderate at least his personal intolerance. But it will prove to be the case that his perception of his role is much more serious and ambitious than that of a simple, temporary mediator in the conflict between Milosevic and the opposition.

Dobrica Cosic is in fact expected to persuade Milosevic to step down peacefully. It is believed that if there is anyone who can do this, then it is he, who perhaps has some sort of paternal authority. There is no doubt that Cosic will try to do this, but Milosevic already feels like a hunted animal and probably no longer believes anyone other than his own television, which tells him that the people still adore him. For this reason, Cosic should perhaps begin the delicate operation of removing him by turning to television itself, which is run by his man Milorad Vucelic. By gradually reducing the number of telegrams of support, for example.

Milosevic's formal and actual power far exceed that of Cosic, but if he does not use it very quickly, Cosic's authority will hold him in check and he will no longer be able to put the military or the police into action against him. Through his very presence on the big scene, Cosic strips him of power and pulls the detonator out of the bomb. This would be all that Dobrica Cosic could still do for Serbia. But Milosevic has still not surrendered, as the students have discovered, and the risk of violence and conflict in Serbia is not minimal, even without him.

As far as the lifting of the sanctions and the return of Serbia to human society are concerned, that which must be done exceeds the strength of one person, especially when it is a man of continuity who would first have to renounce himself and repudiate everything that he has thought and done over the past few years. The difficulty of this in the case of Cosic can be seen from the mere fact that he should immediately disappoint the people who proposed him for his current position. Specifically, he was first suggested by associations of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, who are now to be instructed to stop the war of secession and accept those states as their own. How can this be done by an ideologist of

Serbian unity and Greater Serbia, and how can the lethal sanctions be lifted without that?

But that is only the beginning. Cosic must figure out what to do with Kosovo and how to talk to the Albanians, who believe him no more than they do Milosevic. He also faces growing Montenegrin suspicion toward the new state, which could turn into open rejection once the military threat is removed. Still, the most serious situation concerns Serbia, from which enormous sacrifices are being demanded in a very short period of time, because in a month or two the sanctions will take it back to a primitive state; the factories will be covered by cobwebs, and people will begin to move away the cities and into the rural areas. The question, however, is whether these prospects even seem apocalyptic to the writer-president from Velika Drenova.

Serbia has acted crazily for years, nourished by enormous doses of stupidity, and now it must suddenly stop and turn around even faster, make up with its fictitious enemies (some of whom have in the meantime become actual enemies), fundamentally change its perverted image of the world, and avoid futile hopes in Russia. Such a turnaround could perhaps be carried out by a statesman of the highest stature. Not only is Dobrica Cosic not that statesman; he is in fact horrified by such changes, which upset everything in which he has ever believed.

Thus, the sanctions will continue, perhaps with gradual alleviation, because Cosic will try to maintain a peace-loving approach, insofar as that depends on him. He has not opposed Milosevic's military adventures; indeed, he even called himself up, but he is not someone who is in a position to bear personal responsibility for such a thing. He has received, helped, and organized anyone participating in opening up the "Serbian question," from rally participants in Kosovo to Babic and Karadzic, but he is determined that this conspiratorial side of his politics not be seen and that to the public and to history he remain simply a humanist and democrat. The post of president makes him responsible for everything that he does behind the scenes as well, while moreover it is certainly a positive sign that the capitulation of Greater Serbia will be signed by the main restorer of that bloody illusion.

Further defeats are in store for Dobrica Cosic, even if he manages to liberate the human race from Milosevic. He has come forward as the republic's last defense against growing monarchism, sensing that the return of the prince threatens to open up the deepest and most dangerous conflict, the one over which war was waged in Serbia a half a century ago. If it turned out that the Serbo-Croatian war was not forgotten, if even the memory of Turkish oppression is being revived in Bosnia, then why should the descendants of the Chetniks and Partisans in Serbia (and Montenegro) turn out to be less vengeful when they are shown an opportunity to trade the roles of winner and loser?

Of course, the London prince himself does not desire revenge, but Cosic knows better than he what sorts of stories are being told around the Serbian countryside. Not even Milosevic would have survived in Serbia for so long if it were not for the fear of revanchism and if he had not made continual concessions to the descendants of the defeated side. But regardless of how risky it was, it appears that nothing can stop the return of the monarchy and of the Church to the big picture. Besides the republic, Milosevic also black-marketed old-fashioned socialism, missing a last opportunity to save it through liberal reforms. Thus, it is possible that Cosic himself will eventually have to sign the decree on the prince's return.

The total international blockade right now is already completely shutting the door to liberal reforms, even if Cosic were prepared to implement them. In many regards, Serbia has been perpetually late and is still turning in the opposite direction from the rest of the world. In order to at least change direction, the new president should first of all go to Takovska 10 and tell Vucelic that it is time to stop "spreading the truth about Serbia" and to start honest reporting. Serbia would immediately get a breath of fresh air, and the world would know what this change means. Because the UN observers do not have to go to the field to verify the intentions and behavior of the Serbian Government. All they have to do is turn on their TV.

Cosic too will be regarded through Vucelic, even more than through Gen. Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who are themselves guided by television. And one hopes that Cosic will not say that Vucelic refuses to see him.

Cosic Appointment Seen as Worsening Situation

*92BA1156B Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian
22 Jun 92 p 18*

[Commentary by Dragan Veselinov: "The Tragedy of Serbia"]

[Text] With the selection of Cosic as head of the phantom Yugoslavia, Milosevic has perhaps been given his best opportunity to go peacefully. If he still does not do so, then this will mean that he has decided to restore the crown that the entire world and a majority in Serbia consider poisonous. Why would it not be left to Cosic? Vanity will not allow.

We now have two governments. Cosic accepted the Presidency in order to supplant Milosevic, the greatest Serbian politician of this era. The meaning of this expulsion lies in the fact that Cosic avoids responsibility for Milosevic's war, Serbia's decline in the world, and the isolation of Serbs in the Yugoslav region. Only Karadzic, the apprentice to both of them, was happy about his selection, because there is hope for annexation to "Yugoslavia" and his provincial Caesarism.

Cosic has no political organization whatsoever to back him up. Serbs from Croatia in Belgrade, who suggested

him as president, make up a puppet, revanchist organization that has appeared on television as many times as was necessary for Milosevic's nationalists to make noise against Croatia. He probably hopes most of all that because of the pressure on Milosevic from the Belgrade opposition and the wavering of the military and police, he will be able to draw state power for himself.

With the creation of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] under Beckovic's leadership and the selection of Cosic for the Yugoslavs, the entire team of war nationalists from No. 7 Francuska Street has pulled out of the game, attacking Milosevic, their creation. They will not budge the slightest bit from their intimate position on borders and the national substratum of Serbia as a state. They are not abandoning Milosevic because he has not succeeded. On the contrary, he has done everything found in their aggressive territorial program. They are abandoning him because the general senselessness of the war and anger of the people due to the collapse of the state could shift to them as well.

Serbia has gained nothing with Cosic. Its situation has worsened. There could even be a duel between wartime socialist nationalists and "French" nationalist war strategists. Although Beckovic's people do not recognize "Yugoslavia," they will support Cosic against Milosevic. In this way, "Yugoslavia" and the lawlessness through which it was created are strengthened indirectly. Perhaps this is an accepted sacrifice.

Naturally, Cosic would fall immediately if Montenegro were to leave the stagnating state that he leads. Bulatovic dares not do this. He has seen for himself for the 100th time that the price of the puppet's role and privileged conformism is the decay of honor.

Cosic wants to resolve the "question" of Serbs in Herceg-Bosnia and Croatia by memorandum. This was why he saw the patriarch before his election. They are all continuing the old policy—but the "French" will try to pursue it in such a way that only some of its goals are achieved. With the rejection of Milosevic, they will hold themselves up as the saviors of both foreign Serbs and Serbia. The "French" in Belgrade reproach Milosevic for not knowing how to safeguard the achieved result: the autonomy for Serbs that has been created and the captured territory. With a strong concentrate of aggressiveness, he is raising the world up against Serbia instead of prolonging the realization of goals and weakening the resistance of the great powers through gradual advances. With malice, he is destroying the state's economy, reinforcing political disorder in Belgrade, and jeopardizing the integrity of the state's territory. In this way, Serbia is drawing nearer to military dictatorship and civil war. Both the nationalist and the middle-class opposition would perish in it.

In order to lift the iron curtain of Washington and Moscow from the Belgrade stage, it is necessary that Belgrade and Podgorica recognize the independence of Croatia and Herceg-Bosnia in their existing borders.

Cosic cannot do this, because his "Yugoslavia" is not recognized, nor are the sanctions directed against it. Milosevic must be toppled for this to happen. But that is a double-edged sword. If Milosevic leaves the post of president, then Cosic must find a puppet to recognize the Yugoslav state in the name of Serbia and to protect himself from responsibility for his unrecognized place in "Yugoslavia." Perhaps this is not that difficult; money would be found for a servant. But it is not Milosevic's way to give in, although he holds himself up so grotesquely as irreplaceable and immortal. But if he nevertheless decides to get revenge on Cosic for his election as "president of Yugoslavia," then he will subject him to the problem of cementing autonomy for foreign Serbs, burdening Serbia with aid to those territories, and conflict with the domestic population.

In fact, Cosic is confused. As the logistics man for Milosevic's war, Washington will not lift the international sanctions against him until the problem of Kosovo and Vojvodina is resolved in Serbia, in parallel with a resolution of the status of Serbs in Herceg-Bosnia and Croatia, beyond the outdated concept of a unified Serbia. He will not be triumphantly heralded as a peacemaker until he tramples on the Memorandum and the antibureaucratic revolution of Serbian nationalists. He will be able to leave the game only due to illness, which he will always have the right to cite as an excuse. Otherwise, he will have to recognize that all the recent years of state nationalism, war, and Serbian decline were unnecessary.

With the arrival of Cosic in Novi Beograd, part of the academic opposition has decided on a palace revolution against Milosevic instead of bringing the people to their feet. The entire opposition faces the dilemma of whether to bring down Milosevic with the help of the people who made him, or whether to split up into bickering camps that achieve no good results. Political tactics say, "Everyone against Milosevic!" After that, the question of who was where and who will continue on will be examined.

And what if Cosic and Milosevic come to an agreement and decide to carry on together? This would bring with it a continuation of the war, the complete collapse of the economy, civil war in Serbia, and world military intervention. Afterwards, Serbia would remember how it was once great, extending even from Pristina to Novi Sad, and how it was once well-off, with as much as \$2,500 per capita in 1987. Before the Eighth Session and the war.

Biographic Data, Views of FRY President Cosic

92BA1159A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 pp 17-20

[Article by Slobodan Reljic: "The Sun Is Distant"]

[Text] *As an intellectual who has the opportunity to rule the state, Cosic has found himself in the place of Plato, who was also offered an opportunity to achieve his utopia on an island. Everything else is still an uncertain future.*

"Did you accept the office of president of Yugoslavia in order to make it possible for Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw honorably from his position?" Faced with this question, Dobrica Cosic, standing, thought: "That is not within my jurisdiction."

A little later, both presidents, Cosic and Milosevic, left the Assembly together and entered a black official automobile—which is not a Mercedes, because the previous regime made that name odious to our people a long time ago. It was noticed that the third person in the "presidential trefoil," Momir Bulatovic, was not in their vicinity at that time.

Our latest political drama thus ended in fewer than 24 hours. Specifically, it was announced just the previous Sunday afternoon that Mr. Cosic had nevertheless accepted the candidacy, even though it had been "agreed" that the Montenegrins would get the position of state president. Dobrica has been publicly discussed as president for an entire month now, actually since NIN announced in mid-May that he had been offered that position.

Well, the ways of politicians are unknown, especially where Dobrica Cosic is concerned. Surprising everyone, and apparently even himself, is his specialty. "Dobrica, you are a pig in a poke. Anything can come from you," he was told back in 1950 by Isidora Sekulic, who was surprised by the contents of the manuscript of his book, *The Sun Is Distant*.

Grandfather's Dream

Dobrica Cosic's life really was to follow the line of Isidora's prophecy. First the young party commissar, instead of easily achieving "the biggest ambition of his life... to become president of the collective farm in Velika Drenova," fulfilled the dream of his maternal grandfather (then already deceased), Aleksa, an incurable politician. Old Aleksa, "ever since returning from the Thessaloniki front, up until the 5 May elections in 1935, when he simply went too far in his last defeat... and died 400,000 dinars in debt... spent everything in his unsuccessful election campaign" (according to Slavoljub Djukic's book, *A Man in His Time—Conversations With Dobrica Cosic*). The democrats of his beloved grandfather—there is some irony here—were beaten in 1945 by the candidate of the People's Front, his grandfather's pride—grandson Dobrica.

When he had thus "overthrown the old," Dobrica Cosic went further. He was in Serbia's Agitprop. Today it is hard to imagine the extent of that power over people, their minds, and their talents. It was at those very heights, however, that Dobrica's "first stumblings" began. Something drove him toward the "sinners." When Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz, as a "political provocateur," was fired from the Brcko-Banovici work action, Dobrica Cosic published an exile action poem in MLADI BORAC, "The White Arrow Has Been Fired, the Track Races at a Gallop." Why? "I was an ignorant, self-taught person. I heard about certain basic concepts

for the first time from them. I heard for the first time from Mihiz about Crnjanski.... I heard for the first time from Mica Popovic about Goya, Velazquez, Van Gogh...."

A serious dilemma—between love for "Red Russia" and fear of intervention after the break in 1948—gave birth to an idea in Dobrica Cosic that he could also be recalling more often today: "For the first time, that conflict strongly revived in me the eternal historical dilemma of our land: Is there any sense in fighting for freedom at any price? If not, after so much warfare and so much sacrifice... the time has come for a radical rationalization of historic experience, with which all of our glorious and heroic victories, our entire heroicism and romanticism, would be viewed from the standpoint of their real outcomes.... I would not be telling the truth if I claimed now (in 1989—editor's note) that I had categorically answered that question for myself at that time."

Inevitable Person

Dobrica Cosic is said to be the person who first was horrified about what was happening on Goli Otok, and informed Rankovic about it. In the late 1950's (1956), as a literate man and a sincere communist, Cosic wrote the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Program along with Kardelj. He was shocked when he heard the Slovene's words that Yugoslavia "is to some extent a historical transition" and that "the Slovenes will be with the Austrians and Italians... the Serbs, naturally, with the Bulgarians or the Orthodox peoples, which are in any case historically closer to you."

At the beginning of the 1960's (1961), he had a conflict along the same lines with Dusan Pirjevec. The public polemics ended one night in Ljubljana in Pirjevec's apartment. Cosic: "Of my Yugoslavism, as they say, stone was not left on stone there. They satirized it as unitarism, as nonsense, and as an idea that modern Slovenia and the Slovene people did not have anything to do with...." The irony of communist life led Dusan Pirjevec to come to Belgrade at the time of the *Maspok* [Mass Movement] in Croatia (1971): "Dobrica, I came to call upon you for us to save Yugoslavia together." "It's too late, Dusan," Cosic answered with resignation."

Once more, in 1968, Dobrica Cosic, addressing Spomenka Hribar, recalled that conversation in Pirjevec's apartment. "In the evening, disillusioned with my ideal, I wept in Tivoli forest. Not metaphorically; I wept literally.... Those were my last communist and illusionist tears." And Dobrica Cosic changed sides, as "probably the first Serbian communist who understood."

The Serbian communists nevertheless punished him severely in 1968 because of the "Slovene syndrome." This story, as we know, did not become known until about 15 years later (1983), when his book *Real and Possible*, which described precisely that side of 1968, was a superhit among Serbs. The nationally awakened former

"passionate Yugoslav" "awoke" his people. "The whole printing (12,000 copies) was sold in a few days. As POLITIKA's correspondent reported (the information was not published), 20,000 copies were ordered from Nis alone...."

Let it also be noted here what is said in Djukic's book *A Man in His Time*, that at that Central Committee plenum "Aleksandar Bakocevic was not in favor of postponing the discussion.... He proposed 'discussing the advisability of Cosic and Marjanovic's remaining in the Central Committee if they adhered to their positions.'" That inevitable person, Bakocevic!

Serb and Serb

Having ceased to be a Yugoslav and an LCY member, and having become a Serb and an opposition member, Dobrica Cosic, according to the then-established rules of the game, was driven from the public, among the dissidents. Patriarch German, his compatriot, spoke about him then: "There are people who have changed their ideology and made their entire lives more beautiful and richer.... Dobrica broke free in time, thanks to his wisdom and integrity." (Svetislav Spasojevic: *Serbian Patriarch German*.)

Stevan Dedijer, Vladimir Dedijer's brother, who lives in Sweden and whose name is associated with the article "Serb From the Bottom of the Tub," thinks of Dobrica Cosic's nationalism as a "political and historical illiteracy that is not capable of understanding today's Serbia in the world." Mr. Dedijer writes: "In 1988 I read his novel about Belgrade before the war, and I wrote him a letter: Dobrica, how can you write about the politics of Belgrade and keep completely silent about the fact that the national question was the main one in Yugoslavia then? Why did you baptize the Muslim Mujaga Golubic as a Serb so that he could have a love affair with the Serbian heroine? My brother Vladimir told me, 'Dobrica visited me and wept because you scolded him for being a chauvinist, a nondemocrat.' Cosic confirmed it once again in POLITIKA (an interview in July 1991)."

Dobrica Cosic himself, however, sees his nationalism as follows: "I said several times that I am a Serb-man, I am a man-Serb. My Serbdom, as Mihailo Djuric once said, is a 'forced generality.'" And: "All human individual values should be put above national identity. Absolutely all!"

Seminar in Rome

Cosic said this in 1979, but in 1991, for being inconsistent in this, Vuk Draskovic sharply reprimanded him because of his view that the collapse of Yugoslavia and the war were a "historical opportunity for the Serbs to finish the struggle for their liberation and unification that they have been conducting for two centuries. Therefore, according to you, all those who do not think so are traitors, and those who recall that Serbia is not ready for such an undertaking and that the total war into which the

present regime is pushing us would be fatal, are defeatists." Vuk Draskovic then asked "the father of his nation" the following: "What ideal, Dobrica, is worth the zeal of our sending Serbia's youngest and most valuable heads to the battlefield? You are mentioning some sort of rump Yugoslavia, without Croatia and Slovenia. Any Yugoslavia, however, is unworthy of our sacrifice."

It can be seen from this document, as well as from others, that Dobrica Cosic was not the best at foreseeing the outcome of events. In a little less than a year, what is left of that "rump Yugoslavia" of 1991 is, as cynics say, Black Serbia or Mountain Serbia [play on words: the literal meaning of Montenegro is Black Mountain]. But two years earlier, in November 1990, at an international seminar in Rome (the subject was "Where Yugoslavia Is Going," and Mika Tripalo, Ciril Zlobec, and Vojin Dimitrijevic also attended from Yugoslavia), Dobrica Cosic claimed: "A confederal solution of the Yugoslav state crisis would not only not eliminate national antagonisms, but would instead severely increase them. Consequently, the reasons for a federation can hardly be disputed from a reasonable, national, and political standpoint. They are being disputed, nevertheless, perhaps by a majority of the Slovene and Croatian peoples, as well as parts of the other Yugoslav peoples."

Although Cosic then spoke further about "Yugoslavia's increasingly poorer prospects as a democratic and vitally harmonious state community," his "follower" on the issue of what was then the most topic dilemma, confederation-federation, President Slobodan Milosevic, adhered very firmly in practice to the solution that "can hardly be disputed from a rational, national, and political standpoint." It is not necessary even to speak now about how much of a price Serbia has paid for the insistence upon this, but the Cosic-Milosevic relationship will deserve particular analysis for a long time to come.

After the Eighth Session (October 1987), Cosic said: "I must say that I am not surprised by the methods by which Milosevic settled accounts with Stambolic. These are traditional communist and Titoist methods."

Support for the Leader

A year later (June 1988), after the publication of the proposal from the Belgrade Committee for Defense of the Freedom of Thought and Expression for reexamining the historical role of Josip Broz Tito, Cosic said about the "Titoist" Milosevic: "I think that he conducted himself intelligently and bravely." And about the president's policy: "I appreciate Milosevic's stubborn struggle for the national rights of the Serbian people and insistence upon economic and social reform. I think that he has made possible the intellectual freedom that we did not have until now.... Consequently, I support his entire state program, although in a democratic sense I consider it insufficient.... History reminds us: Peoples who have leaders also have uncertain

futures. It has often happened: Where there is a great leader, there is little democracy. I would be happy if that were not confirmed."

As Slavoljub Djukic states, Dobrica Cosic is "a person who likes to participate in politics." Perhaps it is precisely for this reason that he could not keep himself from assisting what seemed to him to be "what is right." And, even though he said then that "it was out of the question under any circumstances" for him to "return to active politics" ("I would not trade the freedom of my writing desk for any sort of power whatsoever, especially the power given by authority"), "something" apparently drew Dobrica Cosic back. It did not prevent him at all that on 28 March 1989, on the day of the adoption of the Serbian Constitution, there was no room for him among the 4,000 guests at the Sava Center. "But certainly no one, as much as Cosic, had been raising the Serbian question with so much persistence and demonstrating the untenability of Serbia's position, which had arisen with the adoption of the 1974 Constitution."

Somehow, in 1990, Dobrica Cosic became, as Jovan Raskovic puts it, "Milosevic's spiritual father." Let us recall that Raskovic, in an interview for NIN (May 1991), said: "He is basically a person with a democratic will, but he is loyal to Milosevic." Question: "What does this mean, specifically?" Answer: "The democrats criticize him because he did not lead the democratic movement (in the December 1990 elections—editor's note). I was a witness of those persistent requests that he be the main rival of Milosevic and Vuk—but not even Vuk, because Vuk was insignificant in that game. By refusing to oppose Milosevic politically, Cosic was actually assessed by the people who were seeking him for their leader as a person who was helping Milosevic. If Dobrica Cosic had been on the list of candidates, I do not know how Milosevic or his party would have fared." Question: "Do you also think that this refusal was support for Milosevic?" Answer: "It is not support. You know, he is a person who is always surprised at me—ever since I began to yell from these stages and make speeches. Dobrica Cosic, consequently, was not able to cross that boundary which I crossed."

Telegram From Zagreb

Nevertheless, it was confirmed again that the paths of the "will to power" are unknown. Thus, Dobrica Cosic refuted not only Jovan Raskovic, but also, once again, himself. "I have been in the opposition for almost 25 years," he said three years ago. "I left the party in 1968. I was in the active opposition the whole time since then, I stayed there, and I will be there until the end of my life. I do not know whether in this country, or any other, there will be a government in which a writer will not have to be in the opposition. I do not believe in such a government, and I hope that I will keep that fortunate position of being in the opposition for the rest of my life."

So many people are asking today why Dobrica Cosic decided on this step. What can be done in a country that even McDonald's is leaving, and only street popcorn stands are being opened? What does a writer want when the newspapers report that even "Havel's reelection is in question"? Some anonymous politicians now feel that the famous Havel "is not a suitable type of politician for the office of president."

What is intended by Dobrica Cosic, who those who know him claim "will certainly not consent to be a master of ceremonies," which is otherwise the president's role according to the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Constitution? Does he, who has advocated a law-governed state so often, now intend, justifying it by "this situation and this moment," to trample the Constitution and the law, or somehow legalize evading them, and thus move to save the nation? Did Dobrica Cosic accept that office in order to allow Milosevic an "honorable departure," to guarantee the people who are now in power that "there will be no revanchism," or even to "guard the back" of the Serbian president whom he has backed so firmly?

It is believed that it was actually Cosic who formulated Milosevic's project of "all Serbs in one state." It is also known, however, that during the events of last March, Dobrica Cosic sent a telegram to Milosevic from Zlatar. The women at "telegram reception" shook from fear when she read that she had to send the words "You are not up to the task," or something like that, to the president's address. Some people close to Cosic claim that at one time he conveyed to Milosevic confidential messages from the top French political leadership about what should be done with the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], how to behave in Bosnia.... The president allegedly did not listen to those messages.

In a Pozarevac Boat

Nevertheless, because of his "secret" political involvement Dobrica Cosic has experienced, according to the newspapers, having "former admirers these days (August 1991) mail his books back to his home address, thanking him in passing for contributing to Serbia's literary and political standing in the world." The vocal Vuk Draskovic criticized him publicly: "Who are you with, Dobrica, and where did you wander? In a short human life it is enough to be a communist once and to find oneself opposed once to one's people, freedom, and democracy. Being on Brioni and a 'Galeb' is quite enough. After all this, what do you want with a boat from Pozarevac?" Or Vladan Vasiljevic was to ask, speaking about "Milosevic's Bosnians," Dr. Karadzic and Dr. Koljevic: "Are they really representatives of the Serbian people? Aren't they, however, only ones chosen by the writer of *Divisions*? The difference is enormous, and should not be forgotten when the actual state of affairs is determined."

Why, then, did Dobrica Cosic accept the role of president?

He says: "People's belief, the belief of the people that I can do some good." Analysts say that this is correct. In every writer, there are pathetic words but also a desire to do something exalted. An experienced and wise person, however, should be so led by his desires.

And we thus enter into the complicated and uncertain political maneuvering behind the scenes. Thus, it is said that DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia] is postponing its assembly, scheduled for 21 June, until 28 June because the authorities hastily announced "big concessions." In this difficult situation, cautiously announcing the replacement of Bozovic's government can no longer satisfy anyone. It is too late to sacrifice a pawn. The departure of the president of the Assembly, still interpreted as President Cosic's revenge for Mr. Bakocevic's role in that 1968 Central Committee, is an even more naive speculation.

More serious are the views that the part of the Democratic Party represented by Micunovic (by the way, a leader from 1968 who now can no longer even address students gathered in Student Square), in a "coalition" with the Social Democrats (which will allegedly separate from Jovic's wing of the SPS [Serbian Socialist Party]), along with "certain other forces," would stand in front of DEPOS. This is because allegedly, there should not be room for the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement] and Vuk Draskovic in the new government, with or without Milosevic. The army is allegedly disillusioned with Milosevic, and, aware of its (lack of) strength in the event of a serious intervention from the West, would not intervene in politics. And with respect to the new president, it is also being said that he could (and this is also expected of him) straighten out Serbian Radio-Television, in spite of possible opposition from Milosevic. In this regard, people have in mind the fact that Milorad Vucelic is "more Cosic's man than Milosevic's."

Although he has been elected in an Assembly for which only somewhat more than half the state's voters voted, according to the official reports, Dobrica Cosic could nevertheless also win "broader confidence." Many think that he could. "We will hold him to his word," states DEPOS spokesman Vladeta Jankovic. Some people are already saying that the president's powers could be "expanded" in some "roundtable" or similar gathering of figures and organizations which could grant such powers at this time.

Plato's Chance

The reputation that Dobrica Cosic enjoys is undoubted, but so is the great deal of "socialist baggage" that he is carrying. Slobodan Milosevic did not look happy as the "second man" next to the just-elected Dobrica Cosic; Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, again, because of everything kept himself at an appropriate distance; but photoreporters beautifully recorded how the future president was awaited at the entrance to the Assembly by

none other than Braco Kertes, and how he threw himself into his embrace like a close relative.

In view of his disinclination toward monarchy, some people views Cosic's role as "the arrival of the king before the king." According to that scenario, Dobrica Cosic would only be a "president's president."

The day before the writer's decision to accept the role of president of Yugoslavia, Bogdan Tirnanic wrote: "The father of his nation (D. Cosic) was suddenly seized by a titanic fatigue, a wave of melancholy obscured his always sharp glance, and his will leaked away into the abyss of the universal vacuum. How could something like that happen to him just now? Him—the Memorandum oak! Is it real or is it possible?"

Once again, however, with respect to Dobrica, life proved Isidora Sekulic right. Even in a situation in which people downtown were talking about how the "Soder list's" mascot Zika Obretkovic, in spite of the signatures collected, refused the candidacy for state president ("I am not crazy enough to accept it in such troubled times"), in a situation in which even long-standing friends of Cosic's, it is said, grabbed their heads and said, "Oh, God, what does he need it for"—the "father of the nation" accepted.

How should we conclude this story? Only suspicious comments are coming from the world that one can hardly expect that a person who "backed Milosevic" could make a great reversal; in Montenegro "rebellion" is spreading; the opposition in Serbia will only keep quiet for a few days; we have not yet heard from those in the former Yugoslav republics with whom Dobrica Cosic was friends, nor those with whom he argued (Slovenes, above all), nor those whom he once wholeheartedly defended (Alija Izetbegovic, for example)—and the great expectation is continuing. But the sun is distant. Distant!

Dobrica Cosic is now actually in the role of Plato, to whom life offered an opportunity to achieve his "ideal state" on a certain island. History knows how Plato ended up. Let us just say that this reminder is not malice, the spreading of defeatism, or acknowledgement of one more disaster in the land of Serbia. This is just one more comment to our readers, which the man who lived and wrote *The Sun Is Distant* certainly has in mind.

Presidential Authority in FRY 'Triangle'

92BA1156C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
22 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Ivan Torov: "Presidential Authority in Serbia-Montenegro-Yugoslavia Triangle: Three Masters—One Misery"]

[Text] *One dilemma has clearly been eliminated: The goal of drawing up the federal Constitution (with no prior procedure, preparations, public debate...) was not only to give the newly created state some sort of basis in constitutional law in the eyes of the world, but also to establish*

a constitutional-presidential atmosphere in which the president of Serbia would, in practice, be the main figure.

The whirlwind formation of a common state comprising Serbia and Montenegro and especially the (un)expected election of academician Dobrica Cosic as its first president have highlighted the question of presidential authorities. Even a superficial perusal of the constitutional documents of the three states is enough, it seems, to get stronger impressions about who is who.

A long time ago—back when the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia was being drawn up two years ago—impartial experts on constitutional issues, eminent professors at the School of Law, concluded, unfortunately, that in accordance with the old, tested manner of the one-party system, the constitutional realm was once again being orchestrated for the needs of the everyday and long-term interests of one party, one leadership team, and even one leading figure. However, it is precisely the hasty formulation (and adoption) of the stagnant Yugoslav Constitution that will reinforce this conclusion.

Sovereign Power

Montenegro, by retaining the institution of the collective Presidency, despite a certain leveling effect through amendments in 1990 in order to strengthen the position of the president of the Presidency and that of the Presidency itself, has largely stuck to the constitutional decisions from 1974.

During this same period, Serbia, under completely different circumstances, has somehow carried out a major turnabout. Even at a time when the Serbian leadership was fighting to "save Yugoslavia," a constitution was adopted through which Serbia, in practice, was one of the first in the former six-member federation to become independent, establishing a complete presidential system, the goal of which was to consolidate the position of the then president of the Presidency of Serbia, and later president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic.

In only seven articles (63 to 90), the president of the Republic of Serbia is given so much power that from the very outset it was clear to experts in constitutional law that this meant a sovereign, almost unrestricted rule by one post, or rather by one quite specific figure. Thus, thanks to the Constitution, the president of Serbia became the supreme commander of the armed forces (while the SFRY and JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] continued to exist, and still exist in a certain variant to this day) and acquired the right of suspensive veto (returning a bill to parliament for redeliberation), which allowed him to control to a significant degree the just-established but feeble multiparty parliament, to identify under particular circumstances the existence of a threat of war and declare a state of war, to order a general and partial mobilization, and in such a situation to adopt acts with the force of law.

Moreover, the president of Serbia has the authority, at the recommendation of the government, to disband the

People's Assembly. It, on the other hand, is virtually blocked from doing any harm to the president in any manner by mere virtue of the fact that he answers to the citizens, not to the parliament. He can be impeached (replaced) only in the same way that he is elected: by referendum. Unless he resigns first, of course.

Even in the most critical situations (and there have been plenty of them over the past two years), the parliament has been more or less out of the game, practically suspended, while the vital decisions (the war in Croatia and B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina], the EC negotiations, the creation of a new common state) were made in the narrowest circle of people surrounding the president of the Republic or as his exclusive right.

The situation appears to be somewhat different in Montenegro. The Montenegrin head of state (in the person of the president of the Presidency and the Office of the Presidency) does not hold the power of supreme commander of the armed forces, by mere virtue of the fact that the Constitution makes no provisions for the existence of a republican army, only the Yugoslav one. It is the parliament that determines and proclaims, under formal law and militarily, a state of direct threat of war or a state of emergency. If it is not able to do so, then this authority passes to the government, the president of the Presidency, and the Presidency (the four members plus the president), who can enact decrees with the force of law on questions from the Assembly's scope of activities.

Although there is good reason to contend that authorities are not completely and clearly defined in the Montenegrin Constitution, it is still possible to say that there is a certain and mutually restrictive division of power.

The Montenegrin president alone promulgates the enacted laws, but he has no right to a suspensive veto. Responsibility is also shared; although the president and Presidency are chosen in direct elections, they answer both to the citizens and to the Montenegrin Assembly.

Authority Without Authorization

Judging from the contents of the Constitution, its framers in fact intended to give power to the republican heads of state when setting out the scope of activities of the president of Yugoslavia. Practically speaking, he was given only two major rights: to propose to the parliament the mandatar for the composition of the Federal Government (and thus, the Assembly decides) and to schedule federal elections. Everything else is in the realm of protocol authorities (representing the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] in the world and abroad, promulgating federal laws, appointing and recalling ambassadors, decisions about pardons).

It could be said that his post is clearly overshadowed by the authorities of the president of Serbia in particular, but also by those of the Federal Government, which gains significant powers under this Constitution.

Authorities associated with the threat of war and the state of emergency belong to the Assembly, but the possibility is left open for the Federal Government to assume all responsibilities if the parliament is unable to convene: It can proclaim the existence of a direct threat of war, a state of war, or a state of emergency, order a general mobilization, and organize preparations for defense. Thus, it could be said that everything is in the hands of the Assembly or the Federal Government, while the president of Yugoslavia simply provides his opinion.

Longevity—How Long?

This sort of constitutional-presidential triangle clearly opens up many other dilemmas as well, but most constitutional experts agree that one of them, and perhaps the biggest one of all, has been eliminated: Most of all, the goal of drawing up the Constitution, with no significant, prior procedure and preparations, public debate, input by legal minds, through summary proceedings in an assembly body that had long since lost its legal legitimacy, was not only to give the newly created, quick state of Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, some sort of basis in constitutional law in the eyes of the world (which has thus far not recognized it), but also to establish a constitutional-presidential atmosphere in which the president of Serbia would, in practice, be the main figure.

Thus, consideration was given to the realistic (for a certain period) assumption that the current person of the president of Serbia would continue to be inviolable and threatened by no one. The intense pressure on him both externally and internally have lately relativized his position, but this does not mean that he is also disparaged, because regardless of how unfavorable the circumstances are for him, constitutional power, especially in Serbia, but to a significant degree in the federation as well, remains in his hands.

Of interest in all this is the role and position of the first head of the Yugoslav state, Dobrica Cosic. Although some feel that his election is an attempt to somewhat depreciate Slobodan Milosevic's position through the authority of an academician and writer—i.e., to counterbalance him with another strong personality—others see Cosic's election as yet another move to consolidate the decisive position of the president of Serbia throughout the entire territory of (truncated) Yugoslavia.

The further course of events will show who is right.

[Box, p 3]

Military Triumvirate

A fair amount of confusion is provoked by Article 135 of the Constitution of Yugoslavia, according to which the Armed Forces of Yugoslavia in wartime and in peacetime are commanded by the president of the Republic, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Defense

Council. This comprises the presidents of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and Montenegro, while the council is chaired by the president of the FRY.

The Constitution does not specify the manner of work and activities of the Supreme Defense Council, so that one must assume that this information will be provided by a special law, just as it can be expected that the confederal (consensus) principle of decisionmaking will be applied here more or less, even though another solution is not ruled out in terms of the dominant position of the president of Serbia in particular and the protocol function of the head of state.

Many see the Supreme Defense Council—about whose authorities glimpses are now being seen—as a potential military triumvirate, which could play a critical role under certain circumstances.

Bosnian Muslim PREPOROD Calls for War

92BA1157A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian

19 Jun 92 p 25

[Article by J. Janjic: "Instructions for Jihad"]

[Text] Izetbegovic's calls to war can mostly be reduced to the words "we must rise up more energetically in defense of the Republic" or to statements similar to the one that he gave to Bosnian Radio-Television and OSLOBODJENJE after the imposition of sanctions against the FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council: "Now we are all obligated to rise up as one in defense of the Republic."

One might say that the Islamic religious community of Bosnia-Herzegovina is doing this in even more concrete terms. Through its publication PREPOROD, it is providing concrete instructions on how to wage war and how to conduct oneself in it. For example, PREPOROD recently ran an article with the superscript headline "Brief Instructions to Our Warriors" and the headline "For You There Is No Fear...."

Warning that it is necessary to "cleanse our being and thus pave the way for feeding on the pure, divine source," this article gives Muslims several "brief instructions" on what they should do and how they should act. One of these instructions says, "Given the fact that you are under attack on all levels—the religious, cultural, economic, patriotic, and national levels—and given the fact that you are subject to all sorts of mistreatment, persecution, and humiliation, both you personally and the religious objects that symbolize you, you—each of you individually, men and women—are obligated, within the limits of your abilities and opportunities, to rise up in defense of your religion, your homeland, and your honor and to offer protection to the defenseless...."

The following are more of the enumerated instructions:

"Go into battle with pure intentions and with complete faith in Allah; if you survive, you will be *ghazis* [fighters

for Islam], and if you perish, you will be martyrs. Otherwise, you will lose both, and you will certainly be humiliated.

"If possible, go into battle with ablutions and, as an obligation, with God's name in your heart and on your lips.

"Under no circumstances should you go unbathed (unclean, after pollution or marital relations), because any such individual could be a cause of misfortune to both himself and others.

"During your attack against the enemy or struggle with him, say the *tekbire* [repetitive prayer] (Allah is Great!).

"If possible, take the Koran with you."

These "brief instructions" conclude with the words, "After all of this the Muslim must know that he is struggling on the side of justice and on God's path. God's help is guaranteed to all such people."

Delegation for Federal Assembly Completed

AU1107142792 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
3 Jul 92 p 13

[Report by S. Vukasinovic and Lj. Mudresa: "Federal Delegation Finally Completed"]

[Excerpt] Podgorica—Since a part of the opposition (Reformists and the Democratic Coalition) did not, as was expected, nominate their candidates for the remaining five representative seats in the Republican Council in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Assembly, the assembly committee for elections and nominations nominated, in proportion with the number of representative seats, seven candidates from the DPS [Movement for Rights and Freedoms] (four to be elected), and three from the National Party (one to be elected). After counting the votes, it turned out that 81 representatives had voted—for federal representatives from Montenegro—to Srdja Bozovic (70), Nikola Dzuovic (50), Dr. Ljubica Dzakovic (45), and Velimir Golubovic (39) from the DPS, on whose list were also Miodrag Koljevic (36) and Djordjije Gosovia (32). Milorad Milovic (34) from the National Party became its federal representative, while the other two candidates, Pavle Milic and Bozidar Zonjic, each got 22 votes. So the Montenegrin parliamentary delegation in the Republican Council has finally been completed after a long dispute and the resistance by the opposition. [passage omitted]

Problems of Montenegrin Government Viewed

92BA1157B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 pp 25-26

[Article by Petar Nesic: "Montenegro: The Actual and the Possible"]

[Text] *Days of confusion in Belgrade, the unpleasant international encirclement, and the troubles of the authorities in Podgorica.*

Montenegro is a small and proud state. It has its own rationing coupons for gasoline, and "Serbian" coupons are not accepted at the pumps (and vice versa). On the very day when the president of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] was chosen, a prominent member of the Historic Institute of Montenegro (but before academican Cosic was elected) said that "chaos prevails in Podgorica." He was thinking of the ruling group in Montenegro, which was displeased that the selection was not made "according to the rules."

It has been learned from well-informed sources that no one in Montenegro even vied for the post of president of the cheerless FRY. Moreover, it is alleged that Svetozar Marovic, the Montenegrin candidate for the top position in the FRY, spent at least an hour at meetings of the political leadership of the DPS [Democratic Party of Socialists] persuading his fellow party member to accept this honorable candidacy. Coincidentally, in the taxi on the way to the Podgorica airport, we learned from a deputy minister in the Montenegrin Government that talk of Momir Bulatovic as prime minister of the FRY is untrue: "What would he want with that?"

At the moment when a meeting was scheduled with representatives of the opposition (11 June) and when the position of Slobodan Milosevic and the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] close to the Montenegrin ruling party appeared more stable, the Presidency of Montenegro announced that on 17 June that it, together with two representatives of the parliamentary opposition parties, would "exchange opinions and indicate to the public the political means through which it is possible to effectively ensure civil peace and interethnic and interparty tolerance in the Republic, regardless of opposing and contradictory political and other interests and options."

After the insistence of the Serbian part of the federal parliament that the federal prime minister be Milan Panic, the Serbian candidate, the president of the Montenegrin Presidency Momir Bulatovic had this to say:

"We have taken advantage of the opportunity to express to FRY President Dobrica Cosic our assurances, and we have requested an additional, very brief period of time for political consultation that will be carried out intensively within the framework of the Republic of Montenegro, not only on the level of the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists, but also in relation to certain previously planned meetings between the current government and the opposition...."

According to Bulatovic, the Constitution is unambiguous, and the "mandate for forming the government should be entrusted to the candidate from Montenegro."

Analysts of the situation of Montenegro assume that President Bulatovic clearly regrets now that he insisted on a referendum on the federation with Serbia, because

in so doing he narrowed his maneuvering room in these dramatic times. When asked jokingly "Of the two Panices, on whom would you bet as future prime minister?" the president of the FRY who was not to be, Svetozar Marovic, responded as follows:

"If you are thinking of the one in uniform as well, then I am always for the man in civvies." Every Montenegrin knows that Dobrica Cosic does not recognize Montenegrins, says one anonymous source.

Even before the disagreement on the election of the FRY official, there was a sense, both here and there, of mild Serbo-Montenegrin tension. Many Montenegrins living in Serbia are considering crossing over to Montenegro, or have already done so, an area that for them is now certainly more "safe." In addition, there are Serbs who, after a stay in Montenegro, mention unpleasantities that they experienced there "because they are Serbs." Nevertheless, there can be no dramatic turnaround there in policy towards Serbia, experts say, without more serious uproar. The Montenegrin political scene is divided in terms of its attitude towards Serbia and the association with it into "pro-Serbs," who are cautious and pragmatic, and "100-percent Montenegrins." To this must be added the division into Serbs from Montenegro, Montenegrins of Serbian origin, and Montenegrins. The "security" situation appears to be more stable than in Serbia, but with their "violent character" the Montenegrins are no stranger to radical solutions either. In fact, there is not a single political party in Montenegro that denies Montenegrin statehood, and perhaps this is the basis for the belief that apocalyptic convulsions will not come to Montenegro after all.

Significantly more elastic than their colleagues in Belgrade, the Podgorica leadership has made an effort, both in relation to its own opposition and with regard to the encircled situation, to maintain as satisfactory a position as possible. Miodrag Vukovic, DPS deputy to the FRY Assembly, said the following at the first session on 12 June:

"A month or two ago, when we approaching the end of the formal part of the work surrounding constituting the new country, in which I personally participated, I was optimistic without reservations.... Now, this rather euphoric situation on the political scene in the FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia and in its more dominant part in a certain sense warns and instructs us that caution is in order. I believe in the path that we have undertaken, because I personally have participated in it. But there are other paths, and they are different...."

Asked whether the possible election of both the president and the mandatary of the federal government from Serbia will aggravate relations between the two federal member-states, Predrag Bulatovic, a member of the Main Committee of the DPS, said:

"It is not desirable to speak of any sort of aggravation of relations. Our interest is in maximum cooperation between these two republics, in creating a state that will

be maximally stable and strong, because that is what is most necessary at this time."

At this time.

Dr. Slobodan Vujosevic, the chairman of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party of Montenegro, which is outside parliament but very influential, says:

"Over the past several years, as soon as it has actually come to power, the regime in Montenegro has linked itself to the regime in Serbia. They have acted in harmony, have complemented each other, and have relied on one another. The times have changed, and now there is a strongly expressed intention and need by this regime to withdraw from the shadow of the Serbian regime. And that is what will define the policy of this regime in the immediate future."

According to Vujosevic, the Constitution, the federal elections, and the reconstruction of Yugoslavia are part of the platform of his party, but "our insistence that this be done now, that the matter not be postponed, that the regime here link itself to the Serbian regime in a particular manner, was a tactical stance by the party, simply because the government in Montenegro currently enjoys the confidence of around 200,000 voters, which is an incredibly large number for Montenegro, and it would be difficult for that situation to change in the near future. Indeed, they are 'condemned' to rule for the next 20 years."

Bulatovic's regime, according to Vujosevic, wants to depict itself externally as essentially different from the Serbian regime, and to distance itself from it because of the nature of the current situation, while internally, following the mood of a majority of the citizens of Montenegro, it is striving to present itself as working to the advantage of Serbia.

"They have been playing this somewhat two-faced game ever since the Yugoslav crisis began," according to Vujosevic.

Lately, Podgorica's POBJEDA has been defending academician Matija Beckovic.

Podgorica Professor on Montenegrin 'Enigma'

92BA1157C Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 19 Jun 92
pp 26-28

[Interview with Dr. Novak Kilibarda of University of Podgorica by Svetlana Djurdjevic; place and date not given: "Montenegrin Enigma"]

[Text] *"The existing authorities in Serbia and Montenegro are responsible for everything that has happened! Didn't the League of Communists of those two republics heroically struggle to preserve the Central Committee? While Europe and the United States are applauding Slovenia and Croatia for leaving the communists and Yugoslavia behind, the Montenegrin and Serbian communists are taking an oath to Tito's course and to*

Yugoslav fraternity and unity.... They have driven out their own and forced us into this situation...."

It is an understatement to say that the political destiny of Dr. Novak Kilibarda, professor at the University of Podgorica, is unusual. Born in 1934 in Banjani, educated in Belgrade, he became one of the most important researchers into national literature. He has written praiseworthy and important books of short stories. Until the fall of Titoism, he usually made appearances in places where there were no politicians. He gave his unreserved support to Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic when they brought down the old government in Montenegro. And then, disappointed with the outcome, he founded his own party, the People's Party. He has declared himself to be a "Serb of the Orthodox religion."

There are always plenty of reasons to interview Dr. Kilibarda, but the reader should consider only one right now: Rumors—possibly inaccurate—are being heard from Montenegro to the effect that the current Montenegrin Government (i.e., Bulatovic and Djukanovic) is looking for a way to get out of the awkward position in which it has been placed by joining the odious third Yugoslavia.

[Djurdjevic] Rumors are circulating about preparations by the Montenegrin Government to reexamine remaining in a common state with Serbia, especially since the Associated Press interview with Momir Bulatovic. Does this represent a change in Montenegrin policy under the pressure of UN sanctions?

[Kilibarda] Mr. Bulatovic is consistently unprincipled in the question of relations between Montenegro and Serbia. He approaches Serbia and then moves away from it insofar as he can exploit this for the interests of his government and his party! The English have remarked that he wants to see an independent Montenegro, but it is unknown whether he wants this. His motley behavior in The Hague was in fact intended to leave room for any eventuality; this is a policy of "being everything for everybody."

[Djurdjevic] Experts say that confederal mechanisms have been built into the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that can be easily invoked if anyone needs to tear it apart....

[Kilibarda] Let us understand one thing: Bulatovic has a right to cultivate his already recognizable style in the domain of his party's and his government's interests, but I think that he is making a mistake by believing that his bowing to every wind is a reflection of the willingness of the Montenegrin people to be bowed in the same way. Despite the fact that one should not underestimate the political parties and groups that are in favor of an independent Montenegro, it is hard for the Montenegrin national registry office to imagine a Montenegrin showing a passport at the Serbian border. Moreover, Mr. Bulatovic and his party should take a lesson from the Montenegrin rulers, from Bishop Danilo to King Nikola: The people of Serbia and Montenegro should not be

artificially split by state borders. Is it possible, for example, to imagine Vasojevices who regard Serbia as a foreign state!?

[Djurdjevic] This elasticity gives rise to the impression that throughout the entire process Montenegro is behaving as if it is obliging Serbia by simply joining the common state, and that it is leaving a certain amount of maneuvering room for itself. But which side of the scales will be tipped if Serbia and Montenegro want to remain in a common state?

[Kilibarda] The People's Party believes that room for hope for the tragic Serbian people in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] will be opened up only if there is a solid, unified state of Serbia and Montenegro. I think that this is what the people, on the whole, feel in Montenegro and Serbia, and that these people will not give anyone a mandate to extinguish that hope. I do not think that all Yugoslav questions will be resolved under these conditions; rather, everything that is artificially resolved will one day be rejected like a foreign body. In history, matters are more often patched up than fully resolved! Nevertheless, there could be attempts to rupture the achieved agreement on the state unity of Montenegro and Serbia, there could even be strong outside support for this, but I do not believe that this is a positive outcome of this aim.

[Djurdjevic] You once gave Momir Bulatovic and his entire team your unreserved support?

[Kilibarda] I gave my support to young and educated people who had something fresh to say and were proposing something new in the Methuselan fable of the tyrannical self-management regime. It seemed to me that these young people would succeed in defeating Marxist-Titoist power and thought. However, I was mistaken insofar as I failed to consider the fact that these young people had been prepared in the communist spirit to replace eventually the very same old people whom they did in fact replace. They accepted a multiparty system because they had to, but they still preserve everything that they learned at Titoist high schools, importing it into the social and political solutions that they are implementing or planning.

[Djurdjevic] Well, that's quite a skill!

[Kilibarda] Of course their skill at adapting must be acknowledged. The people see this little bit of democratic space that appears in contemporary Montenegro as an endless democratic expanse, but the ruling party presents itself as a national savior in such an expanse. The success of the ruling party in the elections is actually more a psychological than a political ruse. The ruling party loudly cites the will of the people because that party knows quite well that the will in question will last until a democratic consciousness is formed that will realize that the democratic expanse is simply a mirage. If Bulatovic's team succeeds in resolving major historical questions as it establishes harmonic relations between

the "popular will" and their own political interests, then their rule will enjoy lasting historic significance.

[Djurdjevic] You think that history will not be kind to them?

[Kilibarda] For what? If you mean their ability to hold onto power and skillfully adapt, then I tell you that history is not concerned with such trifles. If you mean their intention to make Montenegro independent as soon as they can, then I tell you that Montenegro can never be the kind of thing that states like Liechtenstein are. In economic significance, Montenegro can survive on its own; Montenegro is not poor, as is commonly thought. It can be an economically steadfast state, but in that case it will declare itself an ecological area or a duty-free zone. However, I simply cannot imagine a Montenegro like that! How can I conceive of it when dragons are breathing down on its territory from every side; how can I conceive of it when it is not monoreligious and monoethnic! Only when the Balkans settle down, at least to the extent that the countries of the common European market are settled, will it be possible to speak of Montenegro as some sort of happy, steady Balkan economic entity.

[Djurdjevic] And when will that be?

[Kilibarda] Never! Perhaps sometime, but our great-grandchildren will be in a better position to deal with that than we are.

Austria-Hungary offered King Nikola agreeable concessions if he would reject Serbia in 1914. King Nikola loved his crown and dynasty, and it could well be the case that an independent Montenegro was close to his heart, but despite this he entered into war with the powerful empire. The experienced ruler knew that he would lose all traces of his glorious past if he ordered Montenegrins to watch calmly as three empires—Austrian, German, and Bulgarian—marched across Serbia.

[Djurdjevic] He did what the people wanted?

[Kilibarda] Exactly, but his will, which could have gone in a different direction, fit in with that popular desire. The folklore world says that politics is a whore, but I do not know of a single great move in history that was the move of a whore. Only whores engage in whorish politics. Perhaps there are people who like whorish politics and who accept such politics as their political philosophy, but I am talking here about my people, who cannot be forcibly channeled away from their Orthodox and sometimes sacrificial essence. It is stupid to die in order to demonstrate one's essential character, but it is also unreasonable to live if in fact that life loses all recognizability.

[Djurdjevic] The sanctions are being linked increasingly to the ruling team. Is it possible to emerge from this isolation before dealing with the question of the responsibility of the people who brought it on?

[Kilibarda] The existing authorities in Serbia and Montenegro are responsible for everything that has happened! Didn't the League of Communists of those two republics heroically struggle to preserve the Central Committee of the League of Communists as a cohesive fabric of Titoist-AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia] Yugoslavia!? While Europe and the United States are applauding Slovenia and Croatia for leaving the communists and Yugoslavia behind, the Montenegrin and Serbian chieftains are taking an oath to Tito's course and to Yugoslav fraternity and unity! They were not even helped by the fact that Gorbachev had already set out on a new course and that communist socialism is being destroyed, with no return. They have driven out their own and forced us into this situation. The strongest evidence that only personnel changes of communists in Montenegro and Serbia have taken place is the very fact that the new policy, just like the old one, has placed communist and Yugoslav interests ahead of Serbian national interests.

[Djurdjevic] What are the consequences?

[Kilibarda] The present-day situation in Kosovo and Metohija has developed through this head-in-the-sand policy, and the question of Sandzak and Vojvodina has also been opened up. Politics is not only the daily practice, but also the power to foresee and the ability to perceive one's position in the context of the general political situation. In a word, there must be a the general political situation. Only yesterday, the Serbian and Montenegrin presidents sympathized with Tudjman, Kucan, Alija, and Kiro. They went from republic to republic meeting with them, consuming kerosene and meddling with the people while the four schismatics did their job. In a word, there must rendering of accounts for the policy that resulted in this situation, in front of the people, in order that this sort of policy can be discussed seriously. What have these popular leaders done in terms of consolidating the Orthodox world in order to pave the way for the Orthodox wing in Europe to be a counterpart to the Western Christian wing one day? Not a militant rival, but rather an economically, politically, and culturally steadfast association of orthodox states in Europe.

[Djurdjevic] Who is most to blame in all of this?

[Kilibarda] Everything has been done wrong, with proverbial socialist-realism imagination, but now I would not look for culprits at any cost; there is no time for that. The question of B-H is urgent. It is necessary to sit down at the negotiating table and decide under what conditions the new state can recognize B-H. And it must be acknowledged that the cycle of bloodshed in Sarajevo should not be permitted. In demographic significance, Sarajevo is Serbian as well as Muslim, but in spiritual significance that city is Muslim. They should not have been taken in by Islamic provocation to begin the war in Sarajevo; if they had not been taken in by that provocation, it would have been easier to defend the interests of the Serbian people in B-H. What is necessary now is a meeting between representatives of the three nations in

B-H, the president of that state, and presidents of Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro. This meeting should be attended by an arbitrator chosen by the three political parties. At this sort of meeting, it would be possible to adopt meaningful decisions about the relationship between B-H and the surrounding states, as well as about the political structure of that country of three nations. It seems to me that the issue of condominium should be raised, because dual citizenship for Serbs and Croats would mitigate any extremes for which there is no visible cure. I beg you, the media war has been lost; the Serbs are the appointed culprits, but now grand gestures must be made to achieve something.

[Djurdjevic] How should these grand gestures be made with as few casualties as possible for both Serbs and other people in Bosnia?

[Kilibarda] It is not only individual people who are always on the losing side, but also nations. Gestures need not draw into question the honor of either persons or nations, but if a failed policy is sacrificed, then there is a natural division into losers and winners. You see, on Mr. Izetbegovic's side people are dying and cities are being destroyed, but if he achieves an Islamic state one day, then all these victims will be credited to him. He achieved his goal. The Serbs in B-H are fighting for their elementary rights, first of all to preserve their mere existence, and then, if they preserve that, not to disappear one day like the Khazars did. The policy of Serbia and Montenegro, or rather the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should take steps that are possible. A grand gesture could also be one that means abandoning a gesture that proved to be small but was calculated to be grand.

[Djurdjevic] Could civil war break out in Montenegro and Serbia?

[Kilibarda] There are many contrasts in both Montenegro and Serbia; dissimilar types of currents and parties from 1941 are forming. Nothing has been forgotten; every awakened hatred grows like a weed. The ruling party has still not allowed the dead to rest so that people can make peace with each other. Just look at the Partisan veterans foaming at the mouth when the mortal remains of communist victims are reburied. Other veterans organizations, which receive a hefty support allowance from the state, measure treason and patriotism according to the code that they themselves wrote. If there is civil war, there could even be the settling of scores within families! This is why everything must be done to avoid civil war. It is better to endure an undemocratic government than issue a call to arms!

[Djurdjevic] With regard to the intensity of the hatred that prevails in this region, it is assumed that it will last for a long time. What do you foresee, as a researcher into national literature and an expert in national life?

[Kilibarda] The rapid breakup of Yugoslavia proves that it was an artificial structure. All the artificially suppressed hatreds have blossomed, and it will take a long

time for things to get down to a tolerable level. Nothing should be suppressed. Sulejman Ugljanin exists, and we must talk with him. It is necessary to redefine things under the conditions when B-H was recognized as an independent state. The Titoist system meddled with Enver Hoxha while the situation in Kosovo and Metohija that we have today was being established. It seems to me that right now it is more important to talk to Sali Berisha, the president of Albania, than with Mr. Rugova. In fact, the precondition for a useful dialogue with Mr. Rugova is reaching an agreement with Berisha.

[Djurdjevic] To what extent is there is a danger of Islamic fundamentalism?

[Kilibarda] The impoverished *gazda* [former Muslim ruling class] is dying with a wounded heart because their riches have not been returned! Turkey is once again talking about its expanses from the Great Wall of China to the Adriatic. I am not saying that Turkey is going to revert back to the caliphate abolished by Ataturk, but that democratic country will spread and promote Islam in a manner which, I am afraid, the United States does not understand. Mr. Ozal and Mr. Izetbegovic wear European clothes only, but they never lose sight of the idea of an Islamic, or rather Turkish, commonwealth. Alija Izetbegovic is a more sensible statesman than some people think. Turkey will not send a new Omer Pasha to B-H, it will come there by more modern means....

[Djurdjevic] If we accept the premise that states in Europe are formed according to the national principle, then according to that logic we would have to accept B-H being a state of Muslims!

[Kilibarda] There are no settled states without a national standard. The United States is a big mixer that forms one nation, and Switzerland is the exception. Izetbegovic intends to make a state just like his people want. However, the Serbs are determined to fight for their own autonomous state within the framework of a Bosnia-Herzegovian confederation, and they will not surrender short of that. Thus, either the cantonization of B-H into three parts, or the establishment of a system in which one of the nations cannot be outvoted!

Political, Generation Conflicts in Serbia

92BA1185D Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 92
pp 20-21

[Article by Uros Komlenovic: "Divided Serbia: The Sky and the Earth"]

[Text] In March of last year, it became evident that the conflict of generations in Serbia was carrying over to the political plane. At that time, the Socialist Party [SPS], reacting to student protests, organized its rally on the Promontory [Usce], which is memorable for the speech of Dusan Matkovic, at the time the minister of industry (and now director of the Smederevo Metallurgical Combine), who called upon those gathered to settle accounts with the students, counting on numerical superiority of

its followers. Fortunately, there was no bloodshed, and perhaps one reason was that in view of the age structure of the sympathizers of the incumbent party that were gathered there, a forced march from Usce up to Terazije represented a kind of coronary exploit of epic proportions. Although everything at Usce ended up with a tapping of feet to thundering folk music, there remained the bitter taste of the realization that political antagonism between fathers and sons was assuming disturbing proportions.

The cameras of official television have involuntarily been confirming this thesis in the months that have followed as they reported from the numerous gatherings of the SPS and the parties predisposed to it, at which the appearance of any young person was the exception that proved the rule. In any case, the apolitical Serbian young people were at that time dying and being mutilated in the mud of Slavonia and the karst of Hercegovina; they have left the country in large numbers seeking jobs, bread, and peace elsewhere in the world, they have been grumbling, they have rebelled from time to time, their commitment has maintained the life of an opposition that was almost broken, until the other day, when they expressed their dissatisfaction with the student rebellion in Belgrade, Nis, Kragujevac, Novi Sad.... What could be seen with the naked eye was recently confirmed by a survey of the agency Partner, in which only 10 percent of the respondents under age 30 expressed a liking for the party in power, while more than 40 percent of them placed confidence in the Democratic Party [DS] and the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO].

On a Train for the South

Parallel to the political conflict of generations, the antagonism between Belgrade and the interior, which can be illustrated with many examples, also came to the light of day (and it is also political): The slightly more than 50 percent of the vote that Slobodan Milosevic received in the presidential election in the Belgrade opstinas of Stari Grad and Vracar was considerably less than the average in Serbia (65 percent), especially in Kosovo and in areas along the "southern railroad" (Nis, Leskovac, Vranje). In those same elections, the Democratic Party won all seven deputy seats in the Assembly in central Belgrade opstinas, and the SPO also owes a majority of its seats in the parliament to Belgrade. And in the recently held federal and opstina elections that the democratic opposition boycotted, the situation is similar: If one is to believe the official figures, 56 percent of the Serbian electorate voted, but only 44 percent of voters in Stari Grad and Vracar. Within Belgrade, which also includes a zone of outlying villages and settlements, half of the voters voted. It was again the provinces that saved the elections.

In addition, the fiercest antigovernment demonstrations—from those in front of No. 10 Takovska Street, when the police beat a certain Borislav Pekic, and then 9 March, and the appearance of the tanks in the street before the St. Vitus' Day meeting—have been held in

Belgrade, which has been the origin of numerous initiatives aimed against the current regime—from all the student and secondary school protests there have been up to now to the formation of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia]. Many find the explanation in the capital's civil tradition, which is only partly true, because the present Belgrade is five times larger than the one in 1939, and the new settlers include a large number of "loyal cadres." The interpretation based on multiple sources of news is closer to the truth, because people in Belgrade, unlike the rest of Serbia, can listen to Radio B-92, look at Studio B Independent Television, and they can also purchase the opposition and independent press more easily.

The reason why the antigovernment forces maintain a firm position in the capital should perhaps be sought in the fact that Belgrade has developed for seven decades as the capital of Yugoslavia and has thus become the center of many cultural, educational, and scientific institutions. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, it seems, has become intellectually hypertrophied by comparison to the drastically reduced state. And a large number of intellectuals and institutions (most members of the academy, the university, numerous actors, writers' associations, lawyers, painters, composers, scientists, managers...) have turned more or less openly against the current government. And so the numerous political polarizations in Serbia are being joined ever more clearly by yet another: into the educated and the others. This can be illustrated once again by the survey of the agency Partner, to the effect that 50 percent of the respondents with the lowest level of education (elementary school or less) support the socialists, and only 3 percent of them the Democratic Party. Among the highly educated, the opposition has the advantage. Which probably accounts for the effort of the president of Serbia to equate political influence of Belgrade University with the influence of just any peasant cooperative.

Three Serbias

If we ignore the traditional, and largely fading, conflict between the Partizans and Chetniks, and then the politically undefined division into the "Moravians" and "Dinaridians," as well as the still undifferentiated political scale (the left, right, and center), sufficient differences remain. Many are inclined to reduce the polarization between urban and rural, young and old, intellectual and less-educated of Serbia to the liberal-democratic and conservative-Marxist Serbia. Here, the former is often equated with the "land," and the latter with the "sky." Radovan Bigovic, teaching fellow in the School of Theology, believes that there is division into the social strata that tends toward preservation of the status quo, and another younger one that wants to change it, but he does not agree with the "sky—land" labels that have been handed out:

"Young people are realists and stand firmly on the ground, but at the same time they are open to authentic and lasting values: freedom, justice, love, democracy,

and tolerance. I have seen this for myself in recent days as I followed the student strike. But those who are trying to preserve the status quo, to maintain power and an easy and libertine life without work, resort to emotional speech. They still have success because the media are in their hands, but it seems to me that the more they talk about patriotism and love of country, the less people believe them. I sometimes have the impression that they do not even believe themselves," Bigovic concludes.

Whenever the existence of two antagonized Serbias are spoken of, there is always the danger of oversimplification. Dr. Dragomir Pantic, a social psychologist and scientific adviser at the Social Sciences Institute, believes that the generation conflict has never been so out in the open:

"The conclusion can be drawn from the survey that there are actually three Serbias. The first is the premodern Serbia, made up of elderly and not-well-educated people, who have ties to parties preaching radical nationalism, and in part to the incumbent party. They are pulling backward. The second Serbia is 'modern' or, more accurately, incompletely modernized. This refers to a substantial stratum of people who work in the city, but they have a bit of land in the country, and then some of the administrative personnel, workers, and pensioners. They are mainly sympathizers of the SPS, but their central motivation is security. That is why they resist all changes. The third Serbia, the postmodern Serbia, is associated with young and educated people who, like their contemporaries in the rest of the world, emphasize personal freedoms and values, democracy, and tolerance. That new sensibility has been manifested during the 'velvet' demonstrations on Terazije, and it is now being displayed in the student protest. We need to find some compromise so long as the three Serbias exist, because if there is a division into two parts, then there is a danger of serious conflict."

Rebellion of the Desperate

Prof. Smilja Avramov, on the other hand, believes that the divisions are not that sharp:

"At this point, it is not a question of confrontations within us, but toward the rest of the world. The sharpness of the crisis found us rather unprepared, and it has brought social and economic problems as well as an accumulation of evil, both from outside and from within. This people did not deserve that. I think that there are enough reasonable people who will not allow a conflict or civil war to occur."

It is a fact, nevertheless, that the differing political views and options in Serbia are being advocated with a great deal of passion and with insufficient tolerance. Half a century of destroying the already fragile parliamentary consciousness certainly does not offer a complete explanation of this phenomenon. Dr. Zarko Korac, psychologist, finds the reasons in the patriarchal and authoritarian mindset, as well as in the parliament having compromised itself:

"Doubts about the method of the parliamentary elections, and then the very appearance of the Assembly and the way in which decisions are made, have gone to the point where most citizens would probably vote to do away with the parliament. In addition, there is unprecedented party transvestism, so that the names of the parties rarely correspond to their programs, and political practice has nothing to do with objectives. In this situation, the electorate fluctuates, not allowing the parties to get their bearings."

When people speak about political antagonisms, they often forget the extremely important social factor. Dr. Zoran Vidojevic, scientific adviser of the Social Sciences Institute, says:

"The main social conflicts occur at the level of social welfare and subsistence. The context is well-known: Three-fourths of society are on the verge of hunger, there are more and more unemployed, the economy is in a disastrous situation, and the world has condemned us to economic death. At the same time, the already great social disparity is becoming greater and greater, and there is a social polarization typical of the underdeveloped, and at the same time undemocratic societies, between the excessively rich minority (the lumpenbourgeoisie of diverse origin and war profiteers) and the mass of the hungry, those without jobs, and without an opportunity of finding one."

Dr. Vidojevic also speaks about three Serbias. One, as he sees it, consists of the extrarich, who cooperate with the pseudo-power elite and quite often with ordinary criminals. The second Serbia is made up of a heterogeneous group of employed people who are fighting to survive and are more and more becoming a proletariat of intellectuals, white-collar workers, and farmers, and the third is the subproletariat, people without employment, earnings, and social hope, forced to sell their work power for a humiliating wage and to put up with living conditions below any level of regulated exploitation.

"Conflicts that arise in the context of this kind of social polarization could follow one another in waves and could be accompanied by a great deal of violence," Dr. Vidojevic says. "In a wartime society, rebellions of those who are desperate because of their social position run the danger of reestablishing various forms of dictatorship on the basis of equality in poverty and political unfreedom. There is also a possibility that certain forms of neofascism and neobolshevism may merge. It seems to me that the triad of misery, violence, and national-chauvinistic dictatorship composed of neobolshevist and neofascist elements could characterize all of social life in the immediate future."

Could the divisions of all kinds be mitigated and war somehow prevented? Prof. Smilja Avramov believes that the cause of everything is the long years of ignorance and that the solution lies in shedding light on the dark blots in the past and also in a dialogue concerning all the questions at issue. Dr. Vidojevic, on the other hand,

believes that room must be opened up for a new generation of young and ambitious experts who are not captive to the models of the past.

"It seems to me that this dramatic crisis is a kind of catharsis," says Radovan Bigovic. "I hope that it will rid us of all this and force us to come to see and eliminate from the organism of society and the people those parts that are sick and to arrive at a state of mental and spiritual health. If we achieve a wholesome spiritual atmosphere, the people will be able to react in the proper way to all the challenges."

Dialogue is indispensable in any case, and it is certain that the best-armed side—the government—bears the greatest responsibility for preventing a conflict that could grow into civil war. It is now the government's turn to move, and every postponement could evoke a tragedy of unforeseeable dimensions.

Public Prosecutor Bans Two Ruling Parties

*AU1307175592 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
3 Jul 92 p 10*

[Report by Z. Vukovic: "Ban on Croatian Democratic Community and Party of Democratic Action"]

[Text] Sarajevo—It is quite understandable that the proposal by the public prosecutor in Sarajevo to ban the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] and the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] should have come as such a surprise, since the recent ban of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] was seen as an isolated tacit case, which had nothing to do with its two partner parties. So why a ban now on two ruling parties against which, until yesterday, no one was allowed to say a word of criticism, without "being given a lecture in patriotism for such heresy"?

The fact that Alija Izetbegovic now has such influence on the republican authorities, so much so that the public prosecutor could not have started the legal proceedings without his permission (nor could the mass media have given it so much publicity, albeit without a commentary), inexorably points to the real designer of this extremely significant political move.

The dilemma follows: Why has Izetbegovic decided to ban both his and the partner party?

The reason is obvious. Ever since war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic has been trying to wash his hands of the "Lisbon agreement" on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although he did sign it at the time. The announced visit by Lord Carrington and the uncoined intention of the international community to impose the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia have placed Izetbegovic in a corner. For him, it was a compromise solution to ban the other two ruling ethnic parties, because if there are no talks on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is no forcing Izetbegovic to participate any further in something that he is trying to avoid at any cost. There is no doubt about

the fact that Izetbegovic's agreement to the continuation of the "Lisbon talks" would inevitably lead to his rapid political collapse.

Banning all three ruling ethnic parties is certainly a move that, regardless of the reasons and motives of its designers, represents great and swift progress toward the only solution that can save Bosnia-Herzegovina and its citizens from a total catastrophe. That solution is a civil order in this country. Izetbegovic has demonstrated for the first time that he does want such a state, notwithstanding the fact that analysis and the balance of power lead to the conclusion that he has been "voluntarily forced."

The explanation of the decision to ban the SDA and the HDZ confirms that it was not just a tactical move. Among the reasons that the public prosecutor gave as evidence that the SDA, HDZ, and the SDS had to be banned because their activities were contrary to the law were: "disregard of duties binding by interparty agreements, instigating intolerance, hypocrisy, discord and fallacy in mutual relations, which has made it impossible to reach jointly a unitary political program to counter the current inertia in the state organs, which in turn has led to a complete economic and social collapse, and the deterioration in the safety of life and property to the lowest degree."

In brief, the text of the public prosecutor's explanation is an indictment that does not need further clarification, and it will be impossible to annul at a later date.

The court-induced departure of the three ethnic parties from the political scene, and with them the tripartite concept of rule, will create a new situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In practice, the opposition parties will continue their activities, as will the state officials who have been selected by the three banned parties. Such irregular conditions will be changed through elections. There can be no elections while the war is still raging. Since Bosnia-Herzegovina is a country in which everything has always been possible, a new uncertainty follows.

Belgrade Sociologist on Forming of DEPOS

*92BA1160A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 pp 22-23*

[Interview with Dr. Slobodan Inic, sociologist, by Milena Mikic; place and date not given: "Even After Sloba There Will Be Sloba"]

[Text] The honest intelligentsia and that other kind have evolved into independent intellectuals and that other kind. They are more divided by parties and not so much by ideas. Slobodan Inic, a Ph.D. in sociology, is almost the only one who, while defining a critical distance from the government, has taken up the same critical attitude toward the opposition, with which he has tried to have a

political influence during the last two years (Democratic Party [DS]), and then he gave up on politics as a collective act.

He is employed in the Institute for European Studies (according to Seselj, it heads the list of those to be shut down), but the newspaper, a platform not subject to parties, is where he is active. He has written distinguished books: *Govorite li politicki?* (*Do You Speak Politics?*), *Demokratija aplauza* (*Democracy Applause*), *Teskoće socijalizma* (*Difficulties of Socialism*), and *KP danas* (*The CP [Communist Party] Today*).

Inic tells this story from the time when he was politically active: "I was at the Founding Assembly of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS] for B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina]. I will never forget that atmosphere. When Jovan Raskovic entered the hall, he received the same cheers and applause that Tito once did. I remarked to him: 'This, Jovo, is just like in the time of Comrade Tito.' And I heard some incredible things there that I was sure would bring us into conflict one day. The Muslims who had come to offer congratulations on the establishment of the Serbian party were provocative. Tunjo Filipovic, I remember, said: 'I congratulate you, brother Serbs, calling you by a name you have never dared to call yourselves!'

"It is simply incredible how many intelligent people have assented to nationalistic reasoning, how many of them have been caught up by the hysteria, how many have made their contribution and behaved like absolute fools. When you compare the political involvement of certain prestigious, intelligent, and influential people without which Serbian culture and science cannot be imagined, I would say that they are beneath their work. Let us only take Slobodan Selenic. From that point of view, he is in conflict with his own work."

[Mikic] You have written that there are no great differences between the opposition and the administration. Does all this mutual aggression and militancy necessarily follow because the differences are small (Freud)?

[Inic] The administration, here there is no dispute—is directly responsible for the disaster in every respect. But this administration is specific in one sense: that its program has actually been the program of the opposition from the time of the one-party system up to the present day, by way of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [SANU], No. 7 Francuska Street, and now the Serbian Orthodox Church and the people from the inner circle of DEPOS [Democratic Movement of Serbia]. That is why I say there is no difference between them. This is evident in their specific attitude. People behave so aggressively and militantly toward one another, whether they are in the administration or in the opposition, because they do not differ that much. We are not in conflict with other nationalities, we are in conflict with ourselves.

[Mikic] You are thinking of a conflict of ideas?

[Inic] A person who is intolerant in ethnic matters must be intolerant in social and political matters as well. They are in conflict because they have only one idea: that a community of the Yugoslav nationalities is possible and that Belgrade should have a decisive influence on its arrangement. That is the responsibility that resides here for the course of events. The opposition and the administration are in a relationship of who is going to get whom, which is death to the political life of both of them.

[Mikic] What happens when the charge is released?

[Inic] The impression is created in people's minds that a change of the administration in Serbia, or, better put, the transition from one system to another, does not seem to people like the end of the world, which is very important in societies like Serbian society, because it is not a question here of any kind of communism, but of collectivism. What people are defending today is not communism, but collectivism, a system that feeds them, clothes them, and educates them.... This is something the anti-communists do not understand, this approach of the opposition as a moral factor to set itself up as a moral force to help the government. And that is why it has not succeeded. When I say "help," I am referring to the attempt to assure the administration that there would be no revanchism, revenge, conflict between individuals if there should be a change of administration. That is, what I call the knockout genre. This is all the more important so that the world might understand where Serbia is going. But the oppositionists have not had a feel for this.

[Mikic] Because of inexperience, the "bad" communist past, personal animosities toward Milosevic, or their own advancement...?

[Inic] For all those reasons and others. That way they have helped the administration to hold on, which is paradoxical. Just as many people were willing to enter into a conflict with the Croats, Muslims, and Slovenes, so within their own people they were not ready to play the role of a factor normalizing the situation in a possible change of administration....

[Mikic] In that way, they contributed to the threat of civil war in Serbia.

[Inic] The present opposition, the main and most important one, is a factor favoring a possible civil war in Serbia, although Milosevic and his administration are not lagging behind either. So, with some peoples both the administration and the opposition are tragic for the people themselves. But I am not certain that segments of the people have not also made their contribution from the standpoint of the new political attitude. Certain achievements of civilization, such as the multiparty system, for example, are in our case becoming generators of conflicts—both ethnic conflicts with other nationalities and sociopolitical conflicts within our own nationality. And to its detriment. My mistake was in believing that a free political life would bring about a more economically efficient economy, a freer life from the sense of art, ideas, and in other aspects. That did not

happen. And one particular thing did not happen that a free political life makes possible—integration of the community. With that kind of life we have entered into ethnic, political, and social discords. In that system, reality did not correspond to democracy, but what are we to say now, when democracy does not correspond to reality?

[Mikic] Up to now, the opposition has been accusing Milosevic of having taken away its platform, but today it is accusing him of poor execution of those ideas, without questioning them.

[Inic] I have neither the words nor the strength to state once again, for the umpteenth time, that Milosevic and that National-Socialist gang are directly to blame for the tragedy of the Serbian and other peoples. However, I personally am pained by the fact that the opposition has sullied its own name. My greatest reproaches of the leaders is that they consented to the almost active creation of the basis for promotion of a nationalism centered on Serbian expansionism and predisposed to ethnic conflicts and conflicts with other nationalities. But because I have known all these people for some 10 or even 25 years, on reflection there is no reason to be surprised: Unfortunately, they could not have done otherwise. After all, they prepared this long ago, they subsisted intellectually on that content, they made their promotional efforts, and they were the "conscience" of the Serbian people. In a spiritual sense, the opposition has been building all the essential contents of the military conflict with the other Yugoslav nationalities—borders, percentages, concepts of resettlement, ideas that Yugoslavia was unnecessary.... And when you do not need Yugoslavia, then you have only one consequence: either an expanded Serbia or an expanded Croatia. And what are you going to do with the Muslims? And that is how it started....

[Mikic] Why did you leave the Democratic Party?

[Inic] That is why. I was aware of the consequences for the other nationalities as well, but most of all for the Serbian people. I knew that when the Serbian question was raised as it was done by Milosevic and the Serbian opposition—and they did it in the same way—that all the other nationalities would rise up against us. And I never had any illusions that they would not respond with bloodshed.

[Mikic] The opposition in Serbia is constantly referring to the monarchy, like a trump card it pulls from its sleeve. This applies to those in your former party—the Democrats. Do you consider the return of Karadjordjevic a possible outcome of this disaster?

[Inic] First of all, the worst thing is that the opposition consented to play the same role as the administration, and in particular to be a factor favoring the possibility of civil war in Serbia. It will put the issue of responsibility for everything that has happened without wanting to see that it itself was a sponsor. And that is the most terrible thing: that the other side sees this as an occasion to take

a leap, without seeing all the consequences that will follow. The abnormality of the relation between the opposition and the government is also based on the fact that they are fighting—and that is where their entire struggle is concentrated—over the issue of changing the form of government, i.e., either a republic or a monarchy, without either of them fighting for what is the true content—how to arrive at a democratic Serbia. Only that approach can relativize the conflicts.

As far as I am concerned, I think that the most important thing is to make Serbia a democratic country, and it makes absolutely no difference whether it will be a republic or a monarchy. What more can I say as someone who opposes the monarchy and the Karadjordjevic family in principle? Just as it is a mistake to believe that one man is to blame for everything, and I think that all the waters of Serbia cannot cleanse him—it is equally a mistake to believe that another man, if he comes to power, will radically alter the situation.

[Mikic] How do you see the newly established DEPOS, which declares itself to be a nonparty group to put pressure on the present administration?

[Inic] A fascinating group of people, one which it is fun to analyze. A bit of "statistics": At least three of these men have been the spice in every stew of Serbian expansionism; four of them shared one party; better put, they split it up, with two of them going to London to invite Aleksandar to visit Belgrade. At least five have unreservedly supported Milosevic, and are now making the loudest demand for him to step down. Even today, they think that Milosevic, as we have heard the spokesperson say, is taking good initial steps, is setting his objectives wonderfully, but he overlooks the next steps, he makes mistakes.... It is extremely amoral that the people in DEPOS are the creators, the actual drafters, of the Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, of the borders, of the percentages, of the resettlement, and now in the first sentence of their proclamation to the public, they are in a new role, but it is actually the old on—because they are constantly playing the same role and have a single policy—they say that they are concerned about the fate of the Serbian people! The problem of politics with the Serbs has always been the problem of the moral behavior of their leaders and those around them, and if we are talking about this group of people, then that is the best definition which I can think of at this moment.

[Mikic] You mean to say that DEPOS is a way of "washing their hands" of Milosevic at a time when things are going badly for him?

[Inic] DEPOS and in general the group of members of the academy—but for me the academy is much more than that group, and I mean that in the good sense—are seeking an emergency situation in the name of democracy, while Milosevic is bringing about an emergency situation in a democratic manner, through elections! I do not know what is worse! DEPOS truly has arisen as a way

of washing their hands of Milosevic, and then again that group of people who were the ideological authors of that policy would be Serbia's savior and would play the role of leaders in the country's political life, just as it has disastrously done up to now. DEPOS suspends multi-party life in Serbia, such as it has been. It claims the right to extricate certain leaders which suit it in political life and in this way to cause a schism in the parties, not allowing them to get stronger, to develop naturally, to pass between Scylla and Charybdis. The people from DEPOS want to play the role of an umbrella, and as the wise men of the Serbian people they will decide what is right and what is not, what is completely disastrous by way of consequences. They are a kind of national committee or branch office for Aleksandar in Belgrade.

[Mikic] If under the pressure of the demands Milosevic were now to give up power, do you think that the changeover could be made peacefully?

[Inic] The whole problem with Milosevic lies in the tragedy of the fact that he ever came to power at all. I knew that he would go off into radicalism, communist radicalism to be sure, and that he was never for that position nor for that office. The whole problem is that the people liked his radicalism, but perhaps he did not know how to make political use of what the people liked. Today, I see the demand for Milosevic's resignation as a confirmation of the fact that he never should have come to power, and especially that group of people around him. The problem is that the Serbs are continuing to vote for Milosevic. Accordingly, for me Milosevic is a much bigger problem than Milosevic himself. The other thing is whether there exists an alternative policy to his. Looking at the opposition, but also at the church or the academy, that is, on those institutions that represent the highest level of the spirit in our people, I do not see a future anti-Milosevic policy except one with the sole content: Milosevic is dead, long live the king! And that is the most tragic thing today in the entire possibility of Milosevic's departure. So, he is only the tip of the iceberg. After him, there remains the thick block of ice. Even after Sloba there is Sloba.

[Mikic] How, then, is he to go?

[Inic] It is all the more difficult to believe that he will realize where he has led the Serbian people because I do not see that the Serbian people has realized where it has gotten to, and especially because the Serbs are continuing to declare support for Milosevic. Milosevic will never step down, at least as I understand it, without a great trouble for himself individually. This then entitles the other side to make a move even now and to make allusions to revolutionary right. Some people seriously think that this is the only way of getting rid of him. The consequences of that approach may be the most dangerous of all. So, do we really want to kill one another in order to change things in such manner that nothing would change? It is much the same as in interethnic

conflicts; we have entered into them, and things have not changed, on the contrary, they are still worse than they were.

I see Milosevic's departure in a more complicated way. He is neither aware of the consequences of that departure, nor are those who supported him until yesterday aware of those consequences. I would like it if Milosevic should leave and along with him those who actually created the policy which he took over, of which he was only the executor, and whom those creators want to replace as the executor. If there is someone who has the least right to demand Slobodan Milosevic's resignation and departure, then it is that group.

Prospects of SPS After 'Rift' Considered

92BA1159B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 p 21

[Article by Petar Ignja: "Power Has Been Seized"]

[Text] *The SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] after the "rift"; the Socialist Party has neither the strength nor the courage to go before the public and announce what has been happening in Serbia's political life for the last year and a half, who pulled the strings, and who followed them.... In any case, new elections should be expected by the end of the year.*

At the end of May, about 12 SPS deputies sent a letter to this party's Main Committee, in which they announced the "above-mentioned title" that they would leave this party's comradely ranks, in which they were all still firmly united, before the elections (while the candidates for the new deputies' salaries, worth six of the salaries of their loyal voters, were not yet known).

At first, the news had an almost sensational effect. The newspapers wrote about a rift in the SPS, about the liberal socialists' resolute step in breaking with the hard core of the ruling party, and optimists were indicating that the outcome of this conflict would be known very soon, as early as Friday—and then, just a few days after the alleged sensation, the matter settled down. Our attempt to learn something more about this ruse proved fruitless. Several people from the SPS leadership were not free to talk for the newspapers, Vladimir Stambuk told our reporter (by telephone) that there was no rift whatsoever in the party, and that it had been agreed that until everything was cleared up, there would be no separate public statements. There would be an announcement.

We will await the announcement. We are crazy about announcements.

Several days later, Gadzin Han's socialists, after holding a historic meeting, sent a letter to the SPS Executive Committee and to President Milosevic, demanding that this party's congress be held quickly.

An attentive reader could notice—why is the demand for a party congress being sent to the head of state?—but people in Gazdin Han, apparently, also know who is the boss in Serbia.

The Gadzin Han socialists, when the alleged rebellion by a group of socialist deputies had subsided, decided to ruin both Borisav Jovic, and Petar Skundric, and Rados Smiljkovic, and Vladimir Stambuk, and Slobodan Unkovic... whose positions had contributed to the occurrence of the conflict within the SPS. I was not able to verify this, but one can at least conclude intelligently that the socialists of Gadzin Han are concerned only by the confrontation in the SPS, and that the situation in the state is of less interest to them, and that is why they are giving full support to Milosevic and Bozovic, who did not contribute to the confrontation.

Facing the Truth

When I asked Rados Smiljkovic for an interview, he did not mention any sort of agreement to keep quiet, and we had a nice talk.

He said that the SPS won the elections, but the power had gone into the hands of the republic president and prime minister, and no matter how much the ruling party has been responsible for the situation in the country, those to whom the power belongs according to the Constitution cannot be excused from responsibility.

"In the West, this situation is cleaner. The party that wins the elections entrusts the key roles in the government to people in the party's top leadership, and when the government is not any good the party is not any good either, and they both fall, like ripe pears. Our system is such that I, for instance, who am in the top leadership of the SPS, had never heard of most of the ministers in today's government."

Our interlocutor meant that those who created the government should themselves share all the praise and all the criticisms coming at its expense. Especially the praise....

Insisting stubbornly on the primary responsibility of the party in power for bad government in Serbia—because that party is obligated to replace them, since it has a majority in the Assembly—and saying so to the face of the only person who agreed to talk to reporters, is not decent, especially since Dr. Rados Smiljkovic is not the boss either in Serbia or in the party (as those in Gadzin Han determined for themselves). Nevertheless, several details from the interview, communicated indirectly, give us the right to sense how the power today in Serbia

has been seized from both the ruling party and the Assembly, and indeed, from the voters. The Socialist Party has neither the strength nor the courage to go before the public and announce everything that has happened in Serbia's political life during the past year and a half, who pulled the strings, and who followed them, being careful not to slip, fall headlong, and break their neck.

A party in power that has neither the strength nor the courage to face the simple truth and openly say that it no longer intends to stand behind the worst government in the world can freely be told that it no longer has any right to cite the electoral results of a year and a half ago. When the Socialists went into the elections, on one bright and sunny day, and on a peaceful day, the average daily wage was not spent on a loaf of bread and a liter of milk.

And no matter how skeptical one is toward the group of deputies who first decided to separate from the Socialist Party without question, and then put a finger on their own lips, one cannot ignore their idea of aiming at a party congress immediately—and may the better man win.

At Least a Bearable Life

That is what concerns the SPS. As far as the citizens of Serbia are concerned, they are worried about rifts and reconciliations in the ruling party; they need a government that will at least make a bearable life possible for them, and not a government that has dressed them in mourning. Naturally, this is a question of new elections, and no matter how much lawyers have been pointing out that according to the Serbian constitution elections are only once every four years, it seems that elections should be held as soon as possible, so that the voters will not die in two and a half years.

At this time we can inform our readers, on the basis of reliable sources, that the SPS leadership no longer has any dilemmas about new elections. They are possible, necessary, and essential—by the end of the year at the latest. They have both Assembly and presidential elections in mind.

What will happen as early as tomorrow, whether the principal culprits behind both the political and economic catastrophes will wait for new elections or leave earlier, is a matter for weather forecasts, and not for journalism. The main thing—and it is not so little—is that there will be new elections, probably as early as the fall, and until then the political parties could get serious and make better preparations for the elections, so that we do not throw other kittens in the water as well.

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